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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the following research questions: 
1. How is the process of corporate tax compliance changing for large groups 
of companies? 
2. How is this process being managed by the Inland Revenue? 
The empirical evidence consists of 33 interviews conducted in 2002-04 with IR 
officials; tax directors and tax managers of large corporates; and tax partners from a 
Big 4 accounting firm. This thesis also draws upon archival data including state 
papers and documentary data from the IR. 
Theoretically this thesis draws from the new public management, administration, and 
the tax compliance literatures. However I argue that an approach grounded purely in 
these literatures does not adequately explain the changing tax compliance 
environment for large groups. Therefore I utilise other literatures which draw on 
Foucault's work on multiple expertise constructing subjects engaging with 
disciplinary knowledge and power, to assist in filling this gap. 
Against a backdrop where new organisational structures and processes are shifting a 
once bureaucratic Inland Revenue to a more strategic and marketing-based 
organisation, the corporate tax compliance process for large corporates has changed. 
Where the process was previously a long (in terms of time scale), formal and distant 
relationship with the IR carried out principally in writing, it has, while retaining 
aspects of this past, shifted towards being a mixture of the written and the oral, 
generating a more inclusive dialogue with the taxpayer, frequently in the form of 
meetings based on targeted yet potentially open-ended questioning. This has opened 
up what is described here as a new kind of `truth game', which is less one based on 
inquisitorial practices but more based on examination techniques, played by 
knowledge experts: the IR official and the corporate taxpayer. 
Drawing on a governmentality framework as articulated by Foucault and his latter 
works, I argue that the nature of the corporate tax compliance game resembles a truth 
game between two kinds of subject generated in this transdisciplinary world: the new 
shape tax official and the visible customer (the taxpayer). The IR official - the HM 
Inspector of Taxes, has been remoulded from one type of knowledge expert to 
another, which is a3 dimensional transdisciplinary T shaped tax official. This is a tax 
official who both has the detailed deep technical knowledge as a knowledge expert 
but also has to relate, in a broader sense, to the new way of operating in a strategic 
and marketing organisation. The emergence of the corporate taxpayer as a visible 
customer has changed the process of corporate tax compliance for large corporates 
whereby they exercise certain power in the relationship by virtue of this visibility. 
This research tracks a new kind of interaction of the interplay between 
subjectivization and objectivization which seems to have become established and 
develops a theoretically informed way of looking at emergent governmental and more 
wide ranging forms of application. 
xi 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
1.1 The Research Issues and Questions 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the research questions addressed in 
this thesis and to outline the main arguments that the thesis then utilises to 
address those questions. The thesis seeks to address the following two main 
research questions: 
1. How is the process of corporate tax compliance changing for large 
groups of companies? 
2. How is this process being managed by the Inland Revenue? 
To address these questions, the thesis examines the corporate tax compliance 
processes of the United Kingdom national tax gathering body, the Inland 
Revenue (IR)1, and the ways in which large corporate entities address and 
respond to them. The question being addressed is not: "How do large 
corporates comply with the tax legislation? " but rather there is an attempt to 
develop a more inclusive and interactive focus on the whole field of practice of 
corporate tax compliance inside and across the IR and the large corporates and 
between these parties. The `process' as conceived here therefore has multiple 
aspects. 
' From April 2004 IR and HM Customs & Excise were merged to form HM Revenue & 
Customs (Cm 6163). 
I 
First it is a process with a historical or `diachronic' dimension, which has to be 
understood in its historical and cultural context, which includes the internal 
evolution of the IR as part of the UK governmental apparatus and as an entity 
in its own right. This evolution includes not only internal reorganizations, 
culminating most recently (though outside the terms of my fieldwork) in the 
merging of the IR with Customs and Excise to form Her Majesty's Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC), but also the increasing incorporation across UK 
government of what has been called the New Public Management (NPM) as a 
means of revitalising or moving beyond old-style bureaucracy. 
Second it is a process with a here and now or `synchronic' dimension. This 
includes the doing or enacting of the process in `real time', involving such 
practical and material aspects as paying the agreed amount of tax at the right 
time, whatever is defined as the agreed amount of tax, or the mechanics of the 
way that the process of compliance operates or how these issues interrelate. It 
also includes the way in which doing or enacting the process is lived and 
experienced by its participants, who are for the most part highly qualified, 
skilled and reflective professionals, on both sides of the fence. The process in 
this respect is something that gets achieved through a mix of writing (including 
calculating), talking and reflecting, as the means by which these expert 
professionals engage with regulations, forms, requests for information and 
responses to those requests. One interesting development in this part of the 
lived process that emerged during the period of my PhD research was a shift 
from a predominantly writing-focussed approach to obtaining information (via 
2 
forms, follow-up letters and written responses to these) towards an approach 
which while retaining a strong writing focus component, made much more use 
of oral exchange, in question and answer sessions involving IR officials and 
taxpaying entities and their advisors. 
The object of the analysis undertaken here is therefore this process taken as a 
whole, and with a particular focus on the way changes within the past decade 
have played out and arguably transformed the nature of the process of 
corporate tax compliance in significant ways, whose effects can be expected to 
have reverberations as the compliance process evolves in future. Corporate tax 
is a significant feature of the tax-raising activities of any national tax authority. 
It is also a process which has had to evolve because of the growing economic 
power of major transnational corporations and their ability to engage in tax 
avoidance, whether on a global scale or by exploiting differences within the 
EU between national tax regimes and EU practice. Revenue authorities are 
therefore not in a position simply to impose tax demands and expect them to be 
met. There is necessarily a game involving negotiation and the seeking of 
mutually optimal outcomes. Precisely because of the globalisation of tax 
activity and the attendant evolution in approaches and attitudes, corporate tax 
has become a more high profile and strategic issue for many large corporates, 
causing them to seek to manage their taxation affairs more actively than 
previously, when the focus was largely on compliance with national-level 
legislation. 
2 While the merger of IR and HM Customs & Excise to form HMRC is important and some 
organisational change has occurred, it is unlikely to have any material effects on the underlying 
relationship between the taxing authority and large corporates in the context of Corporation 
Tax. 
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This thesis theorises the impact of these changes and the tensions arising from 
securing corporate tax compliance in a changing environment within both the 
IR and the corporates. One focus is on the IR becoming a strategic and 
managerial organisation (Hoskin, Lamb and Tuck, 2001 b) and large corporates 
changing how their tax affairs are managed by their in-house tax departments3 
(KPMG, 2006; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000b), with a particular interest, 
pursued via fieldwork research, in the everyday practices and discourses 
utilised by the IR to achieve their objectives of compliance and the potential 
implications thereof. The second focus is on the knowledge expertise inside the 
taxpaying entities, and within the inter-relations between the IR and the 
taxpayer. 
I have obtained accounts of practice via discourse including seeing the new 
role of discourse (e. g. in the different interplay of writing and talking). A key 
aspect of this thesis is the high level access obtained to key players within the 
IR and the corporates. Evidence has been obtained from semi-structured 
interviews with informants involved in the process. These informants from 
within the IR include those who have initiated, directed and led the process; 
those who have implemented the process; those who are significant players in 
the process and those who have the ability to alter future processes. This has 
enabled significant insights to be obtained into the process from different 
perspectives. In addition my previous experience as a senior tax manager in 
London with Coopers & Lybrand, a predecessor firm of 
3 Porter, (1999a: 50) defines an in-house tax department as "a unit of at least one staff member 
who is employed full-time within [the] organisation on tax matters". 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers, specialising in corporate and international tax has 
helped me in developing a longitudinal research approach. I had significant 
experience of dealing with the IR as a tax advisor on behalf of large corporates 
and advising those large corporates on tax planning opportunities in the late 
1980s and early 1990s and this has allowed me to develop a personally 
informed perspective on the corporate tax compliance process over recent time, 
which I have drawn upon to supplement the archival and interview data I have 
collected in the course of my doctoral research. Combining this personal 
experience and archival set of understandings with extensive in depth 
interviews with tax officials, tax directors and tax managers of in-house tax 
departments and tax advisors undertaken during the period 2002 to 2004 in 
order to understand the current environment, has enabled valuable and 
significant insights into the process to be obtained. I acknowledge that there are 
potential weaknesses in coming to the research from being an insider. This, I 
would suggest, was eliminated by the significant period which has passed since 
I left the tax advising profession and my more recent experience working on 
the CRAKA4 research project with Professor Keith Hoskin and Dr. Margaret 
Lamb, which enabled me to look more holistically at research problems from 
an academic viewpoint which enabled me to complement my former way of 
seeing with a more academic research perspective. 
During the thirteen years since I left the profession there has been a 
considerable change in the business environment, due to, amongst other things, 
the development of electronic communications technology and further 
4 Centre for Research in Accounting Knowledge and Accountability, Warwick Business 
School. 
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`globalisation' of corporates. Large corporates are responding to globalisation 
and have gone through their own transformation. As a result of the separation 
of the ownership and managerial control of a company and the increase in 
administrative practices and administrative personnel, companies have been 
able to expand into international groups (Chandler, 1977). This has been 
evidenced by the movement from a system in the UK dominated by family 
capitalism to one which increasingly fits into Chandler's category of 
managerial capitalism (Chandler, 1997). The professional manager has 
replaced the owner and the job of dealing with corporate tax compliance has 
been delegated to the corporate tax manager. Due to the changing regulatory 
and globalisation environment, such managers are having to operate in a new 
world where the traditional practices of compliance do not suffice and a new 
way of interacting with the IR has to be learnt. 
The IR also has been in the process of considerable change (Cm 6225: 5; 
Montagu, 1999). Partly in response to NPM and partly in response to the 
change in complexity of the compliance process, the IR is changing the 
regulation process from one of direct bureaucratic control to another more 
inclusive type of working in partnership and in dialogue with the corporates. It 
is becoming an outward facing managerial organisation where focusing on 
marketing and strategy is an important part of managing the inward facing 
process of tax collection. It is utilising techniques from the business world such 
as market segmentation. However bureaucratic processes have not been 
abandoned. They are embedded in these new changing processes in a process 
that itself now takes place in a globalised context. 
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Part of the motivation for this research is that the focus on the IR as a research 
site is relatively news and the research will show a key site/ vehicle for NPM 
practices. Tomkins et at. (2001) have highlighted the under-researched area of 
tax management and identify external trends and researchable areas which 
impact on and may be of value to the management of tax administrations. They 
identify two different ways of posing research questions standpoints: firstly to 
question the effect of the changing political, economic, social and 
technological environments and the consequential implications for taxation; 
and secondly to compare the operations of different tax administrations and 
understand why they differ. This constructs gaps or silences in the research 
agenda such as that identified by Preston6: - 
"Within the accounting literature the relationship between powers and 
practices of the Inland Revenue and the practice of accounting is 
largely ignored" (Preston, 1989: 390). 
Lamb (2001: 273) has noted that "taxation is a process of regulation (... ) that 
relies on accounting practice to provide regulative techniques". An aspiration 
of this thesis is to give an empirical and theoretical contribution to our 
understanding of the IR and how regulation of the tax compliance process is 
governed by discourse and practice. 
The empirical contribution is a greater understanding of how a tax 
administration functions in the NPM era, in which the public sector has 
acquired private sector characteristics (Hood, 1995; Brunsson and Sahlin- 
5There are opportunities for further work (Lamb, 2005: 70). 
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Andersson, 2000). The core of NPM is to remove or reduce the traditional 
distinction between public sector bodies and private sector entities and to shift 
"the emphasis from process accountability towards a greater element of 
accountability in terms of results" (Hood, 1995: 94). A key feature of NPM 
would therefore seem to be greater accountability. The IR is abandoning or 
supplementing traditional bureaucratic practices and values by grafting on a 
range of new more business-minoring practices and discourses (e. g. in the 
strategic and marketing areas) and is being very clearly remade as a more 
managerial and business-like entity (e. g. Hoskin, Lamb and Tuck, 2001a, 
2001 b). It is also arguably recontextualising traditional bureaucratic practice so 
that doing `the same' work as before does not necessarily carry the same 
significance and importance. The theoretical contribution is a greater 
understanding of how NPM is crossing boundaries between business and 
public sector management; in other words how governance and government is 
taking place in a strategic and managerial albeit public sector organisation. 
The relationship between large corporates (defined in Section 1.3) and the IR is 
unlike the relationship the IR has with employees, small businesses and 
individuals with simple tax affairs. This is because there has always been a 
two way pattern of practices of government between large corporates and the 
IR. Examples of these practices are: - 
" Selective non-disclosure 
The law requires full disclosure of transactions to the IR. However 
Corporates can engage in selective non disclosure, for example by not 
6 Although this quote of Preston is dated, it still has significance now. 
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providing all the information at the beginning of an enquiry or only 
providing information which is specifically asked for by the IR (see 
McBarnet, 1991). 
" Negotiation 
Large corporates engage in complex transactions which may not be 
covered by tax law; there may be no provision for the particular 
circumstances or the law may be unclear on a particular issue. 
Negotiation has to take place between the IR and the large corporates 
over an appropriate tax treatment. The ultimate sanction is for the 
Courts to decide the appropriate treatment, but few disputes reach that 
stage; the vast majority are settled via negotiation between the IR and 
the large corporate taxpayer and these negotiations inevitably involve 
an element of `horse trading'. 
" Ability to move offshore 
Large corporates frequently have many overseas subsidiaries and a 
complex group structure. This allows them to move operations or 
companies controlling these operations outside the UK, and therefore 
out of the jurisdiction of the UK Government and the IR if they choose 
to do so. 
" Access to professional advice and expertise. 
By virtue of their size large corporates have the resources to be able to 
employ specialists who have detailed knowledge of a specific area of 
tax legislation and experience in dealing with the IR. 
" Ability to influence legislation 
9 
Large corporates employ significant numbers of employees and control 
significant economic resources. Therefore they are able to lobby 
government for changes in tax legislation. 
One consequence of government agencies becoming outward facing is an 
increasing importance and use of discourses of marketing and strategy. In the 
case of the IR, these new practices of government have developed and altered 
the relationship between the tax authority and taxpayer. Previously no robust 
theorising on these practices has been undertaken. I consider an appropriate 
approach is to utilise a Foucauldian framework based on a governmentality and 
disciplinarity approach. A number of studies have utilised this approach. Some 
have explored governmentality in a historical context (Neu, 2000; Bush and 
Maltby, 2004) and in contemporary financial services (Roberts et al., 2006; 
Hodgson, 2002). Government in this sense involves the attempt to shape 
human conduct via law, rules and rational (including calculative) procedures. 
By focusing on the discourse and practices that enable government to operate, 
this allows different insights into what after Foucault we may call the "truth 
game" (i. e. this instance of tax). This is not as Foucault puts it "the discovery 
of true things" (Florence/Foucault7,1994: 315) but rather the constitution of a 
game with true/ false, correct/ incorrect statements and interpretations carried 
on via certain practices including discursive practices, and taking place in a 
domain of governmentality. A fuller discussion of the theoretical approach will 
be undertaken in section 1.5 below. 
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1.2 The IR: past and present 
In this section I first discuss the IR as a whole organisation as a backdrop 
before looking at the department of the IR, namely the Large Business Office 
(LBO) which deals with large corporates. For the purposes of this research, the 
IR's heritage can be separated into two periods: the old regime dominated by 
bureaucracy and the new regime influenced by NPM. 
Until April 2004 there were two National tax gathering bodies in the UK; the 
IR dealing with direct tax including income taxes and corporate taxes; and HM 
Customs and Excise (C&E) dealing with indirect taxes such as VAT. This was 
an uncommon arrangement as the majority of tax jurisdictions have one entity 
dealing with both direct and indirect taxes (Cm 6163), for example Canada 
Revenue and Customs and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the US. 
Given that the vast majority of the fieldwork was undertaken in the period prior 
to April 2004, this thesis limits itself to that period when the IR was a separate 
department of UK central government. The Minister of State who was 
responsible for the IR was the Paymaster General in the Treasury office. The 
activities of the IR as shown in the Annual report for the year ended 31 March 
2003 include: 
" "collecting income tax, corporation tax, capital gains tax, petroleum 
revenue tax, inheritance tax, stamp duty and National Insurance 
Contributions; 
" administering Working Families' Tax Credits and Disabled Person's 
Tax Credits and preparing for New Tax Credits; 
' It is now acknowledged that Foucault under the pseudonym of Maurice Florence wrote an 
entry on Michel Foucault in the Dictionnaire des philosophes, edited by Denis Huisman 
(Presses Universitaires de France, 1984) towards the end of his life (Gutting, 1994: viii). 
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" providing valuation services for rating, Council Tax, Inland Revenue 
and other public sector purposes; 
" providing policy advice to Ministers in all the above areas; 
" administering Oil and Gas Royalties and enforcing the National 
Minimum Wage on behalf of the Department of Trade and Industry; 
" collecting student loan repayments" (Cm 6050: 39). 
These activities have changed since the Board of the IR was established as a 
distinct department of the UK Government in 18498. Since the 19"' century the 
IR has had operational responsibility in practice for collecting tax in 
accordance with legislation passed by Parliament (Lamb, 2002). However the 
scope of the IR's activities has widened in that, as well as collecting tax, the IR 
is now responsible for paying out tax credits. In common with other 
government departments the IR was a classic bureaucratic organisation. 
Bureaucracy comes with structures of administration. Weber regarded 
bureaucratic management as constituting three areas; official duties, authority 
governed by rules, and the duties carried out by qualified employees (Weber, 
1947: 196). I discuss the notion of bureaucracy in the context of the 
development of the IR further in Section 5.3. 
Within the Civil Service the emergence of NPM was represented by 
"management by accounting" in that accounting became a key aspect to the 
organisation and was a key factor and constituent of any proposed and actual 
changes (McSweeney, 1994). The reforms introduced were intended to address 
the criticisms of the old system: inputs were not related to activities or outputs 
and accounting was carried out on a receipts and payments basis. The 
accounting reforms introduced included the Financial Management Initiative 
(Cmnd. 8616), the Fulton Committee (Cmnd. 3638) and the Next Steps 
12 
Initiative (HC 496)9 and concentrated on changing the scope and reach of 
accounting in order to improve the management of the public sector 
(McSweeney, 1994 : 263). 
The bureaucratic stage of the IR is the inward facing IR. This approach can be 
summarised in a two by two model as detailed below: 
Inward facing 
I 
Operational 
4.4 
i5l 
r3 
Management 
Ä 
Figure 1: The "two bog" entity 
" Inward facing operational practices 
There is an increased emphasis on the 3 `E's (economy, efficiency, 
effectiveness' 0) as a result of the implementation of the new Resource 
Accounting and Budgeting system introduced into Government 
° www. inlandrevenue. pov. uk/history/taxhis2. htm seen 11.4.03 
The details of these initiatives are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
10 Where efficiency is the difference between actual input and actual output; economy is the 
difference between actual input and planned input and effectiveness is the difference between 
actual output and planned output. Effectiveness can be split into two forms: cost-effectiveness; 
and outcome effectiveness where a cost effectiveness delivers its outcome objectives (Bailey, 
2004). 
13 
departments. The Public Finance literature introduces a fourth 
dimension "equity" which relates to the distribution of costs and 
benefits of public finance (Bailey, 2004). This has resulted in more 
autonomous activity as employees are subjected to targets and 
performance indicators. 
" Inward facing management discourse 
Management is now answerable for achieving the targets that articulate 
and define proper (i. e 3 `E's) inward facing activity. They are in that 
process increasingly being judged on what they say as well as what they 
do. They have to talk the `right' talk, as well as walk the right walk. 
Thus the corporate tax compliance process must be viewed against a 
background of a bureaucratic organisation which itself is changing as a 
consequence of NPM. The changes to the IR have not been just limited to the 
range of its activities being expanded. In addition the new approach has been 
demonstrated by a wider appreciation of managerial activities such as strategic 
policy making; reconceptualising the taxpayer as a customer; new IT 
approaches; the use of performance targets and the introduction of the 
Resource Accounting and Budgeting system. In the course of the CRAKA 
project we developed a four by four matrix (Hoskin, Lamb and Tuck, 2001b: 2). 
We suggested that the IR has moved from being a "two box" entity to a "four 
box" entity which we refer to as the IR `boxology' (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: "The Inland Revenue `boxology"' 
Source: Table I Hoskin, Lamb and Tuck (2001b) 
The inward and outward facing IR is one that incorporates a new-style of 
strategic practices allied to a now integral marketing discourse. 
0 Outward facing strategic practices 
The IR is refining its role with central government. It is in the vanguard 
of UK Government policy. The role of IR is to be part of the wider 
"social agenda" as articulated by the Labour Government (Martin, 
2002). One impact of this is that the variety of activities of IR have 
increased from the mere collection of tax as described above. 
0 Outward facing marketing discourse 
The IR has introduced a customer service orientation. This development 
is an important part of a number of changing practices which are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. There I examine the customer 
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discourse adopted by the IR in the context of the wider body of 
taxpayers and in particular the large corporate taxpayer. 
All of these factors have caused significant changes to the way in which the IR 
deals with large corporate taxpayers and the relationships it has with them. Part 
of this development is structural with the setting up of Specialist Large 
Taxpayer Compliance Units (SLTCU) by tax administrations (International 
Monetary Fund, 2002). These units deal with large corporate taxpayers. In the 
UK the IR set up the Large Business Office (LBO) which deals with 900 of the 
largest UK groups of companies, including banks, building societies and 
insurance companies. There are approximately 850 employees I of the LBO. In 
Chapter 2, I discuss further the reasons for setting up these units and the 
benefits and risks associated with their formation. Another development is the 
change in the practices and discourse used when dealing with large corporates. 
These include different practices; internally within the LBO such as remaking 
employees to be outwardly facing, and externally by the LBO to clients in 
general (customers) and large corporates. 
1.3 The Large Corporate Taxpayer 
The research undertaken has focused on the large corporate taxpayer. Whilst 
there are differences between individuals and companies, the basic tax regime 
of these entities has similarities; likewise with the traditional approach to large 
corporates, and small and medium sized companies. However when corporates 
II http: //www. Inlandrevenue. gov. uk/Iborndex. htm seen 7/04/05 
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become transnational the possibilities for widespread use of tax minimisation 
strategies across jurisdictions become greater. The large corporate will 
establish different relationships with the tax administration of the country in 
which the holding company of the large corporate is situated and tax 
administrations of host governments where subsidiary activities are carried out. 
The great majority of the interviews were carried out with tax directors and tax 
managers of FTSE 100 groups. These groups have complex structures and tax 
affairs and are able to structure their activities to take advantage of tax 
planning opportunities. All but one of the FTSE 100 groups of companies (A5, 
2003) employ tax specialists in an in-house tax department to deal with tax 
compliance and tax planning. These departments will deal with the full range 
of taxes and not just Corporation Tax; in that they will be responsible for the 
all the tax affairs of the group including payroll taxes and VAT. The tax 
departments vary in size from one individual to a team of 3 -10. In the words 
of one interviewee the tax departments are `lean and mean' (interview, A5, 
2003). Some of the tax departments use an outside professional firm to prepare 
the corporation tax computations but they retain responsibility for the 
submission of the tax returns and dealing with queries from the IR. Others will 
prepare the tax computation in-house. The groups use professional tax 
advisors, mainly tax specialists from either the Big 4 firms of accountants or 
major law firms, to advise on planning opportunities, acquisitions, mergers and 
restructuring and to advise on negotiations with the IR in complex areas such 
as transfer pricing 12, `controlled foreign companies13i etc. Some of the groups 
12 Transactions between connected companies have to be carried out at an arm's length basis 
for taxation purposes. Transfer pricing refers to the price at which the transaction is conducted. 
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outside these companies will employ a firm of professional advisors to prepare 
the tax computations and deal with the IR enquiries. It was decided to focus the 
research on those groups which had an in-house tax department for two 
reasons. Firstly, they would have more direct experience of dealing directly 
with the IR rather than through an intermediary and, secondly, some of the IR 
changing practices such as the New Compliance Process ("NCP") have been 
directed at those groups which have an in house tax department. 
The work of these in house departments has changed in recent years (KPMG 
2004; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999). From a previously passive role where 
the tax department were seen primarily as cost managers, the in-house tax 
function now is expected to add value to the rest of the corporate business 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000b) and best practice includes marketing its 
services as knowledgeable and professional experts to other parts of the 
corporate group (Interview C5; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002). Therefore in- 
house tax departments have had to adopt a customer focus approach within 
their organisations. The increased expectations that most large groups have of 
their in-house tax departments are reflected in the enhanced goals and 
objectives which the modem tax director/ manager is expected to achieve in 
order to be considered successful and to gain the rewards associated with 
success. This has a direct impact on the behaviour of the tax departments and 
There is potential for disputes between the IR and the taxpayer on whether the transaction price 
is an arm's length price. 
13 Controlled Foreign Companies legislation is a complex anti avoidance provision which 
under certain conditions taxes in the UK the profits of subsidiaries tax resident outside the UK 
(which would not normally be subject to UK tax). It applies to those subsidiaries which are 
subject to a lower level of taxation than if the same subsidiaries were UK tax resident. 
18 
the relationships they develop with the IR in the course of the tax compliance 
process. 
1.4 Corporate Tax Compliance 
Alm, (1991) defines tax compliance as "reporting all income and paying all 
taxes in accordance with the applicable laws, regulations, and court decisions" 
(Alm, 1991: 577). However corporate tax compliance is a term which has 
different meanings to different individuals. To the tax professional in the 
private sector, such as a partner or employee of a Big 4 firm of accountants, 
one definition of corporate tax compliance is the process of submitting 
corporate tax returns to the IR. To the IR, compliance is an "activity to chase 
people who haven't got it [the tax computation] right" and "customers doing 
what they should do in relation to the rules" (Senior IR official, IR6,2004). 
There are two divergent processes of compliance from a corporate viewpoint. 
Firstly a company's compliance work needs to be performed effectively and at 
minimum cost. Secondly `compliance' includes carrying out tax planning 
activities where the `value added component' is to ensure that the company is 
bearing the lowest (taking all costs into consideration 14) possible tax burden. 
Although these processes apply to the large corporates there are significant 
differences between the process for a single small company and a large 
corporate group due the specific practices as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
14 Costs here include both tax and non tax costs (Scholes et al, 2002) and opportunity costs. 
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From an IR perspective the process of corporate tax compliance has changed 
with the introduction of new rules such as `Pay and File' and Corporate Tax 
Self Assessment (CTSA) in the early 1990s designed to speed up the process of 
assessing and collecting tax due. The IR was previously responsible for 
correctly applying the legislation and calculating the tax liability based on 
information provided by a company in a non standardized way. There were no 
statutory deadlines by which accounts and tax computations had to be 
submitted to the IR. This frequently resulted in long delays and the IR often 
had to resort to listing the information required but which it had not received 
for a hearing before the General Commissioners of Taxes before the 
information would be received from the taxpayer. In addition there was no set 
single time limit for when the tax liability for the year of assessment had to be 
paid. The date by which the tax liability was due was calculated using a 
complex set of rules which was determined by the date of the assessment raised 
by the IR. This assessment by the IR was often based on estimated profits 
chargeable to tax using the prior year's result as a guide. 
In 1993, `Pay and File' was introduced. Under this legislation15 a company had 
to estimate the Corporation Tax liability prior to receiving a formal assessment 
from the IR; make a payment of taxation within a set time frame and file its 
Corporation Tax form in a standard format by a fixed date. However the IR 
was still responsible for agreeing the computation and determining the profits 
chargeable to Corporation Tax. The relevant Inspector of Taxes would have to 
issue a notice of determination based on the profits agreed. This procedure was 
15 Finance Acts (No2)1987 ss 87-97,1990 ss 95-103 and 1993 Sch 14. 
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changed with the introduction of CTSA in 1999. Under this arrangement 
companies (on an individual basis) complete a prescribed format return known 
as a `Company Tax Return' 16, which details their taxable income and their own 
calculation of the tax due. This return has to be submitted within 12 months of 
the end of the accounting period, although the tax due is paid at an earlier date 
either; partly within the year of assessment and partly shortly after the end of 
the year of assessment, or nine months after the year end, depending on the size 
of the taxable profits of the company. The return can be amended up to 12 
months after the filing date by the taxpayer. The IR has 12 months from the 
filing date to give notice that they are intending to commence enquiries (COP 
14,2003). CTSA has therefore introduced new managerial time relations into 
the traditional relationship between the IR and the taxpayer. 
The impact of the change in the Corporation Tax compliance process has given 
rise to changes in the way each party operates. Traditionally enquiries into the 
tax return have been commenced by written correspondence with recourse to 
meetings if an impasse in the negotiations has occurred. There is a move 
towards meetings held before the submission of tax computations and 
commencement of enquiries by letter. With the introduction of CTSA areas of 
concern now have to be disclosed by corporates to the IR rather than waiting 
for the IR to raise questions (e. g. transfer pricing issues). Additionally the IR 
now assume the information shown on the return is correct unless it is found to 
be otherwise following IR enquiries and this has altered the audit methods 
employed in the examination of the tax return. 
16 CT600,2002 Version 1 
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I seek to demonstrate that these changes in practice have impacted on the 
relationship between the parties and that they therefore would seem to alter the 
traditional balance of power between the IR and large corporates, raising new 
opportunities and threats for each party. Correspondingly the IR is engaging in 
a different game with these large corporates. I explain what I mean by these 
new opportunities and threats in the following section. 
1.5 Theoretical Approach 
Complex power relations exist between the IR and the large corporate 
taxpayer. On one level the IR is the regulator of the tax compliance process and 
it has recourse to law and ultimately to the Courts by virtue of its position as a 
regulator. There are strengths and weaknesses on each side. The IR is 
employing new practices such as open questioning and new discourses such as 
the construct of the customer for taxpayer, such that the taxpayer is referred to 
by the IR as a `customer'. However the large corporates have a range of 
practices available to them - `a whole series of specific governmental 
apparatuses', with which they can also deploy and exert power in the 
relationship. For instance there is potentially greater expertise to be employed 
and/ or deployed on the private sector side which potentially results in an 
unstable balance of power between the two sides in the relationship. 
In my opinion the choice of a Foucauldian framework is the best approach to 
link practices and discourse whilst at the same time distinguishing the two 
conceptually. The range of what gets said by the IR on one side of the 
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compliance process and the large corporates on the other side, is different both 
at the surface level and at a deeper level. Discourse is not just what gets said, 
but also involves codes and practices and, just as importantly silences i. e. what 
does not get said. The shared discourse between the IR and large corporates 
cannot be restricted in a binary sense as this shared discourse affects the whole 
taxpaying population. Accepted practices are part of "discourse as produced 
truths" (Kendall & Wickman, 1999: 40), so discourse is a key constituent of 
the `truth game'" as will be discussed more fully later. 
Governmentality as articulated by Foucault, describes the movement from an 
older historical regime, sovereign power, to a modem, disciplinary power. 
Sovereign power as exercised by rulers operates as a top down power whose 
subjects are kept in line via punishment (and often horribly punished). 
Disciplinary power operates from top to bottom and bottom to top, and also 
horizontally. The disciplinary approach has been developed in a number of 
research projects in recent years. Some of these (Anderson-Gough, 2002; Lim, 
2000) have drawn in one way or another on the work of Hoskin and Macve 
(e. g. 1986; 1988) and the theoretical framework expressed by Hoskin (1994) 
and others. In this approach drawn from the ideas articulated by Foucault 
(1977a, 1986), there is a particular focus on how disciplinarity is a two-sided 
term, which designates both a certain mode of knowledge (the knowledge 
`disciplines'), and a mode of conduct (behavioural discipline, including self- 
discipline). The disciplinary model tells us that we need to understand and 
factor in the constitutive role of knowledge in the operation of power relations. 
17 Foucault writing as Maurice Florence, 1994. 
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The power exercised by discipline is not inconsistent with a bureaucratic 
organisation whose power is exerted by administration as Burrell (1988) 
argues. 
"thus whilst we may not live in total institutions, the institutional 
organization of our lives is total... Foucault and Weber are not 
unconnected, for the `bureaucratic mode of domination (Weber 1947) is 
also the `disciplinary' mode of domination (Smart 1983,1985). 
Individuals may move in and out of given organizations but remain, for 
most purposes, within either a form of bureaucratic organization, or at 
least within a life space which is shaped and moulded by its 
confrontation with bureaucracy. For Weber, human life takes place 
within the `iron cage' of bureaucracy. For Foucault, human life is 
existence within an institutional framework of incarceration" 
(Burrell, 1988: 232-3). 
However disciplinarity is not limited to power but incorporates knowledge in a 
further respect. We need to understand the key roles of knowledgeable 
subjects. People at the top of organisations, bureaucracies and outside experts 
are all exponents of disciplinary expertise. A key aspect of this research is 
tracing how these knowledge experts are taking on new kinds of expertise and 
how they interact both inside the bureaucracy and externally as expert 
`subjects'. 
Discipline is only one type of power, albeit a complex power. Disciplinary 
power operates in many directions and deploy disciplinary expertise in its 
operation. Therefore subjects are embedded in a net of expertise where they 
have to engage actively with knowledge and being knowledgeable. Therefore 
they are never purely passive objects of some external rule based disciplining 
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but also become self disciplining and self regulating. In Chapter 4,1 develop 
this further. 
This thesis argues that modem apparatuses of government are being developed 
in terms of their external relations to taxpaying subjects through the adoption 
of a customer focussed approach and in respect of the large corporate taxpayer 
an added value approach. At a more specific level the corporate tax compliance 
process is undertaken by representatives both of the IR and of the corporate 
taxpayer. These elite professionals are being made into expert knowledge 
subjects both by discourse and the practices of the Corporate Tax Compliance 
process. During the event that forms part of the process of compliance, these 
expert knowledge subjects undertake `truth games' whereby the detail of the 
tax computation is investigated by the IR to ensure that the appropriate amount 
of tax is assessed. Chapter 4 will focus on the theoretical underpinnings of this 
thesis. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. In chapter 2, I outline the background 
to the research area. Chapter 3 is the literature review. Chapter 4 is the 
methodology chapter. In this chapter I amplify the reasons for the choice of 
theoretical model and the particular research methods and methodology 
adopted. Chapter 5 and 6 are the narrative chapters which discuss the IR; 
Chapter 5 focusing on the structure whereas Chapter 6 looks at the processes 
and practices of corporate tax compliance. Chapters 7 and 8 are the analysis 
chapters which consider the parties to the compliance process and how they 
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have changed. Chapter 7 considers the tax official whereas Chapter 8 examines 
the corporate taxpayer. These chapters examine the development of the 
knowledge expert subjects. Chapter 9 looks at the event of compliance and 
how the `truth games' are played between the subjects. Chapter 10 is the 
concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 2- Setting the Scene: the background to the 
Corporate Tax Compliance Process. 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the context of the corporate tax 
compliance process and how this process can be defined and differentiated for 
large corporates. As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, it must be recognised 
that the process as such must be distinguished from the process as explained by 
the parties. 
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 2.2 looks at the nature of 
Corporation Tax; Section 2.3 tax avoidance; Section 2.4 discusses the 
corporate taxpayer; Section 2.5 considers why tax authorities set up specialist 
large taxpayers' compliance units; Section 2.6 examines the elite group of 
professional dealing with taxation of large corporate entities and in Section 2.7 
I look at the external factors affecting Corporation Tax compliance. 
2.2 Corporation Tax 
In the UK companies paid a combination of Income tax and Profits tax until 
1965 when Corporation Tax was introduced. Although Addington's Income 
Tax Act 1804 introduced Income Tax on the income of individuals, corporate 
bodies were also subject to income tax, however this tax acted as a withholding 
tax on dividends (Brooks, 1986: 387). This meant that the shareholder in 
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receipt of the dividend had received net income (in effect the dividend has been 
"franked") and no further tax, payable by the shareholder, was due on the 
dividend. 
The Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 enabled companies to be incorporated by 
registration and the Limited Liability Act of 1855 allowed shareholders of 
companies to limit their liabilities for the company's commercial debts. 
Initially these early companies were viewed as being similar to partnerships 
because a common form of ownership would have been the closely held 
company in which there were only a few shareholders and those shareholders 
were frequently also the directors of the company. Under UK tax legislation 
partnerships are not subject to tax. The profits of the partnership are subject to 
Income Tax in the hands of the partners. Profits tax in one form or another" 
was also payable by companies. This was first introduced in 1915 and was 
assessed on business profits. 
In 1965 the Labour Government reformed the taxation treatment of companies 
and introduced Corporation Tax. The main reasons given for the introduction 
of Corporation Tax were that there were perceived to be generous allowances 
on investments which had the effect of widening the gap between accounting 
profits and taxable profits on which the tax liability was calculated, and tax was 
calculated on a preceding19 not a current year basis (Talbot, 1964). However in 
the case of National Provident Institution v. Brown2° it was found that tax can 
" From 1937 - 1946 the National Defence Contribution was a form of profits tax. "The previous year profits were taken as the basis for the taxable profits in the year of 
Assessment. 
20(1921)8TC57 
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only be assessed on income which has a source in the year of assessment. Even 
though special rules were in force for opening and closing years, certain 
income was doubly taxed whilst other income was not taxed at all. Another 
consequence of this was that shareholders were receiving credit for tax which 
had not been paid as their dividends were being paid out of accounting profit. 
The Government of the day also wanted to encourage profits to be retained in 
the company and not distributed so that the company could grow using their 
retained profits (Cmnd. 2347). 
Corporation Tax when first introduced was therefore a classical system of 
taxation in that there was no credit in the hands of the shareholders for taxation 
which had been paid by the company making the dividend payment. In 1973 
the Conservative Government introduced a tax credit system: an imputation 
system known as Advance Corporation Tax. On paying a dividend a company 
had to pay an appropriate amount of corporation tax in advance of the normal 
payment date. The shareholder on receipt of the dividend grossed up the 
dividend by the tax paid and received a credit against their tax liability for this 
tax suffered. The company was able to set off this advance payment of tax 
against their liability to Corporation Tax. Advance Corporation Tax was 
abolished by the current Labour government's Finance Act of 1998 although a 
form of an imputation system remains in a modified form (Oats, 2002; Harris, 
1996). 
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All companies are required to notify the IR of their chargeability to tax for an 
accounting period2l. This means that if the company has any taxable income on 
which tax is payable and is not covered by tax deducted at source then they 
must inform the IR accordingly. In addition there is a self assessment process, 
introduced in 1999. A company has to submit a return known as a `Corporation 
Tax Return' together with financial statements for each accounting period on 
which they calculate their own tax liability and pay the tax due to the IR 
without prior assessment by the IR (IR, 1999). The return is due 12 months 
after the end of the accounting period, otherwise monetary penalties are 
incurred. An accounting period does not have to coincide with a year end date 
and may be shorter than 12 months. Once the tax return is received by the IR 
the information is `processed', which means that the information is entered into 
the IR's own computer system. The IR have the right to check the 
completeness and accuracy of the return and can open enquiries within 12 
months of the return being submitted. 
Corporation Tax for large companies22 is paid in equal quarterly instalments 
commencing the 14th day of the 7 `h month of the accounting period with three 
further instalments at 3 monthly intervals (IR, 1999). 
21 There are specific rules for defining an accounting period which is the chargeable basis 
period for taxation (ICTA 1988, Section 12). 
2 Companies with taxable profits of more than E1.5 million. This limit is reduced where the 
company is a member of a group of companies or under the common control of an individual 
or company. 
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2.3 Tax Avoidance 
In Section 1.4,1 briefly explained corporate tax compliance. This section 
expands on this by considering specifically non-compliance and the boundary 
between non-compliance and compliance. 
Non-compliance can either be intentional, for example fraud, in which case it is 
generally referred to as tax evasion, or non-intentional, which arises in 
circumstances, for example, where the taxpayer does not understand the 
complexity of the return. For large corporates the likelihood of non-intentional 
non-compliance is remote since, tax compliance for this sector is carried out by 
tax specialists either within the large corporate or a Big 4 accountancy firm. 
The bi-polar assumption that there is a clear distinction between compliance 
and non-compliance can be questioned. The relationship between compliance 
and non-compliance alternatively may be thought of as a continuum between 
the two polar ends. 
Compliance ------------------------------ - --------------------------- Non-compliance 
Aggressive / Avoidance Strategies 
Figure 3: The compliance/ non-compliance continuum 
Between the two extremities there is a region where being compliant is 
debatable. A taxpayer may be pursuing aggressive tax policies in that they may 
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be compliant with the letter of the law but the activities may not be in 
accordance with Parliament's intentions when the law was enacted, that is, the 
spirit of the law. Freedman (2003) has described this position as "non 
acceptable" avoidance. 
In addition for large corporates there will be a number of "grey areas" in the 
interpretation of the tax legislation. The tax legislation does not cover all 
eventualities and is not all-inclusive. In addition the legislation is designed for 
existing transactions and scenarios and although it contains basic tax 
principles, it cannot predict the tax treatment of new types of transactions that 
Parliament cannot foresee. For complex or original transactions not envisaged 
when the tax law was enacted the IR and the corporates will need to apply the 
existing legislation in order to determine the tax treatment and hence tax 
liability. This application of the existing legislation becomes more difficult the 
more complex or unusual the transaction concerned. The process of applying 
existing legislation in these circumstances is a matter of interpretation: the 
taxpayer is likely to interpret the legislation in their favour whereas the IR is 
likely to interpret the legislation in such a way as to increase the tax take on the 
transaction. 
The difference in interpretation of the tax legislation, and hence the tax impact 
of the transaction, will be a matter of discussion between the two parties: the 
IR and the corporate taxpayer. As the tax legislation does not provide an 
absolute answer to the question: "what is the correct tax treatment of this 
transaction? ", the tax ultimately payable will be a matter of negotiation 
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between the two parties or, if they fail to reach a negotiated agreement, the 
Courts will be required to interpret the tax legislation and decide the correct tax 
liability. 
The assumption that the boundary between compliance and non-compliance is 
hard and fast has been reiterated in the distinction between evasion and 
avoidance. Both are types of non compliant behaviour. The difference between 
tax evasion (an illegal activity) and tax avoidance (a legal activity) in the UK 
was historically defined in the UK IRC v Duke of Westminster case23. The 
principle established in this case is that people are entitled to arrange their tax 
affairs in the most tax efficient way. However this boundary has become less 
distinctive in recent years, through a series of judicial decisions starting in 
1980 with W. T. Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commissioners 24. The Institute of 
Fiscal Studies Tax Law Review Committee's Report on Tax Avoidance (1997) 
found difficulty in defining tax avoidance. They have defined it as: 
"action taken to reduce or defer tax liabilities in a way Parliament 
plainly did not intend or could not have intended had the matter been 
put to it. " 
(Executive Summary, para 7). 
Unlike other jurisdictions such as Canada, US and Australia, the UK does not 
have a General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) and in recent years there has 
been some debate about whether one is desirable. A Consultative Document 
was issued by the IR (1998) and proposed a GAAR which would have applied 
to corporate transactions only. The suggested definition of tax avoidance was: 
23 [19361 AC 377 
24 (1981) 54TC101. 
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"(a) not paying tax, paying less tax or paying tax later than would 
otherwise be the case; or 
(b) obtaining a repayment or increased repayment of tax, or obtaining 
repayment earlier than would otherwise be the case; or 
(c) obtaining payment or increased payment by way of tax credit, or 
obtaining such payment earlier than would otherwise be the case. " 
(in Wallworth, 2000). 
There was much debate surrounding this consultative paper. Whilst not in 
principle opposed to the introduction of a GAAR, the ICAEW's concerns, for 
example, centred on the difficulty of successfully drafting the legislation to 
achieve its objective to counteract highly artificial tax avoidance schemes. 
They felt that the introduction of GAAR in the form envisaged by the 
Consultative document would introduce more uncertainty and necessitate the 
introduction of a specific clearance system (Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England & Wales, 1998: 3). Freedman (2005a) argues that in Canada where a 
GAAR exists, the Canadian Supreme Court is "more conservative" compared 
with the UK House of Lords where there is no UK GAAR25. 
There is evidence that the IR is interpreting the meaning of the term 
"avoidance" in a different way by stretching the definition of evasion to 
include various activities previously regarded as legitimate tax planning (i. e. 
23 The impact of this legislation is obviously of concern to multinationals but it is not relevant 
to this research as this research is looking at the relationship in the UK of large corporates, a 
majority of which will be multinationals, and the UK IR. 
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avoidance) activities within the business community. It is linking avoidance 
with evasion26. 
"We [IR] simply cannot afford to go soft on fraud and avoidance in the 
large corporate sector, nor will we be doing so" (Montagu, 2003). 
The practice of tax avoidance is not limited to arranging transactions in the 
most tax efficient structure27. Tax avoidance activities can also be linked to the 
process of complying. A taxpayer should make full disclosure28. The boundary 
between what is acceptable and what is not will be viewed differently by the 
different players in the tax compliance game. What is considered to be tax 
avoidance to the IR and therefore subject to closer scrutiny, may be regarded as 
effective and legitimate tax planning by a taxpayer. However the IR's 
concentration on this emerging view of tax avoidance has an influence on the 
relationship of corporates with the IR as can be seen from the following quote. 
"A number of companies have expressed concern that some Revenue 
inspectors see tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning everywhere. 
They feel that this approach taints their dealings with the Revenue and 
makes it difficult for them to have an open and trusting relationship. 
Yet tax avoidance and aggressive planning are facts of life. A recent 
private sector survey suggested that they are prevalent in many large 
companies" (IR, 2001, para 67). 
26 An example of this is the recent re-definition of rules relating to personal services companies 
commonly referred to as IR35. 
27 Given the close links between financial reporting and tax accounting, there may be a close 
connection between tax aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness (see Shah, 
1996). The latter has become a matter of general and regulatory concern in the fallout from the 
Enron Corporation scandals. "The immediate effect is a sharp decline in the shares of any 
company that has acquired -fairly or unfairly- a reputation for aggressive accounting" 
(Financial Times, 31 January 2002). 
28 Disclosure of tax avoidance schemes for Income Tax, Capital Gains Tax and Corporation 
Tax was introduced with effect from 1 August 2006 (s309-s. 319, FA 2004). This followed a 
limited disclosure of tax arrangements concerning employment and certain financial products 
in 2004. The disclosure has to be made to the IR by the scheme "promoter" within 5 days of 
the scheme being made available. http: //www. hmrc. gov. uk/aiurndex. htm seen 21 September 
2006. 
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This section has shown that tax avoidance is not an easily definable term and 
what is understood to be tax avoidance has a changeable meaning over time 
and differs with the perspective of either the IR or large corporates. 
2.4 Who is the corporate taxpayer? 
This thesis looks at the relationships in the process of corporate tax compliance 
for large groups of companies. Therefore a key question to address is: who is 
the corporate taxpayer? 
A company can be viewed in a number of ways depending on whether it is 
being looked at from a legal, economic or political perspective. The legal 
perspective regards a company as a separate entity in its own right which can 
contract in its own name, sue and be sued, own property and have an unlimited 
life. From an economic perspective the company and its shareholders may be 
considered a single entity. This can be distinguished from the political 
perspective which treats a company as a tool to regulate the market in which 
the companies operate (Harris, 1996). By regulating the participants (corporate 
entities) in the market, the market is subject to regulation. 
Under UK legislation, a company is regarded as a separate legal entity which is 
subjected to tax in the UK on its worldwide income if it is either incorporated 
in the UK or `centrally managed and controlled' from the UK. A foreign 
company is subject to UK taxation if it derives income from a UK source or is 
trading in the UK. Any resulting tax liability is payable by the company and 
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the company can be sued for default of payment. So for legal purposes the 
company is the taxpayer. 
In respect of a group of companies, each company is treated as a separate entity 
for tax purposes. The consolidated accounts of the group are not assessed to 
tax. In some countries, such as the US and Australia, there are provisions 
whereby groups of companies can submit a consolidated return for the group. 
In the UK there are no such provisions although within certain restrictions 
trading losses and other types of losses29 can be offset by means of a provision 
known as group relief (Lamb, 1995; Lamb et al, 1998). For a group the 
significant company for tax purposes may not be the holding company of the 
group as the holding company may be simply an investment company holding 
shares in the subsidiaries of the group. The most UK tax significant company 
in a group is likely to be the main UK trading company of that group. However 
it may not be necessarily so as this company may have relatively 
straightforward tax affairs and although it may pay the greater amount of tax, 
more time and attention would be spent on a company which has more 
sophisticated financing arrangements. The reason for this is that the 
transactions would be more complicated and potentially interesting from an IR 
viewpoint in that tax revenue may be at risk, as there is more scope for tax 
planning schemes to reduce the amount of UK tax payable. 
The directors have a fiduciary duty to the shareholders to safeguard the 
company's assets. However typically this activity is delegated by the Board of 
Directors to a professional manager. The individual most likely to have the 
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ultimate responsibility for the group's taxation affairs in a large group of 
companies is the Financial Director, who may then delegate the detailed 
responsibility to a tax director or tax manager. It is common for the tax 
manager to be a Chartered Accountant3° who may also be professionally 
qualified as a Chartered Tax Advisor31,32. Typically such managers will have 
worked for a Big 4 firm of accountants specialising in taxation for a number of 
years before leaving the profession at a manager grade. A smaller number of 
tax managers are ex-IR. These individuals are likely to have been fully trained 
tax inspectors within the IR before taking up their present position. 
The structure of in-house tax departments differs between groups of 
companies. Porter (1999: 50) defines an in-house tax department as "a unit of 
at least one staff member who is employed full-time within [the] organisation 
on tax matters. Such a staff member is referred to as a tax specialist". The 
structure of these departments is dependent on 
1) whether the group prepares their own tax computations or outsources 
this work to a professional firm of accountants; and 
2) the scale and variety of jurisdictions in which the group operates. 
The degree of outsourcing also differs (McGee, 2003). At one extreme, the 
whole compliance process may be performed by the outsource service 
providers from preparation of the tax computations, submission of these 
computations to the IR, answering the IR's queries and the negotiation of the 
29 ICTA 1988 s. 380-391. 
30 Member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales or the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Scotland. 
31 Member of the Chartered Institute of Taxation. 
32 Out of the 12 interviews with tax managers, nine were Chartered Accountants. The 
remaining 3 were ex IR officials. 
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final tax liability. At the other extreme, only the preparation of the tax 
computations will be undertaken by the outsourcer and the in-house tax 
department will submit the computations and deal with the IR's questions and 
any negotiations. 
A typical structure of an in-house tax department of a FTSE 100 group of 
companies is shown below. As can been seen from the figure below, the tax 
department is split into direct taxes compliance and planning, indirect taxes, 
employment taxes and personal taxes. 
(M) refers to Manager 
Figure 4: Organisation Structure of an in house-Tax Department of a 
FTSE 100 group of companies 
Source: Interview CIO. 
The corporate tax compliance regime has become increasingly complex in the 
past decade. A number of external factors affect the way in which the corporate 
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tax compliance game is played. From the taxpayer's point of view, increased 
globalisation with its concomitant increase in the number and complexity of 
transnational transactions provides considerable scope for pushing the 
boundary between acceptable and unacceptable tax avoidance. The increased 
sophistication of financial markets, which the tax system has some difficulty in 
keeping pace with, also provides scope for taking advantage of ambiguities 
with a view to reducing overall tax liabilities. Some companies are risk 
minimisers, others play a more aggressive game. On the other hand, increased 
attention on corporate behaviour following world level events such as Enron 
has led to greater regulation of companies requiring them to be more 
transparent in reporting their affairs, particularly in the US. These recent 
developments have led companies to rely more heavily on specialist expertise. 
2.5 Specialist Large Taxpayer Compliance Units (SLTCU) 
The tax administrations of tax jurisdictions have a choice in their 
organizational structure. There are three main options; by type of tax; by 
function or by type of taxpayer (OECD, 2006). These are not discrete as some 
tax administrations may choose to use a combination of the options. Type of 
tax is the traditional method of organisational structure (International Monetary 
Fund, 2002). Under this option the tax administration is separated into different 
departments, each dealing with a particular type of tax. Each department is in 
effect a stand alone entity as it has separate functions to help it administer the 
particular tax by itself. An alternative method is to organize the tax 
administration such that each department is responsible for an essential 
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function such as tax collection, for example processing all tax returns resulting 
from different types of taxes. The third option is to segment the taxpayer base 
into `customer segments'. The staff of the tax administration will be organised 
by these particular segments. The customer segments may be based on size of 
the taxpayer's operations, form of ownership (such as individuals), or 
economic sector such as retail businesses. 
Different tax administrations also have different ways of organising and 
controlling large taxpayers (OECD, 2006). Specialist large taxpayer 
compliance units are based on the third option for organisation of tax 
administrations. The principal reasons for establishing SLTCUs have been to 
reduce the number of taxpayers which are non filing or do not pay; to maintain 
tax revenues at a certain level and to introduce systems such as risk 
management to curb non compliant taxpayers (IMF, 2002: 5). The number of 
SLTCUs in nation states has increased since the US Internal Revenue Service 
set up one in 1975 but the majority were established in 1990s (ibid). 
The activities of these units range between controlling all aspects of 
compliance to being limited to auditing or debt collection. Their individual 
organisational structure also differs from a single office to a number of offices 
located across the particular territory or state. 
A survey by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2002) reported that the 
advantages of setting up a specialist large taxpayer compliance unit concern 
improving the tax administration operations including securing tax revenues 
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and assisting in the identification and subsequently addressing major 
weaknesses in their operations. In particular: - 
" "Improved identification and knowledge of the large taxpayers and 
their operations; 
" More timely and accurate return filing and payment by the large 
taxpayers; 
" Earlier detection of taxpayers' non-compliance with filing and payment 
obligations; 
" More effective audits targeted by economic sector and performed by 
better trained auditors; 
"A reduced stock of arrears and therefore more targeted efforts by 
collection officers; and 
9 Better trained staff able to deal with more complex tax issues, provide 
higher quality services to taxpayers, and detect irregularities and 
corrupt practices. " (IMF, 2002: 36). 
However there are risks in setting up a specialist unit if the unit is not 
sufficiently resourced, adequately championed by the Government, or has a 
lack of authority over the taxpayers within the unit's remit, and if there is 
resistance from local tax offices outside the SLTCU impacting on local office 
morale. A main risk is the potential for duplication by creating a parallel tax 
administration. 
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In the UK the IR set up a SLTCU known as the Large Business Office (LBO) 
in 1997. In Chapter 5I discuss the background to the establishment of the LBO 
and how the structure of it has developed since its formation. A key feature of 
the LBO is that it is split into 13 offices with sectorisation specialists or 
function specialists in areas such as insurance. 
The IR faces increased pressure in the form of changes to UK domestic tax 
legislation. Pressure on government to increased revenue leads to a focus on 
tackling tax avoidance in areas such as transfer pricing, controlled foreign 
companies and securing disclosure of tax avoidance schemes. The IR is also 
under increasing pressure to keep pace with the changes noted previously in 
relation to the corporate tax environment. The IR is not just concerned with 
domestic revenue, but also has to interact with other revenue authorities. This 
includes sharing best practice with, visits by, and negotiations with (e. g. 
Advance Pricing Agreements33) other Revenue authorities. The IR is also 
concerned with managing rogue practices such as aggressive earnings 
management (see Shah, 1996). As a result, a variety of strategies, including 
new expertise, are being adopted by the IR as a whole and the LBO in 
particular. 
2.6 The `elite professional' nature of large corporates' tax specialists 
A key aspect of this thesis, in line with the view that modern government 
requires disciplinary expertise and disciplinary experts, is that the corporate tax 
43 
compliance process for large corporates is carried out by an elite group of 
professionals on both sides of the tax compliance fence. From the IR 
perspective tax officials who deal with the large corporates are senior tax 
inspectors who are the elite of their field. They have undergone specialist 
examined training to become tax inspectors and have a number of years 
seniority. The LBO case directors are senior civil servants. Likewise from the 
corporate or advisors' perspectives the individuals concerned will be 
professionally qualified, the majority of whom are accountants, with a 
substantial number of years of post qualification experience. The link between 
expert knowledge and professionalism has been appreciated and explored for 
some time (Parsons, 1968; Goldstein, 1984; Anderson-Gough, 2006). Although 
strictly tax officials and corporate tax advisors do not belong to the same 
profession, such as being Chartered Accountants, they share a claim to 
belonging to the taxation profession, although this is not a distinct profession 
as members of the taxation profession can originate from a number of different 
professions e. g. solicitor, accountant, Inspector of Taxes (Stary, 2006). These 
elite groups of professionals have a dual role. They both are involved in policy 
but also they sit across the table to negotiate with each other over the amount 
of tax payable. 
2.7 External Factors 
The environment in which the corporate tax compliance game takes place is 
subject to continuous change and both the corporate taxpayer and the IR are 
" Advance Pricing Agreements are agreement between one or more tax authorities and a 
corporate taxpayer over the "correct" transfer price for inter- company transactions within a 
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having to adapt accordingly. This adaptation takes place against an 
increasingly complex background of tensions between the local, in other words 
the UK, and the global; the international environment. Multinational 
companies are able to change tax residence and move outside the UK34, and so 
the corporate tax compliance game cannot be looked from a UK centric 
viewpoint only. The activities and interference of bodies such as the EC and 
the OECD only add to the complexity. In addition large corporates are 
engaging in frequent novel approaches to financing arrangements for which the 
tax legislation has not designed with those arrangements in mind. Likewise the 
IR is unable to focus exclusively on the UK tax treatment of transactions. 
Increasingly the IR is not just concerned with domestic revenue but also has to 
interact with other tax authorities. This includes sharing best practice with, 
visits by, and negotiations with (e. g. Advance Pricing Agreements) other tax 
authorities. The IR has to respond by raising its expertise as I will discuss in 
Chapter 7. Whilst the IR has to interact with other tax authorities there is 
increased competition between countries to attract Multinationals to enhance 
their economies and between tax authorities to maximise their share of the total 
tax take. 
2.8 Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to set the scene for the following research 
project and to explain how the literature review in the following chapter makes 
sense within this context. In this chapter I have discussed the movement of the 
group of companies. 
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boundary between tax evasion and avoidance so as to treat previous legitimate 
tax planning activities as "dubious" and considered to be unacceptable 
avoidance. This has included tightening of the tax rules and the "harding" of 
attitudes over time. 
There is an increasingly sophistication in the activities large businesses which 
include more complex and original transactions, which the tax legislation fails 
to keep pace with, resulting in more "grey areas", which give scope for 
different interpretations by the IR and the taxpayer. This results in more 
negotiations between the IR and the large corporate to ascertain the appropriate 
tax treatment. Consequently there is an increasingly use of expertise by large 
corporates whether provided in-house or from the Big 4 accountancy firms to 
assist in organising the corporate's tax affairs and help with negotiating with 
the IR. The IR response to this development is to increase their own expertise 
and organisation such as the introduction of SLTCUs so that the IR can play 
the tax compliance game on a level playing field. 
The next chapter reviews the existing literature dealing with corporate tax 
compliance from a number of perspectives; tax research, new public 
management and tax accounting research. 
30 This would undoubtedly involve some not inconsiderable costs which would include 
taxation. 
46 
Chapter 3- Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
As stated at the outset, this thesis addresses the following two research 
questions: 
1) How is the process of corporate tax compliance changing for large 
groups of companies? 
2) How is this process being managed by the Inland Revenue? 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss prior academic research studies that have 
addressed areas which impact on the research undertaken. The corporate tax 
compliance process can be looked at from a number of angles; from a tax 
viewpoint, a narrow view focussing on the body of rules, legislation and 
procedures; from the context in which the process takes place; and from an 
examination of the process itself and in terms of the participants as professional 
and knowledge experts. The first of these is found largely within the 
professional and legal literature. The second is most often associated with 
public policy literature. The third approach to this work is more diffuse and 
appears in a variety of literature as will be seen below. Accordingly this 
chapter is split into a number of sections. 
This chapter concentrates on three key areas of relevant literature. I first 
discuss tax research in general and in particular tax compliance research and its 
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strengths and weaknesses. This addresses the first research question. The 
context is affected by changes to Central Government as the IR is a department 
of the UK central government and therefore the research must be sited in the 
context of the emergence of the new form of bureaucracy or what is also 
sometimes known as a post-bureaucratic approach, invoking such constructs as 
NPM. Since the NPM phenomenon was identified (Hood, 1995), work in the 
NPM tradition has reached a more mature stage in which accounting has 
become seen increasingly as an integral and strategic part of any NPM system, 
through the introduction and significance placed upon performance 
measurement and accountability. This section addresses the first question but 
also begins to address the second question. I extend this approach drawing also 
on the professionalisation and public administration literature to understand the 
tax participants as expert professional subjects. 
The remaining part of this chapter is concerned with the second question. The 
IR has a role regulating corporate taxpayers through the administration of the 
tax system and the application of the rule of law. Taxation research has been 
widely seen as a field of study that needs to draw upon outside disciplines 
rather than being a separate disciplinary field in its own right (Boden, 2005). In 
consequence such research needs not only to draw upon such disciplines but be 
reflexively aware of the disciplines it chooses to use (Boden, 2005; Lamb, 
2005). My home or starting point discipline is accounting so in the third section 
I examine the contribution of accounting-based research to the tax field, 
including work in both the conventional or positivist and the so-called critical 
accounting research traditions. I discuss how Foucault's work, not just on 
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disciplinary power but on governmentality, has been brought into play in some 
of the critical accounting research work. In the fourth section I look in more 
depth at the various contributions of work using a Foucauldian approach, 
including the study of discourse and practices, and how such work may help 
us understand the tax administrative process. 
3.2.1 Tax Research 
Tax research is a rich area (see Lamb et al, 2005). Taxation research, as just 
noted, has drawn on outside disciplines and so is interdisciplinary (Lamb, 
2005). It is interdisciplinary in the sense that the study of taxation has drawn 
upon such fields as accounting, law, economics, political science and ethical 
philosophy (Lamb, 2005: 4), with a range of studies focussing on such issues 
as economic decision analysis, the behavioural strategies of taxpayers and tax 
advisors, the role of policy making, compliance costs of tax policies, the 
existence of a rational legal framework, and ethics. Studies within this 
interdisciplinary space can nevertheless be split into two types: those that draw 
principally on one disciplinary approach and those that seek to be more 
interdisciplinary. Both approaches have merits, the former using simplifying 
assumptions to clarify particular interactions, the latter seeking to reflect the 
complex nature of tax work with a more inclusive theoretical framework, but 
therefore incurring the costs of such complexity, e. g. generating more 
interactive, relational form of interpretation. This study draws upon both 
single-discipline and interdisciplinary work, with a particular focus on research 
carried out on tax compliance and tax administrative policy, and also on the 
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whole range of tax research that has drawn upon an accounting perspective. 
Each of the disciplines has their own distinguishable approach to tax research 
and it is worth here reviewing some key features of these approaches. 
3.2.2 Tax Research as Legal Research 
Legal research tends not to use empirical data, instead it involves categorising, 
criticising and constructing theories about legal events, legal structures, cases 
and the law. A proportion of legal researchers take a black letter law approach 
which Freedman (2005b) defines as an approach which "treats law as a 
distinct body of knowledge with some kind of internal coherence, exploration 
of which can provide answers" (2005b: 13). Some legal scholars look to a 
wider form of investigation which may draw in an empirical dimension e. g. by 
incorporating a historical perspective or with theoretical underpinnings drawn 
from a variety of other disciplines such as economics and sociology., However 
a key part of legal research is the appreciation of legal technique and the link 
with legal practice. Tax research in the legal paradigm has been greatly 
influenced by practitioners who combine research with practice (Tiley, 2000), 
examples include, Philip Baker QC, in particular on Human Rights (Baker, 
2000); Malcolm Gammie QC (Bond et al., 2000) and Paul Farmer, Barrister, 
e. g. European Law (eg. Farmer and Lyal, 1994). Other research in addition to 
historical research (e. g. Stebbings, 1993,1994) and criminal aspects of tax law 
(Salter, 2002), has taken an interdisciplinary approach. Some of the work by 
the Institute of Fiscal studies combines law and economic approaches for 
example work on corporate tax harmonisation (Bond et al., 2000). Freedman 
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and Green (1995) examined the inter-relationships of accounting and tax from 
legal and accounting viewpoints. 
Picciotto (2002) combines tax policy with legal research in his book entitled 
International Business Taxation. This monograph is an important contribution 
to multi disciplinary research (Freedman, 2005b) and it examines key issues for 
multinational companies such as transfer pricing and anti tax haven legislation. 
Two other authors from a legal background who have made a significant 
contribution to the area of my research are John Braithwaite and Doreen 
McBarnet. Braithwaite, a regulation lawyer, has done so through his work at 
the Centre for Tax System Integrity at the Australian National University 
(CTSI)35 with respect to tax compliance and the ATO Compliance model 
(Braithwaite, 2003a, 2003b; Ayers and Braithwaite, 1992). McBarnet has done 
so from a socio-legal perspective, both on her own and in conjunction with 
Whelan on `creative compliance' which examines compliance with the letter of 
the law but not with the spirit of the law (McBarnet 2003,1991; McBarnet and 
Whelan, 1999). This literature is discussed more fully in Section 3.3 on tax 
compliance. 
3.2.3 Tax Research as Political Science Research 
Political scientists' interests lie in tax policy research (Radaelli, 2005; Steinmo, 
1993,1998). They are interested in questions concerning the social power 
75 The CTSI was jointly funded by that University and the ATO from July 1999 for six years. 
The work of the centre located "tax systems and their administration within the context of 
democratic governance" http: //ctsi. anu. edu. au/about/index. html seen 21 September 2006. 
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relationships between government, the state and the public including the 
influence of pressure groups (Citrin, 1979), constraints on social power 
(Martin, 1989), tax expenditures (Witte, 1983) globalization and technological 
advances (Bossons, 1988) and the actual policies of contemporary democracies 
(Steinmo, 1993). As Steinmo (1998) says "political scientists tend to focus on 
explaining what it is that governments actually do and understanding why they 
do it this way" (1998: ix). A key interest for political scientists is the role of the 
government in central government and local government and the relationship 
between ministers and the civil service (Rhodes, 2005). This is of interest to 
this research as the IR is a department of UK central government and tax 
officials are civil servants. In section 3.4 I look further at the changes termed 
NPM and at the role of civil servants. 
Governments need to raise finance to fund public expenditure, and taxation 
revenues are a significant part of public finance (Bailey, 2004). However there 
are constraints on how much revenue can be raised by way of taxes especially 
with the impact of globalization (e. g. Tiebout, 1956). Based on rational choice 
theory36 Levi (1988) has developed a theory of predatory rule in which she 
assumes that rulers maximise their revenue subject to three constraints; 
bargaining power; transaction costs and discount rates. Bargaining power refers 
to the degree of control over economic, enforcement activities and political 
resources. Transactions costs are the costs of both negotiating and 
implementing the revenue raising policies and the discount rate is a measure of 
the time frame in which the ruler i. e. the decision maker is operating. Hood 
36 Rational choice theory assumes that before proceeding with any action, individuals calculate 
all the costs and benefits of the action in order to maximize their utility. 
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(1985) shows that tax administration is an important constraint in tax policy. 
His view is that tax policy is constrained by the administration of it and in 
some cases difficulties in administration can alter the tax policy. He illustrates 
this point by examining the policy move from Estate Duty which was payable 
on death transfers to Capital Transfer Tax (introduced in 1975) payable on life 
time transfers as well as death transfers. This change in policy, Hood argues, 
was a result of unsuccessful attempts to make Estate Duty to work properly as 
social norms had changed since the enactment of Estate duty in 1894 such that 
the transfer of property occurred in lifetime as opposed on death. 
However tax policy cannot be looked at in isolation from a political scientist 
viewpoint. As Slemrod (2003) notes that "a working understanding of both the 
details of the tax law as well as the economic and social framework within 
which the tax system operates is essential to evaluate tax policy" (2003: 145). 
Having very briefly reviewed the legal and political science tax research 
literature, I now turn to economic tax research. 
3.2.4 Tax Research as Economic Research 
Tax research within the economic discipline is well established and extensive 
and forms part of public finance research. The research focuses on the 
economic, efficiency and the allocation of resources, economic efficiency and 
incentives and equity and distribution (James, 2005). A key concern is 
maximising output given the resources available to the community. 
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The effect of taxes has been considered in the structure of corporate 
acquisitions (Erikson, 1998), the location of production facilities of US 
multinationals (Devereux & Griffith, 1998), the location of foreign direct 
investment in US (Hines, 1996) and the extent of international tax avoidance 
activity (Hines, 1999). 
There are links in the US between economic tax and accounting tax research 
and joint conferences between economic and accounting academics give 
further encouragement to strengthen these links (Slemrod, 2003). In this 
context, Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) review empirical tax accounting 
research from a US perspective. They concentrate on three areas of tax 
research in accounting. Firstly the relationship between tax and non tax factors 
in decision making; secondly the research into linking asset prices with tax and 
thirdly the tax effect for companies of operating across different tax regimes 
either internationally for taxes levied at a national level and interstate in the US 
for taxes levied at a state level. This research is in the main based on the 
Scholes et at. (2002) model. This model is a positivistic approach explaining 
the role of taxes in organisations and effective tax planning. They posit that 
effective tax planning has three constituent parts which need to be considered, 
specifically: 
1. the tax implications of all the parties to the transaction; 
2. both explicit taxes (actual tax paid to the Revenue) and implicit taxes 
(indirect taxes paid as a result of lower before-tax rates of return on tax 
efficient investments), and 
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3. both tax and non tax costs such as the cost of doing the restructuring. 
(Scholes et al., 2002). 
Maydew (2001) when responding to Shackelford and Shevlin's paper takes the 
view that tax research carried out by accountants from a US perspective is 
rather narrower in its scope than Shackelford and Shevlin's viewpoint. It is 
based on microeconomics and finance and is of a quantitative nature. In 
Macnaughton and Mawani's (2005) review of the microeconomic literature, 
they note that this approach has developed from the Scholes and Wolfson 
model (2002). This research seeks to explain tax planning decisions by 
examining factors which maximise an objective function, wealth often utilising 
effective tax rates, subject to a number of constraints including both tax and 
non tax costs. A related literature looks at the impact of taxes on the capital 
markets (for a review see Holland, 2005): for instance the relationship between 
dividend yields and equity returns (Morgan and Thomas, 1998; Chui et al, 
1992); the validity of tax assumptions in valuing the cost of debt (Franklin and 
Tuck, 2001). This "North American" type of research has influenced many of 
the mainstream US methodologies for undertaking tax research in accounting. 
This is part due to research in accounting having an economic research 
background (Lamb, 2005) and the volume of tax research undertaken in the US 
compared with the UK (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). 
3.2.5 Tax Research as Accounting Research 
"[Accounting is more than just the mere processes of] calculating, 
valuing, reporting, and evaluating financial transactions, performance 
and events. Accounting processes involve techniques, apply principles, 
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and attract theories of improvement and explanation. Accounting 
research focuses on these processes, their outputs, and the institutions 
around them" (Lamb, 2005: 56). 
Within accounting research, taxation is sometimes viewed as a cost which has 
to be accounted for. The majority of tax research takes place within the major 
areas of accounting; financial accounting; financial management and 
management accounting. The range of research from an accounting discipline 
is wide37 and draws upon other disciplines such as law as mentioned above in 
relation to tax and accounting (Freedman, 1995; Lamb, 1995,2001,2002; 
Macdonald, 1995; Noke, 2000; Oats and Tuck, 2006,2005). This 
interdisciplinary approach is reflected in the critical accounting literature in 
that critical accounting literature draws upon other disciplines in particular 
sociology and accounting can be considered to be a "social and institutional 
practice" (Miller, 1994: 1). In section 3.6 I discuss critical accounting literature 
in more detail. 
Tax research has utilised a variety of methodological approaches. Hasseldine et 
al. (2005) note in recent work that approaches have ranged from case studies 
(Pentland and Carlile, 1996; Preston, 1989), interviews (Grasmick and Scott, 
1982; Schwartz and Orleans, 1967), telephone surveys (Hite, 1997), postal 
17 The foci of tax research include reporting costs in published accounts (Holland, 1998; 
Hodgkinson, 2002); tax influence on financial reporting (Noke, 2000; Freedman, 1995; 
Macdonald, 1995; Lamb, 1995); interrelationship between tax and accounting (Oats and Tuck, 
2005,2006; Lamb, 2001,2002); implications of tax legislation (Casson, 1998; Killian, 2006); 
organisation and management of tax practice and planning (Porter 1999a, 1999b; Hansford and 
Hasseldine, 2002; Hoskin, Lamb and Tuck, 2001a, 2001b); tax education and training 
(Freedman and Power 1992; Miller, 2002 and the tax influence on individual and corporate 
financial behaviour (Acker et al, 1997; Dobbs and Miller, 2002). 
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questionnaires (Hasseldine and Kaplan, 1992; Hite, 1989) and laboratory 
experiments (Kaplan, Newberry and Reckers, 1997, Roberts, 1994). 
To understand how tax administrations function, it is important to review the 
literature on tax compliance research. A key aspect of understanding how tax 
administrations work is a consideration of how taxpayers respond to tax 
authorities and what influences them to comply with the requirements of the 
tax system in terms of rules and procedures. Previous research has looked at 
particular aspects of this relationship in a discrete manner and has been 
concentrated in well defined areas. In the following subsections, I focus 
particularly on the research that deals with tax compliance. I discuss key issues 
as follows: from the standpoint of the taxpayer in Subsection 3.3.2 and to a 
limited extent from the perspective of the tax authority in Subsection 3.3.3. 
3.3 Tax Compliance 
There is a considerable body of tax compliance literature. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, Alm, (1991) defines tax compliance38 "as reporting all income and 
paying all taxes in accordance with the applicable laws regulations, and court 
decisions" (Alm, 1991: 577). This literature has approached tax compliance 
from a range of disciplinary backgrounds. Hasseldine et al, (2005) in recent 
work in this area, have identified the following approaches: economic 
(Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998), sociology (McBarnet, 2003), 
38 It must be noted that corporate tax compliance is a term which has different meanings. To 
the tax professional in the private sector such as a partner or employee of a Big 4 firm of 
accountants, one definition of corporate tax compliance is the process of submitting corporate 
tax returns to the IR. 
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accounting (Kaplan, Reckers and Roark, 1988), law (Smith and Kinsey, 1987) 
and psychology (Webley, Robben, Elffers and Hessing, 1991)39. A common 
feature of these studies is that they focus on the reporting requirements of the 
tax system for taxpayers. Throughout this work, greater focus has been given to 
individuals as opposed to companies. 
A number of studies looking at tax compliance research have approached the 
area from a behavioural methodology standpoint (Hasseldine, 2005). This 
approach addresses questions about how taxpayers and tax advisors make 
decisions and how these could be improved. Data is collected from surveys and 
from laboratory experiments whereby the researcher manipulates the data in 
such a way as to see whether the hypotheses based on prior theory are 
validated. In other words if one event happens then this will tend to lead to 
another event. Other researchers have formulated a model and tested the model 
to see if predictions are true. A feature of this type of research is that it is often 
quantitative in nature and based on the assumption that we can observe reality 
and this reality is objective truth i. e. a positivist viewpoint. 
39 Although not central to this research, an example of work carried out in the public sector tax 
practice is research on tax compliance costs (Lamb, 2005; Green, 1996). Tax compliance cost 
literature is well established and by using mostly large scale mail surveys supplemented by 
some interviews (Sandford, 1995: 378; Pope, 2005) looks at the costs that the taxpayer has to 
incur in complying with tax legislation (Sandford et al, 1999; Sandford 1995). Slemrod and 
Blumenthal (1996) looked at compliance costs for large business in the US. Research has been 
extended to include psychological costs in addition to monetary costs, (Woellner et al, 2002) 
and costs of income tax self assessment (Turner et al., 1998) and in Canada the compliance 
costs of individuals (Vailloncourt, 1995). The three key findings from this research on tax 
compliance costs worldwide are that compliance costs are firstly high with reference to either 
absolute terms, percentage of GDP, or by comparison with administrative costs incurred by 
Revenue Authorities; secondly very regressive and a major concern for small businesses and 
thirdly that the research into compliance costs has put compliance costs on the political agenda 
(Pope, 2005: 210). 
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A body of research has focused not on compliance but on its opposite, non- 
compliance; the assumption being that compliance/ non-compliance is a bi- 
polar term. Non-compliance can be split into two areas: firstly tax evasion 
(intentional and illegal non-compliance) (Webley et al, 2001, Alm, 1991, Roth 
et al., 1989); and secondly on unintentional tax non-compliance. The latter 
work has mostly focused on unintentional non-compliance by individuals 
(McKerchar, 2001; Hite and McGill, 1992; McBarnet, 1991). This literature is 
concerned with questions such as what makes taxpayers non compliant and 
from a tax administrative perspective, how to make taxpayers more compliant. 
3.3.1 The Taxpayer's Perspective 
As mentioned in section 3.3, a feature of this literature is that greater focus has 
been given to individual taxpayers or small family businesses rather than the 
large corporate taxpayer (Slemrod, 2004). For an individual such as an 
employee on a modest salary, there is little scope to plan their tax affairs in an 
efficient way whether illegally or legally. In the UK, Income Tax is deducted at 
source each month from their monthly salary under PAYE (Pay As You Earn) 
at prescribed rates and no further interaction with the tax authorities takes place 
as in these circumstances there is no requirement for a tax return to be 
completed. For a company or a self employed individual there are opportunities 
available for paying the incorrect amount of tax whether legally or not. These 
opportunities are much greater for large corporates as large corporates often 
operate in multiple jurisdictions and engage in complex transactions e. g. 
financing arrangements. In addition large corporates can manipulate the prices 
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for intra-group sales of goods and services which impact their profit on which 
tax is charged40. However by reviewing the literature on individual and small 
corporate compliance, research areas can be identified and certain findings may 
be extrapolated to the large corporate environment. 
Andreoni et al. (1998) address US personal income tax compliance. They 
describe the theoretical and empirical evidence of tax compliance literature 
from an economic perspective. They discuss economic compliance models 
such as the Allingham-Sandmo model (1972) and consider the threat of audit 
and detection and the imposition of penalties in deterring tax evasion. The 
Allingham-Sandmo model is concerned with the question of when a taxpayer is 
completing his income tax return, how much of his41 overall income should he 
declare and how much of it should he not declare and therefore evade taxes. In 
Andreoni et al's view, a weakness of the Allingham-Sando model is that one of 
the assumptions is that the taxpayer faces a constant risk of audit. They argue 
that this is not appropriate as a tax authority selects cases for audit on a risk 
basis, such as income being above a certain level. Most of the literature based 
on the Allingham-Sandmo model assumes that the attitude of the taxpayer to 
complying is based on rational choice (Pentland and Carlile, 1996: 274). 
The relationship between tax advisors and their clients is an important research 
area. Tax advisors act on behalf of their clients in dealings with the tax 
40 There is an extensive literature in academic disciplines such as in law, empirical accounting 
and economics, on the tax implications of transfer pricing (for discussion see Elliott, 2005; 
Elliott, 1995). However a review of this literature is outside the scope of this research and it is 
referred to here only as further evidence of large corporates playing a game with the tax 
administration. 
4 The male pronoun is used for convenience and has no other significance. 
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authorities. Researchers have investigated using experimental methods the 
relationship between tax preparers (advisors) and their clients (taxpayers) 
(Schisler, 1995). Frecknall Hughes (2002) looked at the role of taxation 
practitioners in negotiating, with the IR, the fiscal valuation of unquoted 
company shares. Based on negotiation theory as articulated by Wall Jr. (1985), 
she concludes that the language and terminology of negotiation were used 
when agreeing the valuations with Share Valuation Division of the IR (SV). 
However SV drives the process and this type of work was dealt with by 
experienced tax practitioners. 
Hite and Hasseldine (2003) find in a US study that returns prepared by tax 
professionals have less adjustments and tax assessments compared with returns 
completed by the taxpayers themselves. Schmidt (2001) carried out a study 
with adult taxpayers to investigate taxpayers' preference for aggressive tax 
advice from US qualified accountants such as Certified Public Accountants 
('CPA's) as opposed to non CPAs. Murphy (2002) reports on an Australian 
study of aggressive taxpayers. This research sought to understand the factors 
that influence aggressive taxpayers' attitudes and perceptions to the Australian 
tax system. She concludes that taxpayers who take a risky approach seek 
aggressive tax advisors and there are multiple factors in an environment which 
is complex. As mentioned in section 2.4 large corporates either have an in- 
house specialist tax department or employ a firm of Chartered Accountants or 
lawyers to advise on their tax compliance. This may be an indication of large 
corporates' disposition to aggressive tax planning. 
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Shackelford & Shevlin (2001) identify the area of tax aggressiveness and the 
`willingness of firms to avoid taxes' as possible areas for future research. 
Olhoft (1999) has examined the tax avoidance activities of US multinational 
corporations using effective tax rates42 as an indication of aggressive tax 
planning. The empirical results were obtained using regression analyses on a 
sample of US domestic companies i. e. companies operating in the US only, and 
US multinational companies. These results indicated that multinational 
companies with significant pre-tax profits have more opportunities and greater 
incentives to pursue tax avoidance activities compared to US domestic 
companies or companies generating lower profits, leading to their reporting 
lower effective tax rates. Much of the literature that has investigated the tax 
activities of multinationals is economics based and very little has been done in 
terms of a qualitative research approach. 
A company which carries out aggressive accounting may also pursue 
aggressive tax approaches. Cloyd (1995), a US researcher, carried out an 
experimental study which investigated the inter-relationship between financial 
accounting treatment and aggressive tax treatment. Shah (1996) examined the 
close connection between tax aggressiveness and financial reporting 
aggressiveness given the close links between financial reporting and tax 
accounting. He concludes that tax planning schemes are implemented by 
corporates but they are assisted in this process by advisors, accountants and 
'2 The effective tax rate of a company is the ratio of the taxation charge to the profit before 
taxation as disclosed in the financial statements. 
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lawyers and in the case of tax schemes, the IR who give advance clearances on, 
albeit, a part of the transaction. 
Doreen McBarnet, a socio-legal lawyer, is an author who has made a 
significant contribution in this area. Together with Whelan, she examines 
creative compliance with respect to financial reporting (McBarnet and Whelan, 
1999). They use the term creative compliance to explain where the letter of the 
law is followed, but the transaction does not follow the intention of the drafters 
of the law. Companies pursue aggressive financial reporting treatment which 
complies with the letter of the rules of the existing professional standards but 
not with the spirit or economic reality e. g. off-balance sheet financing in order 
to obtain advantages such as favourable net asset values and increased earnings 
per share. 
McBarnet (1991) looked at the amount of disclosure which constitutes creative 
tax compliance. Companies can over-disclose in that they can provide so much 
information which whilst relevant is not entirely necessary to understand a 
particular transaction that it is difficult for the tax official to see "the wood 
from the trees". She also found that companies engage in fraud insurance. They 
seek Counsel's opinion on a particular transaction in order to show that there 
was no intention to evade tax. By labelling or describing transactions in such a 
way the transactions or activities cannot be classified as violating law and are 
designed to confuse and obscure transactions from the IR. 
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McBarnet (2003) suggests that creative compliance is in part due to the nature 
of the law, and in part due to the attitude of taxpayers to it. She argues that the 
problem is not that taxpayers are not complying but the issue is the way in 
which they comply. This theme is reflected by Freedman (2003). She makes 
the distinction between acceptable tax avoidance and unacceptable tax 
avoidance, namely taking advantage of tax rules, but in a way that goes against 
the intentions of Parliament when the legislation was enacted. Both 
McBarnet's and Freedman's work reflects the nature of the game that large 
corporates engage in to alter significant results in their financial statements 
such as profit before tax, earnings per share and effective tax rates43 in a way 
which is favourable to them. 
3.3.2 The Tax Authority 
Most of the literature on tax compliance has focussed on the perspective of the 
taxpayer. Less attention has been given to the viewpoint of the tax authority 
itself as the other player in the tax compliance game. Tomkins et al. (2001) 
highlight the under-researched area of tax management and identify external 
trends and researchable areas which impact on and may be of value to the 
management of tax administrations. Lamb (2005) comments there is much 
work to do in this area. As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, Preston (1989) 
acknowledges this gap in the accounting literature. 
43 The movement and level of these figures create signalling effects to the markets and 
investment analysts. 
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Most of the studies above have assumed that either tax legislation remains 
constant or that the tax authority's practices remain unchanged. Scholes et al 
(2002: 3) take the view that the tax authority takes a passive role in all 
economic ventures, despite having a vested interest in the outcome. 
" .. [T]he taxing authority is an uninvited party to all contracts. 
The 
taxing authority brings to each of its "forced" ventures with taxpayers a 
set of contractual terms (tax rules). 
... In addition, although the taxing authority claims a partnership interest in taxpayers profits, it exercises no voting rights" (2002: 3). 
Hasseldine et al. (2005) have researched the way in which the revenue 
authority communicates with taxpayers and in particular the effect of 
persuasive communication with individual taxpayers. They used a controlled 
field experiment to examine the change in turnover and net profit over a two 
year period after the taxpayer receives one of five possible letters. The letters 
ranged along a spectrum from offering assistance to the threat of an audit and 
the specification of various possible penalties, and were addressed to UK sole 
traders who completed simplified tax returns as their turnover was below 
£15,000 for two consecutive years. Each of the different approaches resulted in 
the taxpayers reporting significant increases in reported turnover above the 
£15,000 threshold. What is significant about this research is that unlike the US 
where some academics have access to US IRS data, the UK IR has not until 
recently cooperated with academics on research projects. Hasseldine et al. 's 
work was carried out with the full co-operation of the IR and in addition was a 
field experiment rather than a laboratory experiment. This arguably reflects the 
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desire of the IR, in common with other UK government departments' desire to 
obtain evidenced-based research (Kelly, 2000). 
Research which examines the corporate taxpayers' perspective of tax 
administration is that of Porter (1999a). She used a survey in 1996 to look at 
the practice of the IR from the perspective of tax managers in FT top 500 
companies and the largest 192 companies in Jordan's (1996) listing of inward 
investors. This survey focused on the work and role of these in-house tax 
managers. In the follow-up research (1999b), Porter conducted semi structured 
interviews with 18 tax managers to find out their views on compliance issues 
and their interaction with the IR in respect of CTSA, transfer pricing and 
controlled foreign companies legislation. Their view was that increasingly 
legislative changes were increasing tax compliance work i. e. the process of tax 
compliance, and that the IR seem to expect the same level of detail from large 
companies as small ones. The interviews were conducted in 1998, just after the 
establishment of the LBO. 
The studies above have approached these research questions from the 
taxpayer's viewpoint (Hasseldine et al. 2005; Roberts and Bobek, 2004; 
Scholes et al., 2002; Porter, 1999a, 1999b). Examples of research which has 
considered the relationship of the Revenue authority and the taxpayer from the 
perspective of the tax authority, are US based studies of the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) by Smith and Stalans (1994) and Pentland and Carlile (1996). 
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Smith and Stalans (1994) in a US context examine tax negotiations between 
IRS officials and individual taxpayers or in a partnership or closely held private 
company (known as a S- Corporation) using a hypothetical experiment which 
invloved interviewing IRS officials and taxpayers. During the interviews they 
gave interviewees various possible responses on a card, such as persuading 
(A), convincing (B), find a new answer (C), compromise (D), go along (E) and 
hold firm (F). The interviewee had to indicate which response; A, B, C, D, E or 
F was appropriate in three situations as follows: which one to start with, which 
response they would do next if the first one did not work and which alternative 
would be the third step if the previous two failed. Smith and Stalans analysed 
the results of 48 tax officials using multivariate techniques. They concluded 
that IRS Officials place more emphasis on the correct interpretation of the law 
and were less likely to adopt compromise strategies than taxpayers. 
Pentland and Carlile (1996) looked at the process of auditing tax returns by 
IRS auditors. Their study differs from Smith and Stalans (1994) in that they 
conducted 142 interviews in two tranches. The interviews were initially part of 
a study originally on the use of computers by accounting professionals within 
the IRS. During the interview, a significant part of the time was spent on 
gaining an understanding of tax audits. Pentland and Carlile acknowledge that 
"most of the data has a distinctly "backstage" flavour to it" (1996: 275). They 
conclude that the process of the audit is an `expression game' in which the IRS 
auditors utilise both formal knowledge and working knowledge to audit the 
taxpayer's tax return. What Pentland and Carlile show is that the tax auditors 
do not just restrict themselves to the information on the return but they look at 
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the affairs of the taxpayer in a wider context which is not limited to just the 
return i. e. where the taxpayer went on holiday, what sort of house the taxpayer 
lives in and what is the taxpayer's lifestyle e. g. "the sailboat sitting in the 
driveway" (1996: 285). The objective of tax agents is to get agreement or 
conclusion to the outstanding issues. In other words as I mentioned in Section 
2.3 there is no one correct answer to being compliant, it is more of a game. 
"Auditing is a classic example of an expression game. The auditor and 
the taxpayer are locked in a contest over the truth of the taxpayer's 
return" (1996: 285). 
Seeking for the truth by tax officials is developed further in chapter 9. 
The role of tax collection involves the application of rules prescribed by the 
IRS but the IRS officials have to work with the taxpayer for them to disclose 
the facts. The interpretation of the facts is dependent upon the relationship 
between the tax official and the taxpayer. 
"The interpretation and application of the tax code is highly contingent 
upon the character of the interaction between agent and taxpayer" 
(Pentland and Carlile, 1996: 270). 
This underlines the ambiguity in arriving at the "correct" tax liability to which 
I refer in Section 2.3. Hansford and Hasseldine (2002) carried out a 
questionnaire survey into best practice in VAT administration. 44 They found 
that a majority of tax advisors in the sample did not agree that the VAT officers 
provided `confident, knowledgeable or consistent advice' and that some of the 
44 VAT was administered by HM Customs & Excise in 2002 and when this survey was carried 
out in 1997. 
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advice provided was confusing. Both the examples above illustrate that the 
relationship between tax officials and taxpayers is interdependent. Where 
taxpayers have tax advisors or in the case of large corporates, in-house tax 
departments, this interdependent relationship involves an interplay between 
experts. 
There has been little research into the culture of tax compliance. Richardson 
and Lanis (1999) develop a model to examine the influence of culture on tax 
administration practices using Hofstede's (1980,1991) cultural dimensions of 
`individualism versus collectivism; large versus small power distance; strong 
versus weak uncertainty avoidance and masculinity versus femininity'. They 
attempt to classify a number of countries by linking these cultural dimensions 
with tax administration value dimension. While not reaching any firm 
conclusions, the authors flag this as something worthy of future research of 
interest to the global tax community. 
However there has been a much wider tranche of compliance literature which 
has examined the grounding in legal relation of the compliance relationship 
between the taxpayer and the tax administration. This work originates from the 
Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) at the Australian National University. 
This work is interdisciplinary in nature and has made a significant contribution 
to tax administration research and the practices of tax administrations including 
the use of the Compliance model by the ATO (Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 
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2001) and the IR (Cm 5428: 14)45. Key contributions are in the areas of the 
distribution of power among the parties and reward/ punishment strategies 
which visualise patterns of corporate tax compliance in a new way. 
Ayers and Braithwaite (1992) take the view that power should be exercised by 
various organisations - markets, the community, the state and associations such 
as trade unions, civil liberties groups, women's organisations and the consumer 
and environmental movements in equal measures so that one organisation does 
not dominate the others (1992: 17). They argue that the state should 
redistribute power by giving power to previously powerless organisations such 
as consumer groups i. e. empowering citizens. Instead of removing regulations 
(deregulation), regulation should be transcending in that different degrees of 
regulation should apply to different strata of the regulated population. In 
addition the regulators should take a softly, softly approach. "[R]egulatory 
agencies are often best able to secure compliance when they are benign big 
guns. That is, regulators will be more able to speak softly when they carry big 
sticks (and crucially, a hierarchy of lesser sanctions). Paradoxically, the bigger 
and the more various are the sticks, the greater the success regulators will 
achieve by speaking softly" (1992: 19). They also argue that this approach 
reduces the costs of complying with the regulations in addition to increasing 
compliance. 
"Punishment is expensive; persuasion is cheap. A strategy based mostly 
on punishment wastes resources on litigation that would be better spent 
on monitoring and persuasion. 
45 Freedman (2005: 28) notes that "some very interesting work is now beginning to emerge 
from CTSI, which] is an interdisciplinary group but showcases the work of John Braithwaite 
and other regulation lawyers which is of great relevance to tax administration". 
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A strategy based mostly on punishment fosters an organized business 
subculture of resistance to regulation wherein methods of legal 
resistance and counterattack are incorporated into industry socialization 
(Bardach and Kagan, 1982). Punitive enforcement engenders a game of 
regulatory cat-and-mouse whereby firms defy the spirit of the law by 
exploiting loopholes, and the state writes more and more specific rules 
to cover the loopholes" (1992: 20). 
This approach is utilised by the Australian Tax Office (ATO) tax compliance 
model. Braithwaite & Braithwaite (2001) have examined the evolution of this 
ATO tax compliance model. Securing tax compliance is depicted as a 
regulatory pyramid. The vast majority of taxpayers are at the base, the non- 
compliant at the apex. Enforcement procedures increase as one goes up the 
pyramid. Murphy (2004) reviewed the use of this model for small family 
businesses using case study evidence. She concludes that the use of the ATO 
Model is a favourable regulatory policy which is responsive to the needs of 
taxpayers and tax officials. The IR has adopted this model to improve 
compliance (Cm 5428: 11), which stratifies customers into those which 
comply, and those which do not. To the latter category, more resources are 
directed and a stricter approach to compliance is undertaken (Cm 5428: 14). 
The IR would like the corporate taxpayer to "pay the right amount of tax at the 
right time", and for the IR to collect their share of the taxation on the 
worldwide profits of the corporate taxpayer. How this model is operationalised 
is discussed in Chapter 6. 
Braithwaite (2003a) adapts the cash economy compliance pyramid for large 
corporates. He suggests that the pyramid becomes an egg shaped model (Figure 
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5) on the grounds that more large businesses comply with the letter of the law 
but not with what the ATO regards as the intention of the law. 
In the grey section of the model, Braithwaite argues that many Australian 
Groups intend to comply with the `letter of the law' but "there are many who 
do not intend to comply with what the ATO regards as the policy purposes of 
the Parliament's tax laws (2003a: 179)46. A difficulty with this model is that it 
fails to capture the complexity of the interaction between large corporates and 
tax administrations. Tax administrations both regulate the large corporates but 
also in some instances assist them when the large corporate is dealing with 
foreign tax administrations (LBO official, 2003: LBO 4). Also the large 
corporates are not as numerous as individual taxpayers or small business and 
the large corporates are all `smart' in the game. Thus the relationship is not two 
dimensional, it is more multidimensional. 
Figure 5: Patterns of corporate tax compliance and ways of shaping risk 
management systems for taxpayers and tax advisors, 
Braithwaite (2003a : 180). 
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Braithwaite (2003b) analyses how the ATO can move towards shaping the risk 
management systems of taxpayers and tax advisors. He suggests this can be 
done by educating taxpayers to check the returns themselves and tax advisors 
to check these checks, and by using internal company systems to check transfer 
pricing records. The relationship between risk and tax approach has been the 
focus of a debate relating to `Tax in the Boardroom', both by City 
organizations and Big 4 accountancy firms (Henderson Global Investors, 
2005a, 2005b; KPMG, 2004; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005b) and HMRC 
(HMRC, 2006). As a consequence of corporate scandals such as Enron, 
Sarbanes Oxley ACT 2002, Early Day Motions47 in the UK Parliament, 
development of pressure groups such as the Tax Justice Network and the focus 
of on a risk based approach by tax administrations, there has a move to look 
outside the silo of tax and engage Financial Directors and the Boards of 
companies to examine the tax strategy of their corporate. (KPMG, 2004). 
3.3.3 Tax Compliance research summary 
Whilst the foregoing literature review on tax compliance research illustrates the 
breadth and depth of tax compliance research from an economic analysis 
perspective following the Scholes and Wolfson paradigm, the focus has been 
on the compliance activities of individual taxpayers rather than corporate 
taxpayers. Little attention in the UK has been paid to the actual practices of tax 
compliance from the taxpayer, tax administration and tax advisory 
perspectives. Roberts and Bobek (2004) acknowledge the gap in relation to tax 
46 The `grey' section in this model should not be confused with `grey areas' in the tax 
legislation. 
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administration research when concluding that companies influence tax laws by 
engaging in political activities in the US48. They say "this paradigm [Scholes- 
Wolfson] fails to recognise the state as a negotiable contracting party and the 
structure of tax accounting laws as endogenous to a corporation's tax planning 
activities"(2004: 566/7). McBarnet (1991,2003) and Braithwaite (2003a, 
2003b) have attempted to address this gap. McBarnet's work on creative 
compliance and the games played by companies who engage in tax planning 
has examined tax avoidance. Freedman (2003) has explored this further in the 
notion of acceptable and unacceptable tax planning. Braithwaite's work has 
considered how tax administrations engage with large corporates to increase 
tax compliance. Even within this approach the issue of discursive strategies, 
the role of different kinds of expert knowledge and the importance in what 
people say has been recognized by Pentland and Carlile (1996) which they 
refer to as the `expression game'. Whilst these studies show that tax 
administration practices are changing, these changes must be put in the context 
of developments in tax administrations in a wider, more holistic sense, as part 
of changes occurring in government. 
3.4 New Public Management (NPM) 
The IR is a department of central government in the UK which administers tax 
collection among its other functions. It is therefore important to examine the 
recent changes to the operations and administration of the public sector both in 
general and specific terms. In chapter 51 look at the specific changes to the IR; 
47 Early Day Motion 1204. UK House of Commons. May 18,2004. 
48 It should be acknowledged that lobbying is different in the US than the UK. 
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however here I focus on the literature concerning with the general changes. A 
key aspect of the general changes to the public sector has been termed NPM. 
The phenomenon of NPM has been evidenced by the reform of the public 
sector not just in the UK but also in other countries such as Sweden, Canada, 
New Zealand and Australia and to a lesser extent France and the Netherlands 
(Hood, 1995) and continues to extend. The core of NPM is to remove or reduce 
the traditional distinction between public sector bodies and private sector 
entities and to shift "the emphasis from process accountability towards a 
greater element of accountability in terms of results" (Hood, 1995: 94). The 
term `New' does not infer that NPM came into existence in 1980s. In fact 
Hood notes that some of the ideas of NPM are just repackaged ideas which 
have been part of Public Administration; however the term `New' was used to 
distinguish this change in public management from other specific initiatives of 
individual countries. 
NPM is not a singular event. Hood (1995) has identified seven dimensions of 
change associated with NPM, as follows: - 
1. "Unbundling of the [Public Sector] into corporatized units organised by 
product, 
2. More contract based competitive provision, with internal markets and 
term contracts, 
3. Stress on private sector styles of management practice, 
4. More stress on discipline and frugality in resource use, 
5. More emphasis in visible hands-on top management, 
6. Explicit formal measurable standards and measures of performance and 
success, 
7. Greater emphasis on output controls" 
(Hood, 1995: 96). 
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For each of these dimensions, Hood identifies possible accounting implications 
which give more attention to cost centres and performance indicators. 
Changes have been seen in management, control and accounting practices 
(Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson looked 
at these changes in constructing organisations as an example of public sector 
reforms. They used three categories to classify the reforms, which were 
identity (autonomy, collective resources, constructing boundaries, being an 
organisation and being special), hierarchy (co-ordination and control and 
constructing management) and rationality (setting objectives, measuring results 
and allocating responsibility and reforms in packages or in strings). Although 
this attempt at classification is helpful some of the classifications such as being 
special and hierarchy would seem to be rather contrived when applying these 
reforms to the IR as the reforms do not fit easily within these categories (see 
Hoskin, Lamb and Tuck, 2001a). 
This form of analysis leads to the conclusion that public sector bodies have 
become more like a managerial organisation with the introduction of financial 
management practice in NPM reforms. This focus on accounting is seen by 
some to be at the heart of NPM reform (Guthrie et al, 1999; Power and 
Laughlin, 1992), although Olson et al (2001) caution against the development 
of this kind of control in the extreme. They refer to an `evaluatory trap' which 
is described as the "pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness potentially resulting 
in a damaging spiral of fewer and fewer public services being provided at ever- 
higher unit costs" (2001 : 506/7). Boden and Froud (1996) express this point 
76 
when looking at the Compliance Cost Assessment i. e. how much it costs 
businesses to comply with new Government legislation. They say that 
"deregulation of the private sector can only be achieved by increasing 
regulatory control over the extent and nature of public administration. "In 
.. sense public sector management 
becomes more management of the public 
sector than by it" (Boden and Froud, 1996: 530, emphasis in the original). 
Broadbent and Laughlin's work on general practitioners and schools has 
looked at the processes of NPM being implemented (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
1998) and with Jacobs, the resistance of the organisation to these changes in 
accounting (Broadbent et al, 2001). Du Gay (2006) is critical of the new 
management methods and efficiency reforms as in his opinion the Government 
are trustees and not owners of the state. He sees NPM as a less effective 
approach than bureaucracy which he sees as being more fit for purpose given 
that the Government are trustees. 
In addition evidence suggests that the culture and the established set of 
attitudes held by Government Departments have changed. The focus is now 
less on the services provided and more on the use and users of these services: a 
customer, and a customer service focus. Public sector organisations have 
adopted ideas from the business world, including turning citizens into 
customers, because they are attracted to the private sector's freedom of action 
(Brunsson, 1994). However the use of customer service concepts is not without 
operational and political difficulties for public sector bodies. They are unable 
to be used in isolation and cannot be divorced from the strategy of management 
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(Fountain, 2001)49. Aberbach and Christensen (2005) examine how an 
emerging customer focus impacts on the role of the citizen. They argue that it 
can be difficult to define who the customers really are and that the customer 
focus on individualism means that group rights and the collective approach of 
the public sector are diminished. Additionally the concept of customer weakens 
the control that political leaders have over the administration. 
The concept of `customer care' within the public sector is problematic as it has 
different meanings to different people. Needham (2006) using interview data 
from central and local government has developed five concepts of customer 
care: "personalizing services around the user; giving users a choice of services; 
users paying for services; treating users with courtesy and respect; and 
improving user access to services" (2006: 851). She concludes that overall the 
customer care concept is supported but with different interpretations of what 
the concept means. 
Political scientists have attempted to explain the nature of the change in style 
of Government (Hood, 1995). Rhodes has examined the new process of 
governing (which he terms: `governance') which refers to the self controlling 
and discipline of departments of Governments which are at the same time part 
of central Government but also have considerable independence (Rhodes, 
1997: 15). "Governance means governing without Government and is the 
ultimate in hands-off government" (1997: 110). Rhodes refers to this as 
`hollowing out the State' (1997: 87). 
49 See Lamb et al. (2003a, 2003b, 2003c). 
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NPM change programmes are manifestly not uniform in form and practice 
across all parts of the public sector (Pollitt, 2002). Such reforms have often had 
effects beyond the outputs of the core public sector, e. g. in health and 
education the UK reforms can be seen as having affected the semi-autonomous 
institutions in the public domain (Broadbent & Laughlin, 1998). In all this, 
there is a general recognition that NPM reforms have initiated changes in 
management, control and accounting practices (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 
2000: 722), as well as the culture and mindset of Government departments. 
Rainey and Thompson (2006) review Charles Rossotti's five year term as the 
Commissioner of the IRS in the US. They highlight the achievements of Mr. 
Rossotti in transforming the organisation and administration of the IRS along 
NPM lines which resulted in improved services for taxpayers. Pollitt has 
reviewed the similarities and differences in public management reform 
worldwide (Pollitt, 2002) and McGuire has examined the similarities of 
customer service charters in Australia, UK and US (McGuire, 2002). 
There are a few studies of the customer-orientation of tax authorities and 
increased importance of marketing to taxpayers. The introduction of the 
construct of the customer to tax practice has received some attention from 
academics, e. g. in the US (Foran, 1999). Marketing to taxpayers has been 
considered by Coleman & Freeman (1994) in Australia and Farron et al. (1999) 
in the UK. 
To date little research has been directed at a central government department 
such as the IR including the nature of the public institution, its services and its 
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relationship to central Government (Rhodes, 2005). Among what little research 
there is, Colville et al. (1993) consider the change management of NPM 
practices in HM Customs & Excise. They argue that there are unforeseen 
consequences resulting from this change in the public sector and any change 
management process in central government must be looked at in the context of 
the changing social environment (see also Doig and Graham, 1998). 
The case of the IR is arguably significantly different from other NPM cases in 
the UK. For example, primary and secondary education and National Health 
Service reforms can be distinguished from IR reforms, to the extent that 
parents can choose (within reason) which schools their children will attend and 
patients can choose (again, within reason) which hospital to attend. Thus, a 
market of competing institutions can be established. But it is more difficult to 
apply the market-driven principles of UK-style NPM to departments such as 
the IR, a department without a natural competition for services outside its 
boundaries. The IR has a certain amount of autonomy from central 
Government but in addition central Government has imposed control on the IR. 
Some IR officials consider that the IR is in the vanguard of the Government's 
social policy (Martin, 2002). 
However following the initiatives termed NPM, the practices of the IR have 
not remained constant. The IR is engaging with corporate taxpayers (the 
enabling process) to improve links and relationships through dialogue, 
discourse and changing practices. Research of the effect of NPM on tax 
gathering practices has been ignored. Another gap in the literature is the impact 
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of NPM on the public servant official - the tax inspector and how the tax 
official becomes a new kind of expert subject. This latter aspect is developed in 
Chapter 7. 
3.5 Links to the Professionalisation literature 
As previously mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, the corporate tax compliance 
process involves elite groups of professionals acting on behalf of the IR and the 
large corporate taxpayer. These groups of professionals, both tax officials and 
in-house tax managers, play a key role as knowledge experts in the corporate 
tax compliance process in part on the basis of being a qualified professional 
whether their particular qualification is an Inspector of Taxes, qualified 
accountant or Chartered Tax Adviser or some combination of these. This 
section briefly reviews the literature on professionalisation. Particular reference 
is made to accountants as many of the in-house tax specialists are qualified 
accountants (Porter, 1999a, 1999b). 
The accounting professionalisation literature has examined the area from the 
viewpoint of imperialism and the professions; inter-professional relations, the 
marginalization of so termed disadvantaged groups such as clerks, women and 
non white ethic origin and commercialization (see Cooper and Robson, 2006). 
Anderson Gough (2002) has looked at the training of a Chartered Accountant 
from a disciplinary perspective. What is of interest to this research is the 
development and influence on the tax profession from other professionals. The 
tax `profession' is not a profession within Carr-Saunders and Wilson's (1933) 
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definition, in that the tax profession is not an organised body of experts who 
have a common system of training, a sole formal examination for entry and an 
enforced code of ethics. Qualified accountants, lawyers and Inspectors of 
Taxes are all part of the tax `profession'. Therefore what is of interest to this 
research is the literature on inter-professional relations. Much of this work has 
emerged from Abbot's (1988) influential work, `The System of Professions' 
which examined inter-professional rivalry (see Cooper and Robson, 2006, for a 
review; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2001). Other work has considered the 
hybridisation of professional knowledge. Kurunmaki (2004) examined the 
hybridisation of medical expertise in Finland. She argues that in comparison 
with the UK, in the Finnish example, calculable practices have been developed 
by medical professionals because management accounting had a different role 
as it is regarded as a set of tools and techniques rather than as a separate 
profession to compete for professional space with the medical profession. 
The IR officials i. e. the Inspectors of Taxes who act on behalf of the IR, are 
`professional' civil servants employed by the UK Government. Rhodes (2005) 
observes that there has been little research, field-based or observation-based, 
until recently into the role of Civil Servants within government departments. 
He himself has undertaken an ethnographic study and cites earlier examples of 
Marsh, Richards and Smith (2001) and James (1999). There has been more 
focus using such approaches on the role of Prime Ministers and Ministers; the 
`Westminster Model'. Rhodes (2005) examines the role of permanent 
secretaries in the British Government. He notes the significance of the ritual of 
tea and coffee at the commencement of meetings which assists in breaking 
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down the formal barriers and tensions of meetings. One previous study looking 
at a non-ministerial level within the IR is that of Procter and Currie (2004) who 
focused on team working processes. They conclude that team working is 
effective when both autonomy and interdependence are operating alongside 
each other. 
3.6 Critical Accounting Research 
In Section 3.1,1 explained that my home discipline was accounting, so in this 
section I review the accounting tax research with a particular emphasis on the 
critical accounting literature. 
The emergence of critical research has enabled new questions to be identified 
and provided new ways of seeing problems. Before I discuss the complex 
power relationship that the IR has with its taxpayers using a lens of 
governmentality, it is important to see where the existing research which 
utilises a governmentality approach fits within the accounting literature. It is 
therefore necessary in the first instance to discuss approaches to accounting 
research in general. Most of the significant approaches to social science have 
been considered by accounting researchers (Laughlin, 1995). Chua argues that 
"[a]ccounting, it appears, remains in the throes of a `scientific revolution" 
(Chua, 1986; 602) and considers research carried out from mainstream, 
interpretative and critical perspectives. 
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Mainstream accounting research could be thought of from the positivist `map 
making' (Solomons, 1978) and post positivist `economic consequence' (Zell, 
1978) viewpoints, mainly as a consequence of accounting research stemming 
from an economics background and the use of the neoclassical economics 
framework. The influence of economics can be seen in tax accounting research 
which was discussed in Subsection 3.2.5. This has led to a quantitative 
methodology being favoured. This approach is still practised by the majority of 
American academics and consequently affects publications in American 
Accounting journals (Ryan et al, 2002: 171). 
Interpretative and critical accounting approaches developed as a `reaction' to 
mainstream accounting research. (Lamb, 1999: 35). The ontology of many 
interpretative and critical researchers is that reality is socially constructed - 
constructivism. The constructivist approach is that representations become real 
in their consequences. People act upon accounting and it becomes reality that 
way, although there is no objective reality behind it (Hines, 1988). Accounting 
cannot be viewed in isolation. Laughlin (1995; 83) argues 
"Accounting is a social practice conducted by diverse social actors. To 
claim that it has generalizable, theoretical characteristics similar to 
gravity is a proposition where there has to be some considerable leap of 
faith. The continuation of the belief "as if' these generalizations exist 
clearly leads to a considerable complexity- reduction process which 
becomes questionable in the extreme. " 
Post modernism, based on a constructivist ontology, takes the view that social 
systems are independent of human control. The human is regarded as the `self 
who through observations "constructs interpretations of the world, these 
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interpretations having no absolute or universal status" (Cooper & Burrell, 
1988: 94). Although these constructs are unable to be generalised they seek to 
inform knowledge but this knowledge is itself a construct of discourse (what is 
said) and the `game' which is being played through the use of language or 
tension between the participants of the game whether these are humans 
(Lyotard, 1984 quoted in Cooper & Burrell, 1988) or things. Foucault's view is 
that the social world is influenced by knowledge and power as these are 
concepts which are interlinked. 
The Foucauldian lens has been increasingly used in accounting research 
(Boden, 1999; Boden and Froud, 1996; Burchell et al., 1985; Bush and Maltby, 
2004; Hoskin and Macve 1986,1988,2000,2005; Hoskin, Macve and Stone, 
2006; Loft 1986; Miller and O'Leary 1987,1994; Miller and Rose, 1990; Neu, 
1999,2000,2006; Oats and Tuck, 2006; Preston, 1989). This research has in 
large part drawn upon Foucault's disciplinary work. Much of this work looks at 
power relations or `power- knowledge' as knowledge in relation to power (e. g. 
corporate interests, the extension of managerialism and the implausibility of 
new more effective accounting techniques). In such work there has been a 
focus on the `managed subjects' as `docile bodies'S° and not on the `emerging 
subject' as an active, reflective and disciplinary expert which this research 
seeks to address. 
Part of Foucault's understanding of disciplinary power is illustrated by 
Bentham's Panopticon (Foucault, 1977a: 200). The central surveillance 
structure is all visible observing the prisoners at all times. The actions of the 
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prisoners are visible to those watching from the Panopticon whether they are 
watching or not. 
"the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic 
functioning of power" (Foucault, 1977a: 201). 
There are two aspects to the Panopticon. Firstly by making the prisoners visible 
they can be controlled and secondly due to their visibility, the prisoners do not 
know if at a particular point in time if they are being watched. As a 
consequence as they do not know exactly when they are watched they become 
self regulating in their behaviour. 
At the same time, the weakness of the Panopticon model (as of the Panopticon 
itself in practice as a prison) was that it does not acknowledge the expertise 
(and cunning) of those subjects within its walls. Prisoners in panoptic 
institutions (like workers in corportations) are not stupid and find ways of 
evading the lines of visibility. Hence other approaches to using Foucault (such 
as those of Hoskin & Macve, and Anderson-Gough) stress the importance of 
acknowledging the equal and complementary role of having disciplinary 
expertise and so becoming, as a subject, a vehicle of positive power, and not 
focussing purely on the effects of modes of disciplining behaviour upon 
subjects who are thereby rendered as passive recipients of a negative repressive 
power that is largely then seen as acting upon them from outside. 
so Foucault, 1977a Discipline and Punish. 
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The practice of making visible an aspect or characteristic allows that aspect or 
characteristic to be regulated as Boden (1999) mentions when examining the 
tax position of the self employed. Accounting may assist with this process of 
making visible (Miller and O'Leary, 1987) However Boland (1987) in a 
discussion of the Miller and O'Leary's paper suggests that Miller and O'Leary 
do not bring out the visibility issue sufficiently. 
"The paper may leave the impression that making visible is akin to 
merely shining a light on something that was simply there but hidden. 
On the contrary, the visibility created by cost accounting is an 
invention. It is a visibility made possible by the discursive practice in 
which cost accounting is located. The person we see through cost 
accounting is a creation of that discourse not a human essence that has 
simply been waiting to be illuminated" (Boland, 1987: 271). 
The issue is not how you become a visible object but how you become a self- 
revealing subject. In other words how this visibility influences in you taking an 
active role as a subject rather than a passive role as an object. I use this link 
between visibility and discourse in Chapter 8 when I discuss the corporate 
taxpayer as a visible customer. 
The `automatic functioning' of power as mentioned above has been 
interpretated as self regulating the individual. Whereas for Foucault the 
regulating of the prisoners was by them being visible, Miller and Rose (1990) 
look to expertise as the regulator. 
"Self regulating capacities of subjects, shaped and normalized in large 
part through the powers of expertise, have become key resources for 
modem forms of government and have established some crucial 
conditions for governing in a liberal democratic way"(Miller and Rose, 
1990: 2). 
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In the next section I discuss one of the particular types of power. 
3.6.1 Governmentality 
Governmentality as articulated by Foucault means: - 
"[1]. The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, 
has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms 
(sovereignty, discipline etc. ) of this type of power which may be termed 
government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole 
series of specific governmental apparatuses, and on the other, in the 
development of a whole complex of savoirs. 
[2]. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the 
state of justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative 
state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes 
'govemmentalized'. " (Foucault, 1979 in Burchell et al., 1991: 102- 
103). 
With the development of disciplinary power from sovereign power, the 
subjects can act as citizens to assist the state in its role as governor. 
Government in this sense "entails any attempt to shape with some degree of 
deliberation, aspects of a behaviour according to particular sets of norms and 
for a variety of ends" (Dean, 1999: 10). Government should be thought of `in 
terms of tactics and strategies of power, of specific, conflictual and changing 
aims, ideals and objectives, and varying degrees of success and failure, with a 
range of consequences situated across the spectrum between the intentional and 
unintentional' (Dean, 1994: 187). Self regulation of subjects makes these 
subjects governable. One illustration of this which is identified by my research 
is that the IR is governing its taxpayers through practices of self regulation 
such as CTSA. 
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However for government to operate there needs to be information known about 
the parties which are being governed. 
"Government is possible only when the strength of the state is known.. 
The state's capacity and the means to enlarge it must be known. The 
strength and capacity of other states, rivals of my own state, must also 
be known. A certain specific knowledge is necessary: concrete, precise 
and measured knowledge as to the state's strength. The art of governing 
.. is intimately bound up with the development of what was called, 
from 
this moment, political arithmetic" (Foucault, 1982 from Martin et at, 
1988: 151 quoted in Hoskin, 1998: 107). 
How the information is disclosed and what aspect of the truth is acknowledged 
is part of a "truth game". This is not "the discovery of true things, but the rules 
according to which, with respect to certain things, what a subject may say 
stems from the question of truth and falsehood" (Foucault/ Florence, 1994: 
315). 
".. forms according to which discourses capable of being deemed true or 
false are articulated with a domain of things: what the conditions of that 
emergence have been; what price has been paid for it, as it were; what 
effects it has had on the real; and the way in which, linking a certain 
type of object with certain modalities of the subject, it has constituted 
for a time, a space, and particular individuals, the historical a priori of a 
possible experience" (Foucault/Florence, 1994: 315). 
In Chapter 9, I expand on these `truth games' in which the IR official and the 
corporate taxpayer each disclose their perspective on the truth in different ways 
and for different outcomes. This disclosure of information is an important 
aspect of governmentality. 
Governmentality has been used in a number of studies in accounting (Bush and 
Maltby, 2004; Preston et al, 1997; Neu, 1999,2000,2006). Some are historical. 
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This is not essential to the use of a governmentality approach. Preston (1989) 
focuses on a taxation episode in a contemporary setting and the way accounting 
and tax expertise renders evasion activity visible and creates compliance. Here 
a similar interest is being examined at a more sustained level across a number 
of episodes. Not all writing within the critical accounting tradition uses 
Foucault's disciplinary work in relation to modem business, new public 
management and the roles of expertise. For example, Foucault's work on the 
`Care of the Self (1986) has been utilised by Anderson-Gough (2002) to 
examine the construction of the subject with reference to the professional 
training of Chartered Accountants. 
The Foucauldian approach is not without its critics both from those who are 
more disposed to a Marxist approach e. g. Armstrong, 1994; Bryer, 1999 and 
Bryer et al, 2006; Neimark, 1990, and from within the so-called economic 
rational position e. g. Edwards et al, 1995; Fleischman and Parker, 1990; Tyson, 
1993. Armstrong (1994), for example, argues that accounting controls are 
different from disciplinary surveillance (1994: 31). He argues, when referring 
to work on standard costing (Miller and O'Leary, 1987), that budgetary 
controls including standard costing systems are alternative methods. He sees 
that these controls have "close[d] off the important question of the conditions 
under which accounting controls have displaced bureaucratic performance 
rules" (1994: 31) and there are problems with these systems as certain 
information can be lost. Armstrong (1994) also criticises this approach in that it 
assumes there is no resistance to power /knowledge. 
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Bryer, utilising a Marxist approach to accounting history seeks to disprove the 
validity of Foucauldian approaches such as that of Hoskin and Macve, which 
focus on US developments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, by 
arguing that capitalist accounting and the modem capitalist mentality are 
already present in eighteenth century enterprises such as the Carron Company 
(Bryer et al, 2006). From a more economic rational approach Tyson (e. g. 
Tyson 1993) has questioned the significance of West Point graduates in the 
development of management and standard costing in the US arguing that 
businessmen pursuing their rational economic self-interest made the more 
significant contributions. Fleischman has focussed on the significance of some 
of the episodes also investigated by Bryer, e. g. also examining the Canon 
Company archives (Fleischman and Parker, 1990; Bryer et al. 2006). 
Interestingly Bryer, Fleischman and Macve have recently been involved in a 
"constructive engagement" in which they have sought to reconcile these 
different approaches so far as it is feasible (Bryer et al. 2006). However, it is 
apparent that significant differences remain in terms of interpretational 
approaches and the significance accorded to facts and episodes that have been 
jointly scrutinised. 
At the same time the approach has been taken up to investigate the ways in 
which financial technologies enable the exercise of governmental power. Neu 
(2000) uses governmentality to examine the purchase of land by first nation 
people in Canada. It is a historical study of the period 1830-1860. Bush and 
Maltby (2004) also utilise governmentality to explore taxation in British West 
Africa in late 1800s to the mid 1900s. Both of these studies show that the 
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colonial powers utilised accounting practices to try to change the behaviour of 
the peoples being governed. Apart from Preston (1989) and Oats and Tuck 
(2006), what is missing in the accounting literature is the use of this 
governmentality lens to examine a contemporary tax domain. 
3.6.2 The use of Foucault to study discourse and practices in tax 
administration. 
There has been a limited amount of research in the tax administration area 
whether historical or contemporary, although Black (2002) examines how 
regulation is achieved through discourse. 
Hobson (2004) uses Foucault's concept of Technology of the Self to examine 
individual tax effective schemes in Australia. She concludes that self 
assessment enables taxpayers to be self regulating but there are no provisions 
to provide for taxpayers who do not have the necessary expert knowledge when 
the legitimacy of the tax effective scheme is questioned by the ATO. 
Lamb (2001) investigates the sovereign powers of the IR in the mid 19`h 
century using the income tax appeal of Thomas Carlyle through the diaries of 
his wife who represented him before the General Commissioners of Income 
Tax in 1855. This historical account shows that at that time the tax 
administration primarily used sovereign powers to secure tax compliance. It 
also alludes to a modem IR whose powers are based on disciplinary practices 
and technologies. 
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Preston (1989) uses a disciplinary framework to examine the practices and 
powers of the IR within a recording company. The case study shows the 
accounting practices of the company were influenced by the disciplinary 
powers of the IR. What is interesting is that Preston is using this case example 
to look at the micro practices of the IR in that he looks at the detailed 
accounting practices within a particular company whereas this research looks at 
the practices of the IR towards different groups of companies. His concern was 
to 
"explore the mechanisms which lead to individuals and organizations 
taking up the explicit and implicit injunctions of the Revenue... [I]t is 
concerned with connections, connections between the Revenue and 
organizations, connections between the Revenue and the individual and 
finally connections between accounting and Revenue practice" 
(Preston, 1989: 411). 
Likhovski (2006) uses a Foucauldian analysis to review the history of the 
Israeli tax compliance culture in 1950s. He shows that the Israeli Government 
utilised various discourses and practices to encourage tax compliance by a 
heterogeneous population of Israelis from different ethnic backgrounds and 
attitudes towards tax compliance, in an "attempt to produce normalized, 
individualizes self-policing model citizens" (2006: 49). 
The CRAKA project, for which I was the research fellow, looked at the 
changing discourse within the IR (Hoskin, Lamb and Tuck, 2001a, 2001b; 
Lamb, Tuck and Hoskin, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). A key aspect of this research 
was that it examined the role of strategic discourse in constructing new 
"customer services" as well as improved "customer service" using publicly 
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available documents and a small number of interviews (five) in the IR. This 
research did not examine the practices which are implementing strategic 
discourse. My doctoral research seeks to address this gap. 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has set out the framework of existing literature which has ranged 
across a number of literatures necessary to develop my theoretical position and 
the basis for the fieldwork. This process has enabled questions and areas to be 
identified not just about specified processes but about the practice of tax 
compliance. It has also enabled me to see gaps or silences in the literature. One 
conclusion I draw is that the tax compliance literature has not engaged to any 
significant extent with the process and practices of tax compliance which 
Pentland and Carlile (1996) commenced. With the exception of Smith and 
Stalanssl (1994) a neglected area is the use of empirical evidence from both 
Revenue Authorities and taxpayers in the same study. In addition much of the 
work that has been carried out has investigated the tax practices and policies of 
multinationals, is economics based and very little has been done in terms of the 
qualitative research. In terms of the NPM literature, there has been little work 
that has examined the actual practices of a tax administration. In respect of the 
Foucauldian and governmentality literature there has been little research 
promoting the interface of the powerful and less powerful (see McNay, 1993), 
truth games and the positive power of expertise. Newton (1998) laments the 
failure of Foucauldian studies to adequately theorise subjectivity in 
organisations. However there is a Foucauldian research line that looks at the 
S' Hasseldine et al. (2005) worked with the IR but their focus was on how taxpayers responded 
to alternate approaches. 
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roles of knowledge and expertise in generating and constituting power relations 
and at the crucial roles played by knowledge experts in such processes 
(Anderson-Gough, 2002,2006; Hoskin, Macve and Stone, 2006). Drawing on 
this work, and on certain possibilities raised in the professionalism and public 
management literatures this research addresses what therefore appears a 
significant the gap in the literature, by seeking to understand the key roles of 
powerful disciplinary experts inside the public sector professional world and in 
dealings with powerful taxpaying entities and experts. 
95 
Chapter 4- Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the methodology and the methods that 
I have utilised to address the research questions. 
In Chapter 1, I noted that the research questions contained subsidiary questions 
such as: what is the process of corporate tax compliance and how is this 
process explained from the perspectives of the parties to the process: the IR, 
the large corporate taxpayer and the tax professional. This changing process 
has multiple aspects at different levels; the tax official, the tax manager and the 
tax professional; the IR and the large corporates; and at the level of the 
interrelationships between these parties. Additionally in Chapter 1, I introduced 
the theoretical approach that I was taking. I explained that I was taking an 
interpretative and critical approach to this research drawing on the influence of 
Foucault. The approach here is to look at: 
1. the use of the theoretical framework of governmentality, discourse and 
practices leading to the production of truth and 
2. the particular forms of data gathering and interrogation that I have 
deployed to fit within this particular framework. 
Theory and data are interdependent. It is not possible to look at data collected 
in isolation as the data depends on the context in which it was obtained. 
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However utilisation of this theoretical framework enables me to explore the 
relations between the taxing entity (the Inland Revenue), the taxable subject 
(the taxpayer), and expert knowledge. 
As mentioned in Section 3.6, the Foucauldian approach to accounting research 
has been increasingly followed (Burchell et al., 1985; Hoskin and Macve, 1986, 
1988; Miller & O'Leary, 1987; Miller and Rose, 1990; Neu, 2000; Preston, 
1989; among others), frequently from a historical perspective (Lofft, 1986). In 
addition the kind of approach I am drawing on has been developed in a number 
of research projects in recent years. Some of these (Anderson-Gough, 2002; 
Lim, 2000) have drawn in one way or another on the work of Hoskin and 
Macve (1986; 1988) and the theoretical framework articulated, among other 
places, by Hoskin (1994) informs Hoskin and Macve 1986,1988,2000,2005 
and Hoskin, Macve and Stone, 2006. In this approach, there is a particular 
focus on how disciplinarity is a two-sided term, which designates both a certain 
mode of knowledge, the knowledge `disciplines', and a mode of conduct, 
behavioural discipline, including self-discipline. Thus the approach draws on 
the ideas articulated by Foucault in Discipline and Punish (1977), where he 
talked about power-knowledge relations with a focus on the ways in which 
knowledge-based techniques (e. g. forms of surveillance, judgement and 
examination) were used from around 1800 to exercise a historically new kind 
of detailed disciplinary `power' over `populations' of `calculable' selves. At 
the same time, it also draws on the ideas developed in Foucault's last work on 
the `Care of the Set f, where particular networks of `practices' were identified 
as the means for exercising self-care in different ways in different eras, e. g. via 
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regimens of physical and spiritual exercise, with `examination' of one's acts 
being a particular technique referred to in the Roman era (Foucault, 1986). 
Hoskin and Macve's approach has focussed on how historically specific sets of 
secondary practices (i. e. those that operate below the level of conscious action, 
as the practices through which people `learn to learn' in a particular way at a 
particular historic juncture) may work to constitute particular modes of 
powerful knowing (such as the modern disciplinary mode) and simultaneously 
to constitute particular modes of conduct (again for the modern era, discipline 
and self-discipline). 
Through a mix of analysis of documentary sources and in-depth, semi 
structured, interview work, this theoretical approach makes it possible to focus 
on the changing roles of management practices and `discourses'. It also enables 
an engagement with the question of what gets accepted as `truth' (as opposed 
both to error and to falsehood) within the interplays between the taxing entity 
and taxable subject over the question of the `correct' tax to be paid in any 
given instance by the latter. The establishment of this truth is of course not a 
momentary or simple process: it will involve the rules for the calculation and 
recording of taxable amounts, written returns containing such amounts and 
where necessary explanations of the sums entered. But where there is not 
straightforward agreement between the parties that a given sum is `correct' 
there must be further examination and possibly argumentation over an 
acceptable version of truth. A key aspect of this thesis, therefore, is an 
examination of the "truth game" or "games" being played by tax officials and 
the taxpayer in the process of corporate tax compliance, with a particular focus 
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on what takes place in those circumstances where there is not straightforward 
agreement, e. g. at those events where tax officials and taxable subjects and 
their advisors meet. Since it is not possible for me to attend and record such 
events as a researcher, this study has done the next best thing, i. e. interview 
participants in such events as to their experience of and their reflections upon 
them. 
This chapter commences with a discussion of qualitative research versus 
quantitative research, following which I discuss previous approaches to tax 
compliance research. I then examine what is meant by the term "discourse" and 
how this is interpreted by Foucault, in order to create a space for a critical 
discourse analysis. In the next section I look at power, knowledge and truth 
practices before explaining the methods I used to carry out the research. The 
data consisted of both documentary/ archival evidence and semi structured 
interviews with the expert officials who are informants to the process. This has 
enabled a rich quality of information to be obtained. It has proved possible to 
track through the documentary/ archival evidence, the pattern of changes in the 
way the IR has operated across the past ten to fifteen years, so to determine the 
extent and nature of the new practices which have set up current regularities in 
the interaction between parties in the tax game. My interview-based evidence 
and the analysis subsequently carried out indicates that the key people on either 
side of the process are themselves aware of certain of these changes and the 
consequently changed `rules of the game', and that consequently expectations 
in going into the game and tactics to be adopted in playing it are now 
considerably different from what was the case 10 -15 years ago. 
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4.2 Quantitative versus qualitative 
Whether research work and the methodology adopted should be defined as 
either quantitative or qualitative depends on the research question which needs 
to be addressed and the availability of data (Silverman, 2001; 25). However the 
choice between quantitative or qualitative is not as straightforward as this as 
the research question can be framed in the `right' methodological and 
philosophical approaches and the method of collecting the data selected 
accordingly. 
A quantitative approach entails collecting large volumes of data by using 
methods such as surveys, structured interviews, questionnaires, National 
Statistics; evidence which can be measured. Analysis of causal relationships 
between variables can be carried out from which predictions are made. It is 
therefore possible to develop general theories across time and space from 
which generalisations and universal laws may be derived. This approach is 
consistent with a positivist viewpoint whereby we can apply scientific 
assumptions to the social world; where reality subsists in external objects and 
is independent of our human consciousness. A hypothesis can be devised and 
tested. Experiments can be set up and repeated in similar conditions; the object 
being to verify the hypothesis. 
Since its development positivism has been widely criticised. One of the 
criticisms of positivism put forward by Karl Popper as described by Delanty 
(1997: 31) is that the logic of science does not proceed from observation of 
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data to the construction of theories or hypotheses52. In addition all observations 
are theory dependent. Observations can never be said to exist independently of 
the assumptions on which the hypothesis is derived. Latour (1987) has taken 
this argument further. In the natural world what you are observing in general is 
inert; it doesn't react and change through the process of observation. However 
even scientific experiments carried out in the so called controlled conditions of 
a laboratory are impacted by `actors' (or more recently `actants') in the 
network; humans, test tubes, measuring instruments etc., all part of a network 
which are interacting with each other. 
A qualitative approach entails most generally, although not universally, `an 
emphasis on processes and meanings that are not rigorously examined, or 
measured (if measured at all), in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or 
frequency' (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994: 4). Qualitative approaches have been 
more associated with the anti-positivist viewpoint which takes the view that 
reality is socially constructed and does not exist independently of human 
consciousness. People construct their social world and the researcher interacts 
with them. During the research process, knowledge is being structured. Reality 
is constructed through social interaction and social activity. 
The choice between quantitative or qualitative approaches is influenced by the 
dominant paradigm of the discipline in which the research is being carried out. 
A paradigm sets the foundation for the majority of the research within a 
discipline. A discipline shares common assumptions upon which new 
52 A frequently used example of this is if I see a number of black swans, I then conclude all 
swans are black. 
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knowledge is built. Kuhn, writing from a physics discipline perspective, looked 
at the assumptions of scientific knowledge and his view was that all 
observations are theory dependent; `the scientific community knows what the 
world is like' (Kuhn, 1962: 5). This is what he regarded as `normal science'. 
Revolutionary science occurs when there is a shift of assumptions and history 
is rewritten to eliminate the trauma of the revolution. There are criticisms of 
Kuhn's model in that it is very restrictive and most social science disciplines 
do not conform to this view. Burrell and Morgan (1979) take the view that a 
particular paradigm is exclusive to one discipline. A discipline which does not 
control its own domain could be thought as one which is in a pre-paradigm 
stage. Burrell and Morgan's approach has been to split social theory into four 
paradigms arising from a two by two matrix; the dimensions being subjective 
and objective; radical change and regulation (1979: 22). This has been 
criticised for being too simplistic in that there are more dimensions of choice. 
(Chua, 1986; Laughlin, 1995; Willmot, 1993). Laughlin 1995 proposes a three 
dimensional model: `theory, methodology and change' (1995: 66). 
This research is qualitative but located within the tax accounting research 
paradigm and especially tax compliance research. It draws on research into 
discourse and discursive practices. My approach differs from much of the tax 
compliance research which has used alternative approaches, such as 
behavioural and positivist methodology, as these alternative approaches may 
not be well suited to opening up the `black box' of the actual practices and 
discourse of tax compliance. 
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4.3 Definitions of discourse 
The constructs `discourse' and `discourse analysis' have been widely used in 
qualitative research in recent years. At the widest level, discourse is what gets 
articulated both orally and in writing. I intend to introduce Foucault's views on 
the nature of discourse since they are of key relevance to the analysis of this 
research. However Foucault's definition is not the only possible definition and 
interpretation. One highly influential research approach is that of Phillips and 
Hardy (2002). Phillips and Hardy define discourse as "an interrelated set of 
texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception, that 
brings an object into being" (2002: 3). Discourse analysis looks at the changing 
range of things that get said (and what does not get said) in particular 
organisational contexts. But discourse is not just about what gets said orally, it 
is also about what gets said in internal documents, press releases and annual 
reports and this documentary communication becomes increasingly important 
but does not supplant oral communication. 
In Phillips and Hardy's view discourse analysis can be regarded as both a 
methodology and a method: it is a methodology in the sense that to carry out 
discourse analysis the researcher must take a social constructivist view of the 
world in which discourse involves assumptions about the effect and the impact 
of what gets said. However it is also a method of analysis and as such includes 
approaches such as narrative analysis and conversational analysis. 
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Phillips and Hardy recognise that there are consequently a wide range of 
different approaches to discourse and discourse analysis. They classify these 
approaches along two axes: firstly in terms of context and text; and secondly in 
terms of constructivist versus critical approaches, where constructivist focuses 
on how social reality is constructed and the critical focuses on the relationships 
between power, knowledge and ideology. On this basis they construct a2x2 
matrix which defines the different approaches into four categories (see Figure 
6). 
Context 
Interpretive Structuralism I Critical Discourse Analysis 
Constructivist Critical 
Social Linguistic Analysis Critical Linguistic Analysis 
Text 
Figure 6- Different Approaches to Discourse Analysis 
Source: Phillips and Hardy (2002: 20). 
The analysis of these categories is as follows: 
" Interpretive Structuralism is helpful in understanding the context of 
large scale changes in broad discourse over a number of years. An 
example is the changing use of metaphors in corporate takeovers 
(Hirsch, 1986). 
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" Social Linguistic Analysis involves a close examination of the text 
which is in written form such as detailed examination of transcripts of 
interviews. 
" Critical Linguistic Analysis (CLA) focuses on the individual texts but 
also examines the power relationships. 
" Critical Discourse Analysis looks at the role of discourse in 
relationships of power and is developed from Foucauldian approaches. 
It differs from CLA in that CLA focuses more closely on the 
microdynamics of the texts. Fairclough (1995) looks at the relationship 
of discourse with language and ideology by examining the combination 
of "a) analysis of text, (b) analysis of processes of text production, 
consumption and distribution, and (c) sociocultural analysis of the 
discursive event" (1995: 23). Fairclough's approach is to take a Marxist 
viewpoint and to examine the domination of the underclass by 
discourse and power `hegemony'. 
Foucault takes a different perspective in that he considers the relations between 
discourse and power and knowledge. 
4.4 Towards a Foucault- based approach to Critical Discourse Analysis - 
discourse/ power/ knowledge 
Foucault's approach concerns power, knowledge and discourse. In his lecture 
`The Order of Discourse' (1981b) he argues that `discourse' is the fundamental 
(and historically grounded) linguistic category, in the sense that we are born 
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into a world of discourse and we develop as speaking (and for most of us 
today) writing subjects through engaging in the specific modes of discourse 
and discursive practices that we encounter along life's path53. In the lecture he 
then explores the operation of discourse with reference to mental illness and 
sexuality. He argues that discourse operates through two inseparable 
components, firstly open discourse which is unrestricted and without limits and 
secondly by institutions controlling and constraining what can be said. It is as 
much about what does not get said as what gets said. Discourse is more than 
just about examining a text54 , discursive practices are 
distinguished by "a 
delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for 
the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts 
and theories" (Language, Counter- Memory, Practice, Foucault, 1977c, quoted 
by Young, 1981: 48). 
Within the order of discourse there will be many specific modes of discourse 
and discursive practice. Such modes and practices will change frequently as 
`new utterances (`enonces') are included. Foucault argues there are three 
criteria which affect such change; formation, transformation and correlations 
and these differentiate a) the field, and b) the individual's discourse and 
53 In this respect Foucault is arguing that the `order of discourse' comes before and makes 
possible the more traditional `orders' of language as defined in Saussurian linguistics "langue" 
or "parole" (Saussure, 1916). 
54 Foucault reiterates this point in "Politics and the study of discourse". He says "what I am 
analyzing in discourse is not the system of its language, nor, in a general sense, its formal rules 
of construction: for I am not concerned about knowing what makes it legitimate, or makes it 
intelligible, or allows it to serve in communication. The question which I ask is not about codes 
but about events: the law of existence of statements, that which rendered them 
ýossible"(Foucault 1968 in Burchell et al, 1991: 59).. 
5 For Foucault, the criteria of formation means the rules which apply to the existence of the 
discourse. Criteria of transformation is ascertaining the threshold when new rules of formation 
arise. Finally the criteria of correlation is how a discourse fits within another discourse. 
Foucault uses the example of the discourse of clinical medicine and how this is positioned in 
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discursive practices. My approach is to use these categories to examine a) and 
b). 
In Foucault's view discourse is always a practice. 
"Discourse is a complex and differentiated practice subject to 
analyzable rules and transformations" (Foucault 1968, Politics and the 
Study of Discourse in Burchell et al, 1991: 71). 
Discourse must make space for text, signified practice and also content. 
Discourse takes place through practices (discursive and non discursive) and 
produces context signification. Discourse cannot exist in isolation. There is no 
discourse without content and significance. Likewise discourse cannot exist 
without "the subject"/ "subjects" which are speaking, writing, listening, 
reading subjects producing and learning the knowledge/ content of a particular 
discursive field. There is in addition no discourse without power effects. 
Foucault sees the link between discourse and power as two way and reciprocal. 
"Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up 
against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowances for the 
complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an 
instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling - 
block, a point of resistance and a starting point for opposing strategy. 
Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also 
undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to 
thwart it"(Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 100-101 in Young, 1991: 
50-51). 
other discourse such as biology and chemistry amongst others (Foucualt in Burchell et at, 
1991: 54). 
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One study where aspects of this can be seen is Knights and Morgan (1991b) 
who examine the role of discourse in the corporate strategy of organizations. 
They argue that by examining discursive practices different understandings of 
the process of strategy can be illuminated. The unintended consequences show 
that the exercise of power and the identity of the managerial subject facilitates 
"the development of a corporate image and rationalizations of success and 
failure for organizations" (1991b: 270). 
I now seek to expand this kind of analysis here by a focus on the interplays 
between power, truth and the speaking/ writing subject. However to analyse 
these interplays effectively it is necessary to introduce the other key 
Foucauldian term "practices". 
4.5 Definition of Practices 
Practices can be thought of as the usual way of doing something or the way in 
which persons operate. There are a number of different ways of looking at 
practices and the use of examining practices to examine the subject/ object 
divide in different ways. 
Bourdieu looks at practices in the context in which they are carried out; 
`habitus'. Habitus is a "system of durable, transposable dispositions which 
functions as the generative basis of structured objectively unified practices" 
and which "produces individual and collective practices" (Bourdieu, 1990: 13). 
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This system can be determined by a number of influences; the social or cultural 
background and the relative position of the individual in the particular field 
being examined. In Bourdieu's view, practices must be viewed in relation to 
the habitus (i. e. not in isolation), that is the concept of how individuals develop 
their identity and the way in which individuals engage in particular practices. A 
critique of this viewpoint is that Bourdieu's view of practices is somewhat 
limited by the constraining nature of the habitus (de Certeau, 1984). 
A different view of practices is taken by Foucault. In order to determine the 
interrelationships between the subject and the object, Foucault looked at what 
is done and what the processes and practices are that determine this inter- 
relationship. By examining and making visible these practices then greater 
understanding can be obtained of the relationship. Specifically, Foucault asked: 
"what are the processes of subjectivization and objectivization that 
allow the subject to become as subject, an object of knowledge? " 
(Maurice Florence: 315). 
and 
"He first studies the practices- ways of doing things- that are more or 
less regulated, more or less conscious, more or less goal-oriented, 
though which one can grasp the lineaments both of what was 
constituted as real for those who were attempting to conceptualise and 
govern it, and of the way in which those same people constituted 
themselves as subjects capable of knowing, analysing, and ultimately 
modifying the real. These "practices", understood simultaneously as 
modes of acting and of thinking, are what provide the key to 
understanding a correlative constitution of the subject and the object" 
(Foucault/ Florence, 1994: 318). 
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Hoskin and Macve (1986) talk about this level of practices being "secondary 
practices". Such practices in fact begin as primary practices in the sense that 
speaking and writing are the objects as our focus when we are learning to speak 
and write. Then they go into the background as secondary for the practice of 
speaking/ writing particular things. In our modem world alphanumeric is such 
a secondary practice as it is taken for granted means through which we 
articulate the things "in writing". In a similar way, Hoskin and Macve (1986) 
argue that in a modem era examining and grading as practices we learn under 
are taken for granted secondary supports to the objects of learning, which is 
precisely why they become centrally significant practices. Therefore such 
practices are always part of what we say and how we act. At the same time the 
sets of such practices change over time, often in small ways. Occasionally a 
new set stabilises and shapes how we become subjects in a systematically new 
way. 
Foucault sees using notebooks and following a teacher as key practices for the 
care of the self in Greece and Rome. He sees confession added to these 
practices in the monastic world. Hoskin and Macve (1986) argue that 
`inquisitio', a formal examination of texts to extract apparent contradictions 
and establish their truth is a further medieval addition found first in Abelard's 
Sic et Non and adopted as a key reading technique in the first universities. New 
developments never totally eradicate older techniques. We can still use written 
notebooks but we have added new ways of establishing and constituting truth. 
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This thesis takes the Foucauldian approach to practices and examines how 
certain practices have become visible. What I am looking at is the expert, using 
practices of data capture, analysing the data so as to generate truth statements. 
In the IR, the tax officials use practices which implement the rules and law, 
commence certain procedures such as enquiries into taxation computations and 
respond to correspondence and analyse particular forms of tax statements. 
These practices constitute the ways of working and they are the means through 
which truth is linked to systems of power. Hoskin (1993) argues that once a 
generation of students begin to learn under constant writing, examining and 
grading practices, they translate these practices into a research context and 
generate new kinds of disciplinary knowledge both in science and the new 
social sciences. His view is that it is precisely these practices that generate 
knowledge based disciplines, but they are also the practices that carry out the 
effects of power and the justification of that power. They are in addition the 
means of ensuring the legitimacy of truths that support the power and ensure 
the indefinite extension of the validities of the truths. This thesis describes a 
modern example of how practices relate to the constitution and maintenance of 
any given truth regime. Particular modes of discourse and sets of practices 
constitute particular forms of power and truth in different eras and form us as 
subjects of our time. 
III 
4.6 Power, truth and the "subject" 
A significant part of Foucault's work concerned the interrelationships between 
the subject, truth and power and the object. Foucault, writing under the 
pseudonym of Maurice Florence, says. 
"The question is one of determining what the subject must be, what 
conditions are imposed on it, what status it is to have, and position it is 
to occupy in reality or in imaginary, in order to become the legitimate 
subject of one type of knowledge or another..... it is a matter of 
determining its mode of "subjectivization"" (Foucault/Florence, 1994: 
315). 
In order to understand the subject - object divide, Foucault was interested in 
the mechanics and practices of power (Rabinow, 1984: 58). 
"Power relations, [Foucault] claims, are "intentional and non- 
subjective. " Their intelligibility derives from this intentionality. "They 
are imbued, through and through, with calculation: there is no power 
that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives" (Foucault, 
1984). (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 187)) 
Foucault refers to calculation specifically in Discipline and Punish. It is by 
calculation and through the `apparatus of writing' that the individual is 
constituted as a `describable, analysable object' (Foucault, 1977a: 190). We 
could refer to this as an apparatus of objectivism. 
Foucault's view was that power is not just negative (Foucault, 1977a: 194) as 
many critics, especially those from a Marxist persuasion, have argued the 
opposite e. g. Neimark (1990). 
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This view is clear already in Discipline and Punish: 
"We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in 
negative terms: it `excludes', it `represses', it `censors', it `abstracts', it 
`masks', it `conceals'. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it 
produces domains of objects and rituals of truth" (Foucault, 1977a 
: 194). 
It is further articulated in the late Foucault/ Florence work. 
"It is obviously not a matter of interrogating "power" as to its origin, its 
principles, or its legitimate limits, but of studying the devices and 
techniques that are used in different institutional contexts to act on the 
behavior of individuals taken separately or in groups; to shape, direct, 
and modify their behavior, to impose limits on their inaction, or to 
inscribe it within overall strategies that are thus multiple in their forms 
and zones of enactment. Such strategies are diverse as well in the 
procedures and techniques they deploy: these power relations 
characterize the way human beings "govern" one another, and their 
analysis shows how, through the use of certain patterns of 
"governance" with madmen, sick people, criminals, and so on, the mad, 
ill, or delinquent subject is objectivized" (Foucault/Florence, 1994: 
318). 
This is about a positive power which involves and implicates the governor as 
much as the governed, the manager as much as the managed. Foucault gives 
this idea a particular embodiment in Discipline and Punish in the idea of 
"calculable man" who he sees as displacing memorable man at the heart of the 
exercise of power (Foucault, 1977a: 193). When we extend this to the insight 
that human beings govern one another we can see those who do via 
management practices do so through being calculable and calculating selves. It 
is here that the term discipline has a special role to play. 
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Foucault constantly analysed and worked on the connections between power 
and knowledge. As Rouse says in his essay on "Power and Knowledge": - 
"A more extensive and finer grained knowledge enables a more 
continuous and persuasive control of what people do, which in turn 
offers further possibilities for more intrusive inquiry and disclosure" 
(Rouse, in Gutting 1994: 96). 
Certain things get validated as truth through knowledge. To Foucault power 
and knowledge were separate and not the same but at the same time part of a 
bigger entity (Hoskin, 1994: 63). Disciplinary power was for Foucault the 
distinct modem but not exclusively modem form of power. Knowledge, 
inclusive of disciplinary knowledge impacts on power. 
"Discipline does not simply replace other forms of power which 
existed in society. Rather, it "invests" or colonizes them, linking them 
together, extending their hold, honing their efficiency, and "above all 
making it possible to bring the effects of power to the most minute and 
distant elements" (Foucault, 1977a: 216). 
One can already see in part 3 of Discipline and Punish ("The Means of Correct 
Training") that discipline in a certain sense has a double meaning; discipline in 
the sense of controlling behaviour and discipline as a separate school of 
knowledge (Foucault, 1977a: 190). 
Hoskin has pursued this further by indicating that discipline is an educational 
term getting learning `into the child' (Hoskin, 1990) which is why pedagogic 
practices have a particular purchase on forming selves and institutions. He 
argues that in the modern mass education based world, humans are shaped by 
pedagogic practices into disciplinary selves who internalise disciplinary 
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knowledge. Further for Hoskin (1988) the world of disciplinarity is also the 
world of governmentality. 
It was in Foucault's later work that he looked at the exercise of power in the 
specific sense which he termed `governmentality'. As discussed in Chapter 3 
governmentality is a whole modem ensemble of practices which govern 
subjects and constitute them in their specific local individuality. This aligns 
with what Foucault says in Discipline and Punish about an older regime of 
sovereign power which focuses upwards gazing purely on the sovereign and 
those immediately around him or her. As Foucault puts it, 
"[t]hose on whom it [sovereign power] was exercised could remain in 
the shade; they received light only from that portion of power that was 
conceded to them, or from the reflection of it that for a moment they 
carried. Disciplinary power, on the other hand, is exercised through its 
invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom it subjects a 
principle of compulsory visibility... And the examination is the 
technique by which power, instead of emitting the signs of its potency, 
instead of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds them in a 
mechanism of objectification" (Foucault, 1977a: 187). 
These practices or technologies set in motion a distinctive new interplay 
between an "objectivization" and a "subjectivization" of the subject. There are 
some technologies 
"which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain 
ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject [and] technologies 
of the self which permit individuals to effect by their own means or 
with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own 
bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to 
transform themselves" (Foucault, 1982: 19). 
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Such technologies are not purely within the self, however. They circulate more 
widely and implicate significant others, often teachers or role models. When 
examining the self, it is necessary to consider the role of such `others'. 
Therefore to examine governmentality relationships we need to consider both 
the `self and the other. The idea of calclable / calculating self is particularly 
valuable in thinking about professional accountants and professional tax 
officials both in the way they do and say as subjects and in terms of the objects 
of their expertise i. e. the taxable entity (the large corporates) and the taxing 
state (the IR). 
4.7 Regimes of Truth 
For Foucault, truth games are a form of power and truth is of its time. 
"Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple 
forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each 
society has its regime of truth, its `general politics' of truth: that is, the 
types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and 
false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques 
and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of 
those who are charged with saying what counts as true" (Foucault, 
1977b: 131). 
There are historically shifting and specific regimes of truth which in today's 
world are a function of disciplinary expertise. Foucault goes on to say that truth 
has five characteristics: 
" "it is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions 
which produce it; 
" it is subject to constant economic and political incitement (the demand 
for truth, as much for economic production as for political power); 
" it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and 
consumption... 
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" it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not 
exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses (university, 
army, writing, media); 
" it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation" 
(Foucault, 1977b: 131-132). 
In this research, these characteristics of truth are reflected: the IR is a key locus 
within government; the existence of political influence on the IR and specialist 
elite knowledge experts. Particularly in relation to tax there have arguably been 
various regimes of truth at work. As indicated in Chapter 1, I would argue that 
one traditional and key approach to generating truth from taxpayer subjects has 
drawn upon an inquisitorial truth regime of the institutional form of 
`inquisitio': the catholic inquisition. 
4.8 Truth and Inquisition Practices 
The Inquisition in the Middle Ages was an ecclesiastical tribunal first 
developed in 1220s by the Catholic Church primarily to control, initially, 
Catharism. Catharism which was viewed as heresy by the Catholic Church, 
centred around the then still largely Romanesque south east France where the 
fragmented political situation of multiple, loose fiefdoms with changing 
loyalties between the Counts of Toulouse and the Lords of Barcelona 
encouraged "heretical thought" and certainly anti-Catholic feeling (Hamilton, 
1981). The first inquisitors were priests from the Dominican and Franciscan 
Orders; the majority of whom would have been University Graduates (Hoskin, 
1990) and experienced in formal oral examinations, grounded in an expert 
mode of critical reading known as `inquisitio'. Abelard had developed this 
form of critical reading in his Sic et Non (c1140 AD) as the means of 
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reconciling apparent contradictions in earlier theological texts. This kind of 
"inquisitio" quickly became established in the nascent University of Paris as a 
major way of reading texts. It was then used by teachers as a way of examining 
students as well as texts. In these examinations the master would question the 
student and the student would have to respond orally. Students whose answers 
were acceptable could go up a step or degree ('gradus' from Latin). Once the 
right of scholarly bodies, the "Universitas" or unified collective of scholars to 
award these degrees was sanctioned by the church, the university as a new 
institutional form took shape. This new approach to truth extraction was 
imported into the inquisition procedures by the very graduates who had 
undergone it as students. The truth extraction was then disseminated widely 
e. g. into the inquisitorial approach to law that is still widespread in Europe 
particularly in France (Vogler, 2005) and in Coroner Courts in the UK. 
In the UK, in contrast to the inquisitional approach the adversarial approach56 
to law is applied. In the adversarial approach the judge acts as the umpire 
listening to the evidence of the opposing parties. Both approaches are 
concerned with finding out the truth but in different ways. In inquisitorial 
systems "the way in which the search is conducted can shape the `truth"' 
(Sanders and Young, 2000) whereas adversarial systems place more focus on 
proof (Sanders and Young, 2000: 15). This research considers interactions 
between the IR and large corporate taxpayers before any subsequent court 
action takes place. Whilst I acknowledge that this court action is based on the 
adversarial approach, my contention is that the role of the tax inspector in 
56 The procedural transformation from the inquisitional to the adversarial approach to law took 
place in the mid eighteenth century (Vogler, 2005: 131). 
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examining the accounts has inquisitorial characteristics in that the tax official 
looks to the facts as expressed in documentation (particularly though not 
exclusively tax returns and what is often referred to as "the Bible" of 
transactions) to establish the truth (Tiley, 2005). Therefore it is my contention 
is that the inquisitorial approach exists still in a modified form in the event of 
formal interrogation in IR cases. 
What is of relevance to this research is not the reasons for the inquisition but 
the practices by which the inquisitors elicit their evidence, although the 
practices cannot be regarded in isolation without an appreciation of the powers 
of the inquisitors. The theoretical powers of the original inquisitors were 
extensive; however in practice they turned out to be limited. Part of this can be 
attributed to the objective of the tribunal which was to make the heretics 
confess and convert to catholicism. The inquisitorial procedure was 
standardised a short time after the commencement of the tribunals. 
Once the offenders to be tried were identified, often by information provided 
by local informants, `inquisitio' could commence. The trial, which was held in 
camera, consisted of the accused, one or more inquisitors and a notary who 
recorded in writing the proceedings (Hamilton, 1981). 
The inquisitor would question the accused via a set of questions which the 
subject was invited to respond. Those accused who refused to disclose 
information, as opposed to those who refused to recant, were probably tortured. 
A difficulty for the inquisitor was when the accused appeared to co-operate 
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with the tribunal, but was equivocal with the truth telling it in a way which 
would be confusing to the court. Experienced inquisitors wrote manuals for 
their less experienced colleagues and "warned them not to ask leading 
questions at the beginning of the examination of a perfectus, since he would 
give truthful answers and the interrogation would be ended; whereas a more 
subtle approach might elicit information which the tribunal would find useful" 
(Hamilton, 1981: 47). This can be thought of as an example of a truth game. 
The issue here is not whether a statement is purely true in the sense that it 
corresponds with the facts, but that the truth disclosed through questioning may 
generate truth beyond the intentions or comprehension of the accused (i. e. after 
the data has been analysed). Truth overflows the boundaries of what has been 
s' said and extends what is therefore sayable. 
The development of manuals enabled the oral inquisition process to be 
extended by written truth games although the manuals were secondary to the 
oral process. The movement to a written form of `inquisitio' is further 
enhanced in the development of forms and questionnaires which combine 
specific questions with a space for answers, thereby allowing "space" to 
become completed by the filling in of the form. Analysing the forms takes 
place through subsequent writing, examining and grading of the answers that 
fill the space, and of any non-answers (McLean and Hoskin, 1999). A whole 
new regime of truth develops which focuses on texts made up of written, and 
so apparently objective, facts and deploys forms of interrogation which include 
S' Thus it is an alternative to the correspondence theory of truth in which the focus is purely on 
the internal coherence of some statements with each other as for instance applied by Arthur. 
Arthur (2004) develops this approach to examining truth in the context of accounting 
statements. 
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written questions and subsequent expert forms of analysis of the answers to 
such questions, and indeed potentially of the questions themselves. 
The relation of truth to power is a fascinating aspect of the overall truth game 
which Foucault addresses in his Parrhesia58 lectures delivered in the 1980s59. 
Here arguably an even older discursive practice finds a new possible use within 
the world of disciplinary expertise. Foucault explores the role of parrhesia in 
understanding truth games. The essence of parrhesia is that it is a form of truth- 
speaking that over runs the boundaries or norms of what is usually sayable. The 
way in which parrhesia plays out, will vary according to the nature of the truth 
game involved, something which itself can be seen, reading across Foucault's 
work, as varying in different eras. So for instance, the kind of truth game 
played in the form of confession undertaken in an encounter with a 
psychoanalyst is very different from that played in ancient Greece, not least 
because the object of the game in the psychoanalytic encounter is to surface a 
truth that lies hidden below the level of intention in the sub-conscious. This 
kind of truth-game, whose understanding is the object of Foucault's interest in 
The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 (1979), engages with a category, the sub- 
conscious, which has no purchase in the world before Freud in the way that it 
does since. 
In these lectures, Foucault gives an example of the truth being disclosed 
through questioning between Creusa and her servant in Ion, one of the 
58 "Fearless speech" (Luxon, 2004). 
59 Foucault, 1983a, `Discourse and Truth: the Problematization of Parrhesia'- six lectures given 
at the University of California at Berkeley. 
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Tragedies of Euripides. Foucault sees this play as parrhesiastic because "this 
interrogative inquiry is the reversal of the oracular disclosure of truth. Apollo's 
oracle is usually ambiguous and obscure, never answers a set of precise 
questions directly, and cannot proceed as an inquiry; whereas the method of 
question and answer brings the obscure to light60" using questioning to cross 
boundaries and get the seemingly unsayable said. My argument here is that this 
kind of tactic can be adopted by either party in a `truth disclosure' game. In the 
tax compliance process, the inspector may seek to make the taxable subject 
speak what is really true whether he/ she intends to or not. This may seem an 
inversion of the principle of parrhesia as `speaking truth to power', but 
arguably it is, rather, an extension of that principle. Foucault poses the 
question: 
"But does the parrhesiastes [the one who uses parrhesia i. e. the one who 
speaks the truth] say what he thinks is true, or does he say what is really 
true? To my mind the parrhesiastes says what is true because he 
knows that it is true; and he knows that it is true because it is really 
true"61 
That ironically is precisely the truth that power in the form of the IR wants 
spoken to it, but probably will not be able to achieve. In any inquisitorial 
question and answer environment truth games are played. How and how much 
information is disclosed (see McBarnet, 1991) influences the outcome of the 
game. Parrhesia is a tactic not just to suppress the truth but also to extract more 
truth by saying too much at the new event. Arguably it is the game. It is a new 
game which is an interplay of inquisitorial methods and examination 
techniques. 
60 http: //foucault. info/documents/parrhesia/Lecture-03/-6. ion. html 
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My methodological approach draws upon therefore, not only both discourse 
and discursive practices but also the question of truth practices. These practices 
are shaped by power relations in particular the exercise of power in the sense of 
governmentality and by expert knowledge. Having outlined my methodological 
approach in the next section, I now explain the methods of my data collection. 
4.9 Methods 
As I have previously mentioned theory and data are interdependent. The 
methods by which data is collected depend on the methodology adopted. A key 
aspect of this research is the access gained to the key informants into the 
process. The methods employed are sympathetic to the theoretical framework 
adopted by this thesis. Two sets of data were employed. Firstly I examined 
archival material such as the Annual Reports of the IR which provided me with 
documentary evidence in which to locate the interviews and secondly, 
transcripts and recordings of interviews. The interviewees revealed 
perceptions, articulated their understanding and silences which set those 
perceptions within their institutional context. Ideally it would be preferable to 
observe the practices. However this was not possible as I was refused access so 
interviews are a feasible way to get at practices second hand. The interviews 
were semi structured and therefore discursive regularities and silences could be 
explored, as the research is as much about what does not gets said as what does 
get said. 
61 http: //foucault. info/documents/parrhesia/Lecture-O1/03. parrhesiatruth. html 
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In the following section I firstly discuss how the research site was selected and 
secondly how the interviews were carried out and the process of identifying 
themes. 
4.10 Selection of research sites 
A key difficulty for researchers in qualitative studies is obtaining access to key 
individuals in an organisation and this is especially so when interviewing elites 
(Hertz & Imber, 1995: x). It is also a time consuming process obtaining 
interviews with elites (Odendahl & Shaw, 2001: 308). Elites, by virtue of their 
position, have a large number of demands on them and on their time, so fixing 
a suitable date in their diary at some date in the future, in addition to getting 
past their gatekeeper (most commonly their secretary) takes a not 
inconsiderable length of time. 
A pilot study of five semi- structured interviews was carried out to identify 
dominant themes in the research and also to ascertain the relevance of the 
research to participants. These five interviews were carried in February to June 
2001 and the interviewees were tax directors or managers or financial directors 
or controllers of corporate taxpayers with responsibility for taxation. The 
companies included a privately owned food company, subsidiaries of overseas 
holding companies and two FTSE 100 companies. The companies were chosen 
on the basis that I had worked with the interviewees when I was a tax 
professional so the interviewees, with one exception, all had a background 
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similar to mine in that they had worked in the tax department of an 
international firm of accountants, now a Big 4 firm, and had left the firm when 
they had achieved senior manager status. These interviews were very wide 
ranging including covering the tax strategy of the companies and the issues 
they had in dealing with the Revenue authorities. I took an inductive approach 
to the research and from these interviews I became aware that an interesting 
research area was the changing relationships between large companies and the 
IR from the perspective of the large corporate. The next four interviews were 
carried out in September 2002. Three of these interviews were with tax 
partners of a Big 4 accountancy firm, as I wanted to get a professional 
advisors' perspective of the changing relationship. The fourth interview of this 
stage was with the tax manager of a specialist financial group of companies. 
The reason for selecting this company was that I wanted to obtain an 
understanding of whether the specialist nature of the financial sector would 
impact on the relationship with the IR. Financial groups were one of the first 
types of groups to be treated as specialist areas by the IR. 
The third tranche of interviews were carried out with tax directors and tax 
managers of FTSE 100 companies. I obtained access through a tax partner of a 
Big 4 accountancy firm. I was able to choose those companies I wished to 
contact. The groups of companies selected were on the basis of having a 
significant UK tax charge in their latest financial statements. I did not select 
those companies whose UK tax charge in the accounts was mainly covered by 
the availability of Double Tax Relief 2 for foreign tax suffered. In this case 
62 Double Tax Relief is a provision within UK tax legislation whereby credit is given for 
foreign taxes paid against the taxpayer's UK liability to tax (ICTA 1988 Part XVIII. 
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these companies would have been less interested in their relationship with the 
UK tax authority as the amount of UK tax payable to the IR would be small. 
They would be more focussed on foreign tax authorities procedures as this 
would be a more substantial cash flow burden as a greater amount of overseas 
tax would be paid than in the UK. 
The number of interviews to be carried out is dependent on when saturation is 
reached and the further interviews do not produce any new information. At the 
conclusion of this stage I had interviewed 14 companies and I was not reaching 
saturation as each group of company had a different experience with the IR and 
there was not a consistent viewpoint. I then decided to look at how the IR 
understood the process to see why I was not reaching saturation. After the next 
series of interviews I understood why I had not achieved a consensus as each 
LBO office is individual and there were no common practices of introducing 
the new procedures and practices. 
4.11 Interview process 
The interviews were carried out as semi structured interviews. Semi structured 
interviews were chosen as they give the possibility of following up information 
as part of the interview. In any interview situation the interviewer must respond 
to the ethical issues arising. An interview is a `subjective gleaning information 
collection process' in a confidential setting, such as an office, where the 
interviewer and interviewee are present (Kvale, 1996: 20). 
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The ethical issues in this research were on two levels. Firstly information was 
given in the interview which could be market or price sensitive or confidential 
in dealing with the IR. The interviews which were taped were either transcribed 
by the author or by a professional transcriber who had signed a confidentiality 
agreement. In addition all the interview transcripts and notes were assigned a 
letter and were not in the name of the individual or company. Certain of the 
transactions of some of the groups would have been in the public domain. 
Where detailed quotes could have been traced to a particular group, for example 
a sizable disposal which would have been reported in the press, certain details 
were altered by the researcher to anonymise the particular group of companies. 
Such details would include information regarding the timing of the disposal 
such as year end dates. These changes did not alter the detail of the quote only 
the particular circumstances. 
The second level of the ethical issue confronted concerned having to deal with 
interviewees who were senior figures with their own, often complex, agendas. 
The interviewees were all informants to the process of corporate tax 
compliance and were elites in their particular sector. These individuals, by 
virtue of their position, are used to presenting and disseminating information. 
The information involved can be of a particular type or the elites can seem to 
give information which on reflection is of little use at all i. e. `just talk' (see 
Ostrander, 1995). Some of the information may be disclosed on purpose for 
dissembling the Group's discourse. It is important to be aware that there may 
be a dual purpose of the interview. As well as an assessment of what I wanted 
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from the interview I also gave consideration to the question, what use the 
interview was for the elite person being interviewed. 
Wherever possible the interviews were taped. The interviews which were not 
taped were either on the basis that the interviewee would not give permission 
or that the status of the interviewee was politically sensitive. Research into the 
IR practices from the perspective of the IR by academic researchers is new and 
this new opening up of the IR has only occurred in recent years. Ten years ago 
it would have been unthinkable to have joint conferences with the IR and to be 
able to interview IR officials without signing the Official Secrets Act. There 
has been some criticism in the press about the new IR procedures and so some 
of the IR individuals were sensitive to criticism and therefore would not allow 
themselves to be taped. For each interview I gave assurances that the 
interviews would not be attributed directly and would be anonymised. This 
does not impact on the research as I wish to understand the general relationship 
between large companies and the IR, not the specific relationship of one 
particular company. 
I dressed as if I was a tax professional for each interview in that I wore a 
formal suit to both corporate taxpayers and the IR. This enabled me to be 
considered as a fellow professional by interviewees, who all dressed in a 
similar way. At the beginning of the interview I established my knowledge of 
tax and explained I was a Chartered Accountant and Chartered Tax Advisor. 
This was helpful in establishing the depth of the interview, rapport and 
established my credentials. In one interview the interviewee was talking 
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superficially about tax and I was able to alter the depth of the interview by 
demonstrating my extensive tax knowledge. My tax knowledge assisted me as 
the interviewees were able to talk in tax code, using terms such as controlled 
foreign companies, transfer pricing and thin capitalisation, without having to 
explain these terms to me. A problem with my tax knowledge could have been 
that I assumed that I had understood the situation. To counteract this, during 
the interviews I ensured that I did not assume my perspective on the 
relationships between the IR and large companies and compensated by asking 
the interviewee to give me examples of issues they were referring to. 
Each of the interviewees was sent a brief email prior to the interview to explain 
my research area in general terms. This enabled the interviewees to give some 
thought to what the interview would be about. I did not give them the specific 
questions which I was going to ask as I wanted the interview to be as free 
ranging as possible. Before the interview I researched the group of companies 
that the tax director was responsible for. This involved looking at their website, 
press releases and recent press comment and examining the most up to date 
financial statements of the groups. For interviews with the IR, I kept up to date 
with current developments by examining the IR website and press comment on 
the IR. It is important to do sufficient research about the particular interview 
site prior to the interview as this has a number of advantages. 
Firstly it demonstrates to the interviewee that you understand their business 
and are prepared; secondly I could ask questions arising out of the information 
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I had gathered and thirdly it gave me a background on which the interviewee 
comments were made. 
I requested 45 minutes for the interview and made sure that I finished the 
interview within 60 minutes unless the interviewee suggested that the interview 
could extend beyond this time. I was aware that the tax directors, tax managers 
and tax partners were sensitive about time and time was limited for them so I 
did not want to overstay. Lack of time is a key issue when interviewing elites 
(Odendahl & Shaw, 2001) so full use of the interview must be made as it may 
be the only opportunity when an interview can take place. In fact I found that 
the most interesting part of the interview was about 40 minutes into the 
interview. This was when the more sensitive issues would be discussed. I 
ensured that my tape recorder did not need to be turned over at this point by 
using the long recording facility. This was because in some early interviews I 
found that having to turn the tape over stopped the flow. 
Each interview followed a similar pattern. I started the interview with some 
general questions about the qualifications of the interviewee and how the 
interviewee arrived at his/ her present position. I then asked questions of a 
practical nature on the tax compliance process before I asked subjective 
questions on what they thought of the changing relationships with the IR. I also 
asked how they thought the other parties would view the changing relationship 
with the IR. This was very interesting as it enabled data to be obtained as the 
how the interviews saw themselves in their relationships with the key parties. I 
did not keep to a formal questionnaire as I found that it was preferable to have 
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a free ranging discussion without artificially breaking the conversation. An 
additional advantage was that it allowed for the possibility of developing areas 
which were not foreseen prior to the interview and enabled me to ask questions 
not previously prepared. I made sure that I asked open questions and I used 
probes such as nodding, looking questioningly and reflecting back part of what 
the interviewer had said. I also gave encouragement for example by smiling 
and laughing, at appropriate points. At the end of the interview I made sure that 
I had covered all the questions on my questionnaire and asked the interviewee 
if they had questions and whether there any further questions which I should 
have asked. This enabled me to see what significance the interviewee gave to 
an aspect of the tax relationship, as frequently they would reiterate points they 
had made before. It also had the affect of giving the interviewee the impression 
of retaining control over the interview so the power relationship between the 
interviewer and interviewee were comparable (Hirsch, 1995). 
In any interview situation the quality of the data depends both on the rapport 
built up between interviewer and interviewee and the questions or prompts 
made by the interviewer. The time between questions, the particular point in 
the interview when the question was asked, the nature of the questions and the 
summary of points made by the interviewee all contribute to the data obtained. 
By not following a strict interview questionnaire and following areas of 
discussion, the possibility of a reluctance of the interviewee to go beyond the 
precise questions asked is reduced. As Foucault notes "as for the person 
answering the questions, he too exercises a right that does not go beyond the 
discussion itself; by the logic of his own discourse he is tied to what he said 
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earlier, and by the acceptance of dialogue he is tied to the questioning of the 
other' (Foucault, 1984; 63 381). This is also part of the `truth game' played by 
the interviewees. 
Each taped interview was transcribed. Extensive notes of those interviews that 
were not taped were taken and these were written up immediately after the 
interview when the interview was fresh and recent. An advantage of taping is 
that one cannot rely on notes or recollection of interviews (Bucher et al., 1956). 
In Silverman's (2001) view there are three advantages to taping interviews; 
tapes are a public record; can be replayed and also preserve the sequences of 
the interview (2001: 162). Different perceptions can be obtained from the 
interview. I found that when listening to the tape or reading the transcript 
different inferences would be obtained which did not occur to me on a first 
reading. Also when taping an interview, I found that I could listen to the 
interviewer and think of further questions to ask without worrying whether I 
was taking sufficient notes. Also I found that the taking of notes could 
influence the interview as the interviewee could read my notes. 4 This had the 
effect of the interviewee being prompted to use words which could be regarded 
as jargon or `company speak'. As the NCP was in the process of being 
introduced and some of the IR interviewees gave the impression that it was 
important to `talk the talk', it was interesting for the research when the 
interviewees used terms such as "taxpayer" or "cases" instead of the term 
"customer" (See Chapter 8). At the commencement of the first series of 
63 'Polemics, politics and problematizations : an interview with Michel Foucault' (1983b) in 
Paul Rabinow, (1984) The Foucault Reader. London: Penguin Books. 
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interviews I asked the pilot interviewees whether they would like to comment 
on the transcripts. Whilst they were happy to give me an hour of their time they 
explained they had many competing time pressures and were unwilling to give 
further time to the research. In subsequent interviews I did not ask the question 
as I appreciated the time constraints that elites were under (Odendahl & Shaw, 
2001) and in addition I did not want to disadvantage any future research 
opportunities with the same elites. 
4.12 Matched pairs 
There are a limited number of groups within the LBO and a limited number of 
Case Directors and therefore during the course of this research I interviewed 5 
matched pairs i. e. I interviewed the Case Director responsible for the particular 
group for which I had also interviewed the tax manager. In one case both the 
taxpayer and case director were aware that I was speaking to the other party. In 
the rest of the situations they were unaware. In all these situations I realised 
early on in the interview with the tax official that the person being interviewed 
was the case director for one of the groups whose tax manager I had previously 
interviewed. There were obviously ethical considerations to be taken into 
account. The tax manager would obviously be sensitive to any remarks which 
could relate to them. I was extremely careful in my comments and during the 
interview to ensure that the tax inspector had no idea that I was relating to one 
of his cases. If I gave a viewpoint I made especially sure that the comment was 
64 At this level most of the interviewees who were trained as auditors prior to becoming tax 
directors, tax managers or tax partners, and tax officials would be able to read upside down 
without any difficulty. 
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as general as possible. Interesting insights were obtained from these matched 
pairs. 
4.13 Coding and Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) 
Coding is a key process in the analysis of qualitative data. Coding enables 
dominant themes to be identified and is an iterative process, albeit time 
consuming. By coding, the interview transcripts and other data are critically 
interrogated, which is more than just repeating the story or conversation held. It 
provides a rigour to the analysis which may not be evident if the transcripts are 
just read through. 
CAQDAS does not supplant the interpretation of the data. There are various 
levels of use of the computer package from one just assisting in organising data 
to enabling searches to- take place utilising key questions. However the 
advantages in using a computer package is that firstly the data is kept in a 
machine readable way so it can be coded in different ways. It also provides a 
convenient cut off point and coding can recommence after a period of time 
away with minimal set up time. This is especially relevant to my position as I 
was a part time student and lecturing at two institutions so I was unable to 
spend multiple consecutive days working on my PhD. Thirdly it makes large 
volumes of data manageable. However care must be exercised when using 
computer programmes to ensure the programme does not become a 
'Frankenstein's monster' in that the technicalities of the programme become 
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the central core to the work as opposed to using the programme as a tool with 
which the process of coding is undertaken (Fielding & Lee, 1991). 
I used QSR NVivo, a commercially available CAQDAS to interrogate the data 
and assist in keeping under control the volume of data generated. I converted 
transcripts, notes of meetings, documentary data obtained from the IR website 
such as minutes from LBF and departmental meetings into rich text format to 
enable the data to be input into the NVivo software package. I then coded the 
documents. The particular codes used were obtained in two ways. Firstly I 
drew up a list of themes arising from my theoretical framework, literature 
review and my previous knowledge of the area. Secondly when I was coding 
the data if a particular section of the text did not fit the coding scheme and 
suggested a different code then I would generate a new code. This last method 
of generating codes from the data is part of a grounded theory approach 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). However my work is different from a grounded 
theory approach in that this was a small part of the coding process. 
The following codes were developed from the literature, my previous 
experience and interrogating the data through an iterative process: 
Accountability Customer Regulating 
Accounting Customer Service Resources 
Adult relationship Disclosure Risk assessment 
Advisors Enabling Specialist 
Appraisal Enquiry Strategy 
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Audit process Fast track T shaped tax official65 
Avoidance Governmentality Targets 
Certainty Institutional Tax planning 
Compliance IR operations Training 
Compliance cost LBO history Trust 
Conflict LBO identity Understanding 
Confront Moral Visibility 
Consistency Negotiation Voluntary compliance 
Consult Power 
CTSA Real time 
Once I had analysed the data and generated the codes, I then reread the data to 
see if the original codes were still applicable and if not recoded the data with 
the new list. I then printed the sections of text under each code which enabled 
me to identify the dominant themes. This second level of analysis enabled me 
to develop a deeper level of identification of themes and concepts. When I 
realised that there were clusters around key themes such as the structure, 
process and practices, tax official, customer and event of compliance, these 
became the basis of the chapters and structure of this thesis. 
4.14 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter I have set out the aspects of my methodology. First I have 
reviewed its theoretical grounding as a Foucauldian inspired discourse and 
°' This is a tax official who both has the detailed deep technical knowledge as a knowledge 
expert but also has to relate, in a broader sense, to the new way of operating in a strategic and 
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practices framework and methods by which I have carried out the research. The 
methodological framework developed here concentrates on Foucault's later 
work, which brings together a focus of governmentality, discourse and 
practices and the production of truth by powerful expert subjects. Second I 
have reviewed the application of this framework through interviews with key 
informants supplemented by documentary and archival information. These two 
sets of data; the interview transcripts which reveal perceptions, articulation of 
understandings and silences, and the other documents which provide an 
institutional context and wider picture in which to set these perceptions, 
understandings and silences give a rich research site. This has enabled me to 
examine the practices of the tax compliance process and the production of the 
knowledge expert subjects. Before looking at these knowledge subjects in more 
detail, the next two chapters look at the structure and processes of the IR which 
are drawn largely from this later set of materials. 
marketing organisation. 
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Chapter 5- The Organisation of the IR 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to address the research questions `How is the process of corporate 
tax compliance changing for large groups of companies? and How is this 
process being managed by the Inland Revenue? ' we need to understand the 
history of the IR and where the new IR is positioned. The aim of this chapter 
and the next is to explain the origins of the IR and how it has changed and 
developed since the re-introduction of income tax in 1842, with particular 
emphasis on the post World War II period. 
The approach adopted here draws upon Foucault's concept of `History of the 
Present' (Foucault, 1977a: 31), on the grounds that the past of this institution 
continues to have a significant influence on how it operates in the present and 
to shape its possible futures. 6 So the IR today may in many respects be `new', 
but it becomes `new' (and gets re-shaped into further new structures and 
processes) not purely through imposed re-organizations of structure and 
process but through the way that its workforce (and its customers) live out such 
re-organizations in the experience of undertaking and undergoing tax 
compliance. 
Given the role that the IR plays in the government of the state (and in enabling 
the financing of the government of the state) that `lived experience' can be 
66 As one recent commentator puts it in discussing this concept of Foucault's: "[h]is primary 
goal is not to understand the past but to understand the present; or to put the point with more 
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understood as a form or practice of what Foucault named `governmentality'. In 
Chapter 3, I explained that `governmentality' is the whole apparatus of 
government. It is not simply applicable to formal government although formal 
government was the context in which Foucault developed the idea. Foucault's 
observation was that political arithmetic was the key technology for the 
governing of the state. The practices of government can be deployed through 
the structure of the organisation which governs and the processes by which the 
organisation governs - `the instruments of government' (Foucault, 1979, in 
Burchell et al., 1991: 100). In this chapter the history of the organisational 
structure of the tax administration in the UK, including the IR, will be 
explored. In the next chapter the changing processes, discourses and practices 
of the IR will be discussed. The basis of the analysis is governmentality, 
concerning both the IR's past as governmental entity and the governmental 
practices deployed. It will be seen that although the practices have changed, the 
governmental principle has continued to hold sway. 
5.2 Localised operations 
A key aspect of IR operations over much of its history has been the localised 
nature of them. Even in the past few decades when the design of formal 
organizational structures has been deployed to generate a more integrated form 
of administrative coordination, there has been much devolvement to local 
levels of discretion in the implementation of policy and the day-to-day running 
nuance, to use an understanding of the past to understand something that is intolerable in the 
present" (Gutting, 1999: 10). 
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of tax offices. One IR official noted in 200167 that the regional executive 
offices of the `Network' enjoyed relative autonomy, and each region has been 
described as a "fiefdom", operating independently of each other and Head 
Office. 
Historically the administrative structure of taxation collection was based on a 
principal-agent type of arrangement whereby the state, as principal, set the 
level of taxation that it wanted from a given locality or set up a customs office 
at a point of passage, and appointed local worthies or officials as its agents in 
the collection of the relevant revenues. From Charles II's time, the net effect 
was that the state developed a local network of such officials across its area of 
jurisdiction (Ward, 1952). So, for instance, in seventeenth-century England 
when Parliament wished to extend the scope and amount of tax levied (Sabine, 
1966), it legislated for a new administrative framework but still on the 
principal-agent model, whereby local Tax Commissioners were set up68. These 
were usually members of the gentry (men of substantial property holding) 
(O'Brien, 1989) in a given neighbourhood who met two times a year to make 
assessments of tax due and appoint (in a further principal-agent structure) a 
clerk, assessors and collectors to organise the collection of that tax (Stebbings, 
1993). In line with the principal-agent model, collection was made according to 
the significant geographical units of the British state at the time, its counties 
and cities. Thus in practice this was a localised system of charge-discharge 
collection, in which the principal charged the agent to discharge a prescribed 
67 As part of the interviews carried out for the CRAKA research. 
68 Some of the Commissioners appointed in the 1690s had served under Charles II. A 
proportion of the Commissioners or their fathers had sat on the Commissions from 1660 and 
earlier Commissions (Ward, 1952: 522). 
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duty and then evaluated the agent's performance. The twice-yearly 
appointment of agents by the local Commissioners was a key way of 
motivating successful discharge of duties. 
Income Tax was introduced by William Pitt in 1799, substantially amended by 
Addington in 1803 and abolished in 1816. It was reintroduced in 1842. During 
this period, the system of administration and jurisdiction previously existing 
for assessed taxes was extended (O'Brien, 1989; Brewer, 1988; Ward, 1952). 
In the early 1800s, the administration of Income Tax was carried out by a 
number of distinct bodies: the General Commissioners who were appointed 
through the Land Tax Commissioners (Avery Jones, 2005; Sabine, 1966: 28; 
Stebbings, 1993) and were responsible for the assessment and collection of 
Income Tax69; the Surveyors appointed by the Crown who had legal authority 
to examine tax returns and assessments before and after approval by the 
Commissioners; and the Commissioners for the Affairs of Taxes. Addington's 
1803 tax showed similarities with Land Tax. For instance the same divisions or 
areas which were the basis for Land Tax, became the same divisions for 
income tax purposes thus retaining the localised structure. The General 
Commissioners were appointed from these divisions. Both the General 
Commissioners and Surveyors had the right of appeal direct to the Courts 
(Sabine, 1966: 21). General Commissioners were still part of the administrative 
process for another 150 years (Stebbings, 1992: 398) in that they continued to 
be the supreme assessing body. 
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By 1797 an administration had been set up (although it had been proceeded by 
a number of different bodies) for the administration of Land Tax and Assessed 
taxes of the Treasury, Commissioners and Surveyors and although the 
appointment of Commissioners was still the result of patronage there were 
steps towards finding the most suitable efficient person. By the time income 
tax was introduced in 1799, Surveyors were acquiring more duties and were 
becoming a key necessity for the administration of taxation70. The localised 
nature of their activities was also a feature such that even in the early part of 
the 20th Century Surveyors had to live within three miles of their office 
(Williams, 2005: 151). It is interesting to note that the Commissioners were 
originally people with local knowledge who were responsible for tax collection 
in their local area and this tradition continued with the regional network of tax 
offices with companies being allocated to particular offices based on the 
location of their Registered office rather than as a basis such as industry type. It 
is acknowledged in the Annual Report for the year ended 31 March 1976, that 
a `local presence is desirable, from the point of view both of the Revenue and 
of the public. It is more convenient for the taxpayer, it makes for a greater 
awareness and understanding on the part of the taxman and it is often easier to 
settle disagreements face to face' (Cmnd. 6734: 20). However it was noted 
there were challenges to this practice, automation, staff shortages especially in 
London and large companies to concentrate their remuneration centres in one 
69 Corporation Tax was not introduced until 1965. Up to that time Companies were subject 
(and still are in certain cases) to Income Tax and other forms of profits tax e. g. Excess Profits 
Duties. 
70 Ward describes the work of Surveyors. "They represented the treasury interest when appeals 
were heard before the commissioners. They attended collectors upon their rounds to help 
extract money from defaulters; they examined collectors' books to see that their balances were 
promptly paid to the receivers. They also stated accounts for collectors at the beginning of the 
financial year, before the commissioners had made out the duplicate assessments, so that 
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location. Centralisation first occurred with the establishment of the Large 
Groups Office in 1990s which will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.8. 
5.3 The formation of the IR- the emergence of bureaucracy 
The IR has been a distinct department of the UK Government since the Board 
of the IR (BIR) was set up in 1849" when the Board of Excise was added. 
Since the 19th century the IR has had operational responsibility in practice to 
collect income tax in accordance with Parliamentary legislation (Lamb, 2002). 
The BIR produced its first Annual Report for the year ended 31 March 1856 
(Sabine, 1966: 87). These reports were addressed to "To the Lords 
Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury" (1867) and therefore this was the 
mechanism by which the BIR was accountable to the House of Commons. The 
later Annual Reports show that the Surveyors have greater significance and are 
"beginning to emerge as the prototype of the modern government servant" 
(Sabine, 1966: 89; Williams, 2005)72 - an early version of the position of 
Inspector of Taxes, the tax official which will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
Each Annual Report of the IR gives details of taxation and duties collected and 
explanations of external influences. For example, in the Eleventh Annual 
Report for the year ended 31 March 1867, the Commissioners point out their 
concerns about the reduction in taxation which was attributable to a decrease in 
collecting could proceed. They were required to watch local proceedings in the courts which 
affected the revenue" (Ward, 1952: 540). 
71 www. inlandrevenue. gov. uk/history/taxhis2. htm seen 11.4.03 
72 In 1785, Pitt as part of his reorganisation of assessed taxes, created the position of Inspector 
to supervise surveyors. In 1798, surveyors were appointed to receive training so that they could 
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income tax and various duties such as fire insurance duty, stage carriage duty 
and post horse duty (1867: 3). 
Bureaucracy comes with structures of administration. The hierarchical 
principal/ agent model in its simple original form is supplanted in such an 
administrative structure. The larger the organisation the more formal and 
impersonal structures have to be put into place to manage the organisation. Due 
to the size of the entity it is no longer feasible to operate using an informal rule 
structure. Blau and Meyer (1971: 4) define bureaucracy as a "type of 
organisation designed to accomplish large scale administrative tasks by 
systematically coordinating the work of many individuals". Weber described 
the main characteristics of a bureaucratic organisation. He regarded 
bureaucratic management as being made up the following areas; defined 
divisions of labour - official duties; authority governed by rules which are 
formulated and recorded in writing, and the duties carried out by qualified 
specialist employees who are organised in an hierarchical structure (Weber, 
1947: 302-3). 
Hall (1963) when considering bureaucracy in organisations used six 
dimensions. These dimensions are as follows: - 
1. "A division of labor based upon functional specialization 
2. A well-defined hierarchy of authority 
3. A system of rules covering the rights and duties of positional 
incumbents 
be promoted to Inspector. This was the commencement of a professional grade of Inspector 
(Ward, 1952). 
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4. A system of procedures for dealing with work situations 
5. Impersonality of interpersonal relations 
6. Promotion and selection for employment based upon technical 
competence". 
(Hall, 1963: 33). 
These six dimensions can be seen within the IR. The organisation of the IR was 
based on functional lines as discussed below. For instance examinations were 
introduced in the late 1870s which covered translation to or from either French, 
German or Latin, mathematics, double entry bookkeeping and political 
economy. The successful candidates were appointed as Surveyors. Prior to this 
time Surveyors were appointed by nomination (Sabine, 1966: 122-3; Lamb, 
2001: 290). The introduction of examinations changed the type of staff 
employed by the IR. The new appointees with a background of "respectable 
lower middle classes" (Williams, 2005: 144), were unlikely to be members of 
the same social circle as the previous incumbents. After 1908, there were no 
specific departmental examinations and applicants for the post of Surveyor 
came from successful candidates of the Civil Service Intermediate Examination 
(Williams, 2005). 
The Report of the Royal Commission on Income Tax 1920 (Cmd. 615) looked 
at the administration of the tax system among other things such as rates and 
scope (Sabine, 1966: 158). Although the measures were not immediately 
adopted certain of the recommendations came in later, such as the appointment 
of Collectors by the Board of the IR and the Board being responsible for `the 
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general management of the collection of the tax' (ibid.: 187) and using the 
General Commissioners as a `purely appellate body' (Sabine, 1966: 160; 
Stebbings, 1994: 66; Lamb, 2001: 295). As mentioned above, up to 1920, the 
General Commissioners had tax administrative duties. These duties were 
transferred to the Surveyors - the Inspector of Taxes thus bringing all tax 
administrative duties under the IR (Stebbings, 1994: 65). The early 1920s saw 
a more centralised and bureaucratic system of tax administration (Daunton, 
2002: 113). The transformation of the General Commissioners into 
independent adjudicators from their role as tax collectors on behalf of the 
Government reduced the influence of lay Commissioners. The work of tax 
administration was now finally within the remit of professional employees. 
Weber (1947) regarded a bureaucratic organisation as highly efficient and 
suitable for all varieties of administrative activities (1947: 309) and arguably 
has a relatively long modem history. For instance, Brewer argues that the 
English Excise in the eighteenth century was a bureaucracy "more closely 
approximated to Max Weber's idea of bureaucracy than any other government 
agency in eighteenth century Europe" (1988: 68). But Church (1981) when 
considering the French ministerial bureaucracy in 1770-1850 argues that it only 
really developed in a widespread way in the modem era. 
"Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy is a specific form of administration 
which is a direct outgrowth of the nature of authority in the policy. 
Administration can and does exist in all ages and countries as an 
intermediary between government and governed. Bureaucracy however 
comes into being only with the rational and legal authority of the 
modern state. Basically for Weber a bureaucracy is a formal 
establishment of professional administrators, organised on rational 
lines, to carry out the wishes of a superior political will" (Church, 1981: 
10-11). 
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5.4 Bureaucracy and disciplinarity 
Weber notes that "bureaucratic administration means fundamentally the 
exercise of control on the basis of knowledge" (1947: 311). Knowledge in this 
case means technical knowledge and knowledge gained whilst carrying out the 
job. As mentioned previously, Burrell (1988) argues that bureaucracy and 
disciplinarity are not inconsistent. Disciplinarity, as mentioned in Section 4.1, 
is a two-sided term: the knowledge `disciplines', and behavioural discipline, 
including self-discipline. 
Bureaucracy is subject of much criticism - too much form filing, too many 
regulations ("red tape") and inefficiency (du Gay, 2000; Parker 1993). NPM is 
seen to oppose bureaucracy and introduce reforms for the `better' (du Gay, 
2000: 6). It describes the introduction of commercial practices from the private 
sector such as competition between suppliers, market type practices, customer 
focus and increasingly performance management targets. The latter utilises 
targets against which performance of the organisation is measured. 
In the next section I look at the impact of bureaucracy and the movement away 
from it in the structure of the IR. 
5.5 The Organisational Structure of the IR 
An illustration of the impact of the move from bureaucracy to NPM can be 
seen when comparing the organisational charts of the IR for the years ended 31 
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March 1969 (Figure 7), year ended 31 March 1976 (Figure 8), year ended 31 
March 1983 (Figure 9), as at September 1993 (Figure 10) with the latest 
structure before the merger with HM Customs and Excise in April 2005 
(Figure 11). 
Figure 7 below shows the organisation structure of the IR as at 31 March 1969 
(Cmnd: 4262 : 13). What is of interest here is that the chart is organised on 
functional lines. However it is not clear how the separate sections (or offices) 
report to the `The Secretaries' Office' comprising the three divisions; Stamps 
and Taxes; Establishments; and Statistics and Intelligence. 
In 1975, following a review of the general organisation of the IR, the structure 
of the department was altered so that a common head office made up of four 
divisions was set up (Figure 8). These divisions consisted of Policy; 
Management; Technical and Finance. In addition a regional structure was set 
up to take over Income tax assessing and recovery work. The primary aim of 
the new structure was to improve management, with a secondary aim of 
improving service to the Government and the Public as the allocation of 
resources could be made more easily, tax inspectors could be deployed for 
specialist work and in the future the assessing and collection operations could 
be combined (Cmnd. 6302: 4). 
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Figure 7- Organisational Structure of the IR as at 31 March 1969 (Cmnd. 
4262: 3). 
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This new structure remained substantially the same for a number of years as 
shown in Figure 9. The impersonal form of the structure is demonstrated by 
departments being given titles as PI (Personal taxation), P2 (Collection and 
Enforcement), Ml (Personnel), M2 (Manpower and Training), TI (Profits, 
Capital Gains), T2 (Avoidance and Evasion, with responsibility for the Special 
Offices and International) etc. This is an example of a still functional 
organisation but one demonstrating divisional bureaucracy; functional as the 
departments are tax driven such as P6 Capital Gains tax and P7 Development 
Land tax but also bureaucratic in that the departments are labelled in an 
impersonal way and the structure allows for the flow of information upwards to 
either a deputy chairman or a director general. 
The annual report for the year ended 31 March 1983 (Cmnd. 9305: 5) refers to a 
number of internal management reviews including; 
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" Review of the Collection Service 
" Review of the tax office network 
The main theme of these two reviews was rationalisation. The number of 
Collection offices and tax offices reduced and a common system of staffing 
these offices was introduced. Previously the Collection Offices and the Tax 
Offices had different systems of staff grading and career patterns. 
" Line Management and Inspection System 
The theme of the recommendations arising from this report was to increase 
the `accountability of tax office managers and to enable more effective 
monitoring of local performance to be carried out by Regional Managers' 
(Cmnd. 9305: 6). This recommendation was in line with the Financial 
Management Initiative (Cmnd. 9058). The aim of this was to increase the 
amount of financial and management accounting information received by 
the Board and other managers regarding tax revenues and administration 
costs. 
The overall aim of these changes was to improve the efficiency in the 
department (Cmnd. 9576: 6). Thus it may be seen that the IR developed into a 
classic bureaucracy where certain forms of management practices were already 
in place. In Hoskin and Macve's (1986,1988) terms, these are the practices of 
writing (key to any bureaucratic system and process), plus forms of examining 
(of texts and people) and grading of performance. However within the new IR 
under the NPM regime these practices remain in place, but certain ways of 
deploying them intensify, e. g. through the articulation of quantifiable 
performance targets and measurement systems, plus more intensive forms of 
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Organisation Structure of the IR as at 31 March 1983 (Cmnd. 9305 : 16) 
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accounting and accountability (e. g. the attempted implementation in the Civil 
Service of Resource Based Accounting). So in the new `strategic IR', top 
management continues to deploy the same management practices but now they 
serve the new purpose of `doing strategy' (Hoskin, Lamb and Tuck, 2001). The 
next section discusses this new `strategic IR'. 
5.6 The Changing IR 
Following the 1991 White Paper `Competing for quality' (Cm 1730) and 
policies introduced by the Citizens Charter (Cm 1599), and Next Steps, the 
Board of the IR decided that significant change to the structure and processes 
of the IR was needed (NAO, 1996). This resulted in a ten year change 
programme starting in 1992. The change programme focused on four important 
areas "known as the "Four Cs": 
" Customer service - to gain a significant improvement in customer 
service by getting people's tax affairs right first time; 
" Compliance - to gain a steady improvement in compliance; with 
the right amount of tax paid at the right time; 
Cost efficiency - to gain a significant reduction in costs and 
provide value for money in everything the Department does; 
" Caring for staff - to recognise that people are the Department's 
most important asset" (NAO, 1996: 1). 
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These "Four Cs" were translated into a programme which reorganised the 
office structure; simplified and streamlined processes; improved use of IT and 
changed the culture of the Department (NAO, 1996: 1)73. 
"The purpose of the restructuring is to improve the quality of service to 
taxpayers, whilst increasing efficiency and reducing operating costs. But 
the office reorganisations are also a part of a much wider programme of 
change designed to streamline and simplify procedures, make more 
effective use of information technology and improve the way in which 
work and people are managed" (Gilbody, 1993: 18). 
The structure of the tax offices was altered. The Collector offices were merged 
with tax offices and separate tax offices were set up (Taxpayer Service Offices, 
Tax Enquiry Centres and Tax District Offices, Cm 2665: 11). In addition, as a 
consequence of this review new processes were introduced such as Income Tax 
Self Assessment (ITSA) and subsequently CTSA. ITSA especially came to 
dominate the change programme in the mid 1990s. These new processes 
enabled corporate tax compliance processes to develop later as is discussed in 
Chapter 6 below. 
5.7 "The modernised IR" 
Both the activities of the IR and their approach to their responsibilities have 
altered following on from the White Paper "Modernising Government" (1999, 
Cm 4310: 13). This White Paper focused on "five key commitments [of the 
then government]: policy making; responsive public services; quality public 
services; information age government and valuing public services. The 
objective of the government in introducing these commitments was to 
73 See Lamb, Tuck and Hoskin (2003). 
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modernise government so that "[b]etter government make life better for 
people" (Cm 4310: 13). In response to this White Paper, the IR responded to 
the needs of its customers. 
"In line with the Modernising Government agenda, we want to make it 
as easy as possible for our customers to do what is needed at the right 
time, at minimum cost" (Cm 4477: 6). 
In Chapter 8,1 will consider the impact of this customer construct in more 
detail. 
The activities of the IR were widened with the additional responsibilities of the 
Contributions Agency and parts of the Benefits Agency in April 1999 (Cm 
4477: 5) and the Child Benefit Centre transferred in 2003 (Cm 5304: 4). 
Figure 11 shows the Organisation structure of the IR before the merger with 
HM Customs & Excise on 31 March 2004. This chart shows the IR divided 
into functional departments including the names of those personnel responsible 
for the departments. In addition the chart also makes clear the reporting lines. 
I have reviewed the organisation charts of the IR from 31 March 1969 up and 
including as at 31 March 2004 prior to the merger. These charts depict the 
change in structure of the IR from an organisational structure based on 
different types of taxes to one which is based on functional activities reflecting 
NPM characteristics. 
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5.8 Emergence of the Large Groups office74 
As previously mentioned in Section 5.2 the assessment and collection of taxes 
were very localised. For a company, the particular tax district dealing with its 
tax affairs was dependent on where the registered office was located. As 
mentioned above there are no provisions to look at a group as a sole entity for 
tax purposes; each individual company in the group has to be examined by 
itself. In the 1980s, for a particular group of companies, it was not uncommon 
to deal with a number of tax districts and therefore a number of different tax 
inspectors, if the individual companies in the group did not have a common 
registered office address. The registered office frequently would be different 
from where the operations of the company took place as normally the 
registered office would be the site of the group's head office. 
The IR had little coherent strategy for dealing with these groups. The method 
of examination was dependent on the individual district inspector and whether 
they were technically competent and what they chose to look into. An effect of 
this is that the issues would be considered separately and there was no joining 
up of issues unless the cases were referred to Head Office, for example, on a 
technical issue. There is evidence that some Inspectors liked having a large 
business in his district as there were more complex tax issues to be investigated 
and often it was his major case (Tax partner, A4; Senior official, IR3)75. In 
" The information in this section is taken from interview notes of interviewees who were IR 
officials at the time of the reorganisation. The documents referred to are not publicly available. 
's I refer to each interview as to the type of person, tax official, tax manager, tax advisor. Each 
interview has been given a number which designates the particular interview as set out in 
appendix 1. 
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addition at that time, in the words of one IR official, "the IR thought they knew 
best about tax issues". In the opinion of the IR official this was also reflected 
by companies. In his experience a large company would have been very wary 
about challenging the IR about tax technical issues. However this changed in 
the 1970s, in his view, with the increase in the rate of Corporation tax to 52%, 
an increase in the number of specialist tax advisors and the state of the 
economy leading to an active tax planning industry becoming established76. 
In December 1983 a review of the 58 Tax Offices headed by Principal 
Inspectors of Taxes (Cmnd. 9305: 6) was completed. The Committee 
undertaking the review was headed by Barry Pollard, who was a senior 
manager in Head Office, and recommended what were called Pollard districts 
(Tax partner, A4,2003). This recommendation meant that without changing 
the basic organisation, where a Principal Inspector was in charge of a district 
all the files for a particular group were transferred to that one office. This 
allowed all the companies in a group to be looked at in the same location. 
However the IR still looked at cases for tax purposes on a company by 
company basis. There was no expectation that the group would be looked at as 
a group, which is logical for tax law purposes. Although these were specialised 
offices headed up by one principal inspector and supported by four or five 
inspectors and one secretary, they still retained all their other work including 
smaller companies. Most of these specialist offices were located in London 
because the registered offices of most groups of companies were located there 
and the rules of allocation of cases were still based on geographical area which 
76 There were a number of leading tax cases challenging the IR which the IR won such as 
Furniss v Dawson (55 TC 324). 
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is evidence of the enduring nature of historical structures. Some of these 
offices were quite specialised, for example banking and insurance, due to the 
nature of the groups of companies in a particular location. In the mid 1980s 
with the increased pressure on the IR on recruiting and retaining staff in 
London, some of these offices were moved outside London to the regions. IR 
staff could obtain significantly better remuneration in the private sector at that 
time and were prized by the firms of accountants who recruited them, for their 
`inside' knowledge of the IR. 
The position after Pollard in the opinion of one tax official interviewee (Senior 
official, IR4,2003), was that some groups were held to be more important than 
others for no real reason. There was no separate organisation for groups. In 
1993, the Davenport Report was issued which looked at groups of companies 
being dealt with on an group basis with other large groups. It also coincided 
with a number of tax offices moving out of London. In 1995 Manchester tax 
district became a pilot district for the new system based on the 
recommendations of the Davenport Report (Senior official, IR4,2003). Non- 
large groups work was shipped out and the tax district retained its staff 
although compared with the old system they had less work to do. This enabled 
resources to be freed up to spend extra time on major cases such as large 
groups of companies. The experiment was successful and the Pollard Advisory 
Group review ("PAG") looked at the work post Davenport. These special 
districts (known as PI77 districts) were individually run and very small and 
acted independently. They numbered about 70 in total and were part of the 
77 Principal Inspector 
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regional office structure, although a view was expressed by one interviewee 
that the line management structure was never straightforward. In the opinion of 
one IR official there was very little direction from the regional office. In the 
North West the then Regional Director had 7 tax districts, which were very 
small consisting of 1 PI, 3 or 4 assistants and a secretary. The Regional 
Director had also to run the rest of the regional business, which included the 
local tax office network. Often he was preoccupied in dealing with the bulk of 
the other work. In addition the PIs in these small districts were very much 
technically advanced in tax knowledge compared with the Regional Director. 
There was no co-ordinated regional structure. Each region was fairly 
autonomous and these small districts dealing with the large corporates followed 
their own particular region's policy. As a result there was little consistency 
across the IR as a whole in the way of dealing with large groups of companies. 
An IR official expressed the view that the issues that PAG raised were about 
more control, more governability and accountability for the change (Senior 
official, IR4,2003), which at the time raised concern among the PIs. 
In 1994 in London, the Large Groups office was set up (Cm 2665: 8) which 
subsumed the large specialist offices from the local London regional 
management offices. This was the forerunner to the establishment of the LBO. 
"It was intended that there would be taxpayer benefits arising out of the 
changes, but I was not going to kid anybody in saying that this was a 
customer driven initiative. It was entirely an initiative designed to 
create greater yield by making the tax units dealing with the biggest tax 
payers more efficient in the way in which they were dealing with those 
individuals, designed to create more money. Again it's a simple 
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background; if you enquire into those that have the biggest numbers 
you're likely to get the biggest numbers in return. You know, if you 
spend all your money enquiring into fish and chip shops you won't 
create a great deal of extra yield. If you spend all your resources 
looking at the FTSE 200 and the Fortune 500 end in the UK you're 
likely to get more extra yield, and the reason for that is that you need to 
understand the profile of the tax take in the UK. " (Tax manager, ex IR 
official, C 10,2003). 
In many ways, NPM is easier to implement in a discrete stratified sample of 
taxpayers such as large corporates as the tax affairs of large corporates are 
harmonised to some extent. 
5.9 The Large Business Office 
The Large Business Office ("LBO") was set up on 1 August 1997 to deal with 
the largest corporate taxpayers with a new structure consisting of 15 offices 
(Cm 4079: 23). This was a move away from the 70 or so office (PI districts) 
structure. This number of offices has subsequently been reduced to 13 with 
four in London and the rest distributed around Great Britain. This was because 
two of the offices were becoming too small to be efficient in the view of one 
interviewee (Senior official, IR7). The size of an office is influenced by the 
number of groups of companies within that office. If two groups dealt with by 
different LBO offices merge then the enlarged group will be sited in one LBO 
office only. There is no precise definition of what constitutes the criteria for a 
"large" group to be included in the LBO. The criteria for large is based on a 
scoring system which takes into account both the size of the group and 
behavioural factors such as attitude towards tax avoidance and the extent of tax 
planning undertaken (LBO official, LBOI, 2003). 
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With the introduction of the LBO there were 4 changes to the districts: 
1. The full role of the Davenport Report was applied only to multinationals 
2. Groups were treated as Groups - the official IR's divisions were broken 
down. Although legally the individual companies were dealt with 
separately by the IR, the transactions of the group would be looked at as a 
whole e. g. financing arrangements. 
3. Each separate and individual regional office was run like a professional 
partnership by the Case Directors. 
4. These professional partnerships were under single line management - the 
LBO. The LBO head office was responsible for the management of all 
LBO offices. 
Each separate LBO office has a different management structure. Each LBO 
office has a slightly different organisational structure but in the main consists 
of 4 or 5 senior Inspectors who are part of the Senior Civil Service. There is no 
one person in charge of the particular office; the office is run by a management 
team - what is referred to internally as a "professional partnership". Although 
groups of these offices are under the control of a deputy director, the individual 
offices remain fairly autonomous. Each office has an office manager who is 
either part of the management team or, more likely, a dedicated manager who 
is responsible for running the office on a day-to-day basis. For example, one 
particular LBO office had six senior inspectors (Case Directors) and each was 
allocated a major corporate group which is a household name. Each group will 
be allocated a number of hours from the budget. These hours represent the time 
that it is felt should be spent looking at the particular corporate group's tax 
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affairs by the LBO case team. In addition each case director will have a variety 
of smaller groups to be examined with any remaining unbudgeted time 
available. On each group, there will be a team of Inspectors of different grades, 
numbering up to four on the larger groups. These inspectors operate on a 
matrix system in which they work for a variety of case directors; in other words 
they will not work in the same work team for each case. The case director in 
charge of the team will have a certain proportion of the time of each of these 
different inspectors allocated to the group and they will define responsibilities 
for each of their subordinate inspectors on how the work on the group is 
divided and handled. In May 2004, there were plans to reduce the number of 
offices to increase specialisation. In London the 4 LBO offices, which deal 
with banks, financial institutions and insurance companies have now been 
merged into one financial office with a line management structure and a single 
person responsible for the combined office, thereby ending the professional 
partnership management structure. 
Since their formation there has been further specialism in addition to the 
Financial Office, as each LBO office has a sector specialist interest such as 
Telecom companies, property companies or banks etc. The IR take the view 
that advantages can be gained from sector specialism as information about 
specific complex issues, both commercial and taxation, affecting the particular 
industry can be shared within the IR In addition this structuring by sector is 
mirroring the structure of the Big 4 accountancy firms (Tax partner, A2,2002). 
As the then chairman of the IR, Sir Nicholas Montagu said in 2003. 
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"Specialisation, where it makes sense, and the concentration of work 
into more specialised business streams have been a growing feature of 
our structure over recent years. One of the first of these was the creation 
of the Large Business Office, or LBO, handling the affairs of large 
corporations and public sector employers. This has enabled us to devote 
some of our best technical experts to helping the customer organisations 
get and keep their affairs in order, and also to policing them effectively 
and detecting things going wrong, or risks, at an early stage. In a recent 
survey an overwhelming majority of large companies rated the LBO as 
effective in identifying and helping to resolve risks, and had confidence 
in their knowledge of tax law and practice" (Montagu, 2003)78. 
This move from functionalist specialisation by tax to sector specialist focus is 
an indication of the move from bureaucracy to NPM. In particular the structure 
of the organisation is being tailored to the taxpayer (customer) sectors as 
opposed to functional structures internal to the IR such as based on the 
particular type of tax. 
5.10 NPM versus Bureaucracy 
As mentioned previously NPM is seen by some to be the saviour of 
bureaucratic public administrations. The introduction of NPM or 
entrepreneurial goverance79 is seen to be the paradigm in opposition to the 
Weberian ideal of a bureaucratic structure (Du Gay, 2000: 6). Du Gay criticises 
this move towards NPM. In his book "In Praise of Bureaucracy" he argues that 
78 Reproduced in Lamb, Tuck and Hoskin, (2003b : 41). 
"" Entrepreneurial governments promote competition between service providers. They 
empower citizens by pushing control out of the bureaucracy, into the community. They 
measure the performance of their agencies , focusing not on inputs but on outcomes. They are driven by their goals - their missions - not by rules and regulations. They redefine their clients 
as customers and offer them choices - between schools, between training programs, between 
housing options. They prevent problems before they emerge, rather than simply offering 
services afterward. They put their energies into earning money, not simply spending it. They 
decentralize authority, embracing participatory management. They prefer market mechanisms 
to bureaucratic mechanisms. And they focus not simply on providing public services but on 
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bureaucratic officials' role was "administration". This had two parts; firstly 
policy advising and secondly management where management meant 
"mobilising and co-ordinating resources to carry out accepted policy" (Parker. 
1993: 170). However the new discourse of public administrators is that 
administration has been replaced by management (du Gay, 2000: 137) which 
creates difficulties as management is not a synonym for administration. 
Managers carry out policy which has been defined by senior management for 
that particular organisation, whereas as civil servants, managers implement 
policy in a wider framework such as advising on legislation, dealing with other 
Governments, administering justice and regulating activities. Du Gay is not 
arguing that entrepreneurial governance should not be applied to the public 
sector but it should be recognised that public servants have a role which is 
greater than just maximising the '3Es80'; their role is to act ethically in the 
State or public interest (du Gay, 2000: 144) - the `ethos of office'. It is thus 
interesting to understand what it is to be a civil servant in that sort of 
environment. Under the old principal/ agent model, the tax administration was 
delegated to the agent with minimal intervention. However with bureaucratic 
practices each level of administration reflects the principal/ agent model. There 
is scope for invisibility as there is little investment in surveillance and control. 
For instance the regional office structure of tax offices outside the LBO was 
referred to by an IR official as a fiefdom. The bureaucratic rules defined the 
subjects. However with more complex practices, the formalised structure is 
broken down so that new practices and functions such as marketing are outside 
the previous formal structure. These new structures create space for elite 
catalysing all sectors -public, private and voluntary - into action to solve their community's 
problems. (Osbourne and Gaebler, 1992: 19-20 quoted in du Gay, 2000: 5). 
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specialist knowledge experts. This ethos of office is taken up in Chapter 7 
which looks at the changing role of the tax official. 
5.11 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has examined the move from bureaucracy to NPM reflected in the 
IR's organisation charts. It has traced the development of localised operations 
and the setting up of the LBO. The focus of the chapter has been on the 
structure of the organisation of the IR to illustrate the new practices being 
embedded within the IR as a response to NPM. The next chapter discusses the 
new practices and processes introduced to the Corporation Tax compliance 
game. 
80 Economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
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Chapter 6- Processes and Practices 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter considered the changes to the organizational structure of 
the IR which have arisen as a result of the move from a bureaucratic structure 
to one which reflects NPM. The purpose of this chapter is to extend the 
analysis and to look at the processes and practices of tax compliance which 
have been influenced by this move. This chapter looks at the practices which 
large corporates engage in with the IR to submit their tax computations and 
how those practices have changed as a consequence of a change in the 
legislative process for filing tax computations and against a background of a 
changing IR using both documentary and interview data. These practices have 
been influenced by the move from direct bureaucratic control within the IR to 
one in which governance principles are being utilized as was discussed in the 
previous chapter. This involves taking a managerial approach to tax 
compliance, focusing on the method of service delivery as well as the tax 
collection process. 
6.2 The Managerial and Strategic IR 
The changes to the IR have not been limited to the range of its activities being 
expanded and the changes in its organizational structure which were discussed 
in the previous chapter. The new approach can be seen in the wider 
appreciation of managerial activities such as strategic policy making; 
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reconceptulising the taxpayer as a customer; new IT approaches; performance 
targets and the introduction of the Resource Accounting and Budgeting system. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Hoskin, Lamb and Tuck (2001b: 2) suggest that 
the IR has moved from being a two box entity to a four box entity to which 
they refer as the IR 'boxology', as set out in a figure repeated here for 
illustrative purposes. 
"The Inland Revenue `boxology"' 
Source: Table 1 Hoskin, Lamb and Tuck (2001b) 
The bureaucratic stage of the IR is the inward facing IR whereas the outward 
facing IR is the new style strategic and managerial IR. This model illustrates 
that the impact of NPM is not changing the IR into a completely new entity 
with private sector characteristics, but rather, the 'managerial and strategic IR' 
has within it embedded bureaucratic practices. Marketing practices have been 
introduced to this process: the taxpayer has been relabelled as a 'customer' 
(and a marketing director was appointed in November 2001). 
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Public sector agreements with measurable targets were introduced following on 
from the 1998 White Paper, `Public Services for the Future: Modernisation 
Reform Accountability' (Cm 4181) and its 1999 supplement (Cm 4315). With 
the greater emphasis on performance targets some change areas have become 
more significant than others. Hoskin, Lamb and Tuck (2001 a, 2001 b) identified 
four areas of change: policy, operational, technological and perception. These 
areas are interdependent. 
9 Policy. The traditional role of policy has been extended to encompass the 
widened activities of the IR: 
"We have established with Customs & Excise a joint policy steering 
group with senior representatives from both Departments. The group 
ensures that policies are co-ordinated and reflect the lives of citizens 
rather than the boundaries or working practices of a Government. 
Where other Government Departments have a shared interest in policy 
development we ensure our advice reflects consultation with them. 
Our overall aims are to give Ministers comprehensive, timely and high- 
quality analysis and policy advice which reflects wider Government 
policies of encouraging work, enterprise and competitiveness while 
promoting fairness and delivering environmental objectives. 
Consultation with our customers also forms a key part of our policy 
work and where we implement legislative changes we aim to do so in a 
way that minimises the administrative burden" (Cm 5029: 25-26). 
Interestingly the taxpayer here is referred to as a customer. I discuss this 
customer concept further in Chapter 8. 
" Operational. With the increasing pressure on resources available from 
central Government, the IR has to be more efficient in assessment, 
collection and administration of tax and seek out alternative ways of 
achieving their primary objectives. This has been reflected in two of the 
Public Sector Agreement (PSA) targets set by the Government. 
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"PSA target 1. Deliver year on year improvements in the number of 
individuals and businesses who comply with their obligations and 
receive their entitlements" (Cm 5706: 10). 
"PSA target 4. Improve value for money by achieving annual 
productivity gains of at least 2.5% per year until March 2004, without 
detriment to accuracy or customer satisfaction" (Cm 5706: 13). 
One approach used by tax authorities has been the utilisation of a model 
similar to the Australian Tax office (ATO) tax compliance pyramid model 
81 
- 
The difference between the ATO model and other traditional models is that 
the traditional view is that the more tax authorities punish for non- 
compliance, the more taxpayers will comply. The ATO model on the other 
hand, encourages taxpayers to co-operate with Revenue authorities in 
complying but with the threat in the background that if they do not comply 
then the Revenue authorities will apply the law strictly (Braithwaite and 
Braithwaite, 2001). This has been adopted by the IR in the following model 
(Figure 12). 
Taxpayers who comply voluntarily will be `encouraged'. Those who do not 
will be pursued by the IR using their legislative powers82. The difference 
between the ATO and the IR models is that the IR model links the ATO's 
compliance pyramid with customer behaviour and relationships. However 
81 Notwithstanding that Braithwaite posits a different shape for Large Business see section 
3.3.2. 
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the appropriateness of this model for large business may be questioned 
(Braithwaite, 2003a). 
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Figure 12: Inland Revenue Compliance Model 
(Source: Cm 5428,2002: 11, ) 
Reproduced in Lamb, Tuck and Hoskin. (2003a: Fig. 8). 
" Technological. To be more efficient the Government aim was that by 2005 
all communications with taxpayers will be available electronically. This 
was reflected in the following target: 
82 http: i/ýýýývv. hmrc. aov. uk/consult/annex3. pdf seen 2/ 11/06. 
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" PSA target 3 
Ensure by 2005 that 100% of [communication] services are offered 
electronically, wherever possible through a common Government 
portal, and a take-up rate for these services of at least 50%" (Cm 5706: 
10). 
This has a number of advantages. Firstly it saves time and resources for the 
IR as the data does not have to be input into the IR systems by the IR and 
the data does not have to be rechecked. Secondly the IR obtains the data in 
machine readable form which in their view `avoids unnecessary enquiries 
which are corrective and increase employers' burdens rather than adding 
true value'83. Thirdly the IR is able to employ data mining techniques84 on 
the data to identify disallowable items for tax purposes such as entertaining 
and legal fees incurred on capital items. However the target assumes that 
the majority of taxpaying companies complete their returns electronically. 
Evidence obtained from pilot interviews would refute this assumption as 
the companies at the time of the interviews did not have the necessary 
software to link with the IR systems (Tax partner, Al, 2002)85. 
" Perception. The IR is attempting to change the culture of paying taxes 
by introducing a moral argument. In a speech in January 2003, 
Montagu, the chairman of the IR said: 
83 Montagu, (2003) http: /hvww. inlandrevenue. gov. uk/news/tax avoidance measures sp. htm 
seen 13.3.03. This is in addition to PAYE procedures. 
84 Data mining techniques such as the use of IDEA computer programme. These programmes 
electronically interrogate computer held data such as the accounting records. 
85 At 30 November 2005 there was a limited take up of electronic filing: 12,300 returns out of a 
population of 800,000 returns received each year (Cm 6691: 77). 
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"The link between taxes and the social goods that would be impossible 
without them is the very foundation of tax morality and cannot be stated 
too often"86 (Montagu, 2003). 
It is questionable how relevant the moral issue is for large corporates. The 
activities of corporates are delegated to professional managers who understand 
their objective is to maximise shareholders' wealth. Consequently, the moral 
argument was met with misunderstanding and irritation by tax managers and 
tax professionals. They did not see why the IR should have a view on the 
amount of tax raised but what they should be interested in is whether or not 
there were unfairnesses or anomalies which need removing (Tax partner, A3, 
Sept 2002). In addition they felt that the IR was not appreciative of the other 
stakeholders in the company. 
"[The IR] have started talking about the implication that it is our duty to 
pay tax. Well clearly it is our duty to pay taxes as levied by the law. But 
we are not in the business of paying tax any more than we have to and it 
is often overlooked by revenue officials that the directors of these 
companies have fiduciary duties to their shareholders and paying 
excessive amounts of tax isn't the way you discharge your fiduciary 
duties. But having said that a company like [ Plc] has a good reputation 
in the public and with the tax authorities and other Government 
authorities which it jealously protects but it does reserve the right 
within certain parameters to do carry out schemes which or carry out 
transactions which may according to the Revenue's view be offensive 
but from our perspective they are legitimate because we are entering 
into business transactions and if we choose to do that in a tax efficient 
way that's up to us" (Tax director, C13, July 2003). 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, large corporates have additional considerations 
compared with smaller companies including reputational interests and two way 
practices of government between the IR and them. The response of the IR and 
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now the HMRC has been reflected in the `Tax in the Boardroom' agenda 
(HMRC, 2006). This has substituted the moral argument to one of corporate 
social responsibility (Henderson Global Investors, 2005a, 2005b; KPMG, 
2004; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005b). 
In addition to renaming taxpayers as customers, a further example of the 
marketing approach of the LBO is the setting up of the Large Corporates 
Forum (LCF). This body had its first meeting on 18 January 2000. The aim of 
the LCF was to enable the IR to get a better understanding of the needs of large 
corporates with the aim of `assisting compliance'. The membership consists of 
tax directors and managers from large corporates and LBO officials. The 
membership of the forum is supposed to be representative of the corporate 
taxpayers dealt with by the LBO. The purpose of the LCF is to enable: 
" "better understand the needs of its customers and so improve the 
service it provides. 
" identify the compliance burden on customers with a view, where 
practicable, to taking measures to reduce it. 
" provide a forum within which current taxation and operational issues 
can be debated"87 
Meetings are held approximately three times a year. The LCF is an example of 
the IR moving away from bureaucratic practices to be more strategic in dealing 
with and understanding their taxpayers. 
16 http: /www. inlandrevenue. gov. uk/news/tax avoidance measures sp. htm seen 13/03/03 
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6.3 Corporate tax compliance 
This section discusses the impact of the change in practices to secure Corporate 
Tax Compliance. It is divided into three sections. Firstly I discuss the position 
pre-self-assessment, secondly the introduction of self assessment, which 
represented a marked change in the accountability of the taxpayer, and lastly I 
discuss the NCP. What can be seen is that the `truth game' changes in response 
to the development of corporate tax compliance process. 
6.4 Pre-Self Assessment 
The IR was previously responsible for correctly applying the legislation and 
calculating the tax liability based on information provided by a company. This 
information was provided in a non-standardized way. The company would 
send a copy of its annual report and accounts for the particular year together 
with a corporation tax computation which vary in length from one page to tens 
of pages. The length of the corporation tax computation was partly dependent 
on the complexity of the company's tax affairs, but it was also dependant on 
the amount of disclosure the company wished to make about its tax affairs. The 
advantage of disclosing, for instance, a breakdown of legal and consultancy 
fees showing the constituent parts was that it pre-empted questions by the IR. 
The Olin Energy Systems Ltd v Scorer88 case in 1985 also assisted the 
disclosure process in that it was held that if a transaction was disclosed in such 
a way that having regard to the circumstances and material in the Inspector's 
"http: //www. inlandrevenue. gov. uk/tbo/Ibo6. htm seen 20/09/03 
8858TC592 
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possession that a competent and ordinarily inspector would come to a certain 
conclusion then if the issue was missed by the Inspector, then the company did 
not have to adjust the computation. Another possibility is what McBarnet 
(1991) refers to as `non-disclosing disclosure': in this situation the taxpayer 
makes a full disclosure but in such a way that hides or reduces the significance 
of the taxable transaction. 
There were no set time limits on when accounts and tax computations had to be 
submitted to the IR. This frequently resulted in long delays before 
computations were submitted to the IR. The IR often had to list the information 
required but not yet received for a hearing before the General Commissioners 
of Taxes before the information would be received from the taxpayer. This was 
the first stage in the legislative process and the Commissioners would have the 
power to determine finally the tax assessable. 
In addition there was no set single time limit by which the tax liability for the 
year of assessment had to be paid. The date when the tax liability was due to be 
paid was calculated using a complex set of rules based on the date of the 
assessment raised by the IR. This assessment by the IR was often based on 
estimated profits chargeable to tax using the prior year's result as a guide. 
When the tax computation was finally submitted, the inspector would review 
each computation to see which how much investigation was required. 
"Companies sent their accounts in and an inspector looked at each and 
every account. .. [B]efore I left, [the IR moved] to a classification 
system which was almost as simple as, you're just going to tick and let 
it pass, to, well that's more complicated - and needs a more in-depth 
investigation. To, this needs some sort of audit process and we really 
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think there is something wrong and we're going to have a really, real 
in-depth investigation of it and ask them all sorts of questions" (ex IR 
official, C9,2003). 
Large companies, due to the complex nature of their affairs, were most likely 
to have an investigation each year, although not of the standard of an `audit' 
referred to above. It was not uncommon for groups of companies not to have 
tax computations agreed by the Inspector for many years, sometimes as long as 
10 years. 
To speed up the CT Compliance process, in 1993, `Pay and File' was 
introduced. Under this legislation89 a company had to estimate the Corporation 
Tax liability prior to receiving a formal assessment, make a payment of 
taxation within a set time frame and file its Corporation Tax form in a standard 
format by a fixed date. However the IR was still responsible for agreeing the 
computation and determining the profits chargeable to Corporation Tax. The 
relevant Inspector of Taxes would have to issue a notice of determination based 
on the profits agreed. This procedure was changed with the introduction of 
Corporate Tax Self Assessment (CTSA) in 1999. 
6.5 Corporate Tax Self Assessment 
Self assessment marked a significant change in accountability and disciplinary 
technology. The taxpayer, not the IR, became responsible for calculating 
taxable income and the actual tax due. The taxpayer became self accountable; 
in Foucault's terms self governable and self regulating. Under CTSA, in order 
89 Finance Acts (No2)1987 ss 87-97,1990 ss 95-103 and 1993 Sch 14. 
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to arrive at the taxpayer's taxable income, the taxpayer has to take a view on 
how certain items or transactions will be treated for tax purposes. This 
contrasts with the previous position where the taxpayer disclosed a limited 
amount of information and the IR would assess the taxable income. The 
information thus disclosed has become more visible in addition to the taxpayer 
becoming visible. 
This is reflected in the following quote from a tax advisor. 
"The onuses have shifted. It's up to you to really be whiter than white. 
To say, look I've got this wrong. And it's quite a step now for 
companies. To actually put a line on your tax return that you've made 
an adjustment for inter company pricing. Because what's happened 
commercially isn't good enough for tax purposes because it's not arm's 
length. You've actually got to put that on your tax return. And that's 
really quite a different sort of you know mindset. Something we've 
never had had to do before. You think, well we know we've got it 
wrong but we think there's an argument for saying it's wrong and we'll 
let the Revenue come and argue about it as they might do for ten or 
twenty years with some companies which they have done in the past. 
And it's taken years and years to sort out transfer pricing. So it is a 
different approach from the client's perspective" (Tax advisor, A3, 
2002). 
The tax advisor is acknowledging the changing accountability of CTSA. In 
addition there is evidence of a change in the responsibility for the production of 
truth. 
6.6 Impact of CTSA 
The introduction of CTSA met with concern from the representative bodies and 
Corporates as it introduced a new way of working and new accountabilities, 
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although some tax managers were positive about the introduction (Porter, 
1999b). To address this concern the Self Assessment Consultative Committee 
(Corporation Tax) was set up by the IR. This consisted of members of the 
representative bodies such as the Institute of Directors, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and the Chartered Institute of 
Taxation. 
From the perspective of an IR Official the impact of CTSA has been to 
increase the volume and quality of disclosure, which assists the IR Official. 
"I think the impact was far less on both sides than people anticipated. 
There are certainly areas in which it had an impact in terms of transfer 
pricing and CFCs. We get much better documentation now than we 
ever used to. So when you get submissions on returns sent in, quite 
often I have seen now tremendous amounts of information that you 
would have to have dragged kicking and screaming out of them in the 
past. I think on transfer pricing, the fact that they now have to tick on 
the boxes about it, means that they have actually thought about it. They 
may well have thought about it before but usually if you ask a question 
now they will already have had the documentation ready" (IR official, 
LBO2,2003). 
This reflects Porter's (1999b) findings that tax managers anticipated that the 
introduction of CTSA would involve additional information flows. This is 
consistent with the view of tax managers interviewed in 2003 in that there was 
little notice of the change albeit in increased paperwork. 
"I can't make out it has any impact at all, other than the different forms 
going in" 
(UK tax manager, C11,2003) 
PT "What do you think has been the impact of CTSA? " 
Ans "I think it's more paperwork". 
PT "Just paperwork? " 
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Ans "A lot more paperwork. I think it has helped to bring groups up 
to date. Tax payments under it are difficult. I think probably 
for the first two or three years groups were really struggling to 
be able to pay the right amount of tax at the right time. There 
has been a lot of extra paperwork, an extra compliance burden 
on the taxpayer". 
(UK tax manager, C14,2003) 
"I don't perceive any massive change in approach from the Revenue 
under CTSA. Maybe they're taking a little while to gear up to it but 
when I think back to the time just before CTSA came in you had all the 
professional firms that were jumping up and down and saying " CTSA 
oh my goodness, the sky's fallen down, it's going to be terrible so 
you'll need us to come and help you out for lots of fees etc etc". And 
the Revenue I think at the time were saying at the time it was evolution 
rather than revolution and I think with hindsight that's actually what's 
happened it is evolution, but very slow evolution. People were worried 
about, for example, transfer pricing enquiries oh my God as soon as 
this happens there were going to be a deluge of transfer pricing 
enquiries that hasn't happened and I think it's because the Revenue are 
taking a while to understand and what it is they're meant to be doing 
and to get inspectors up to a level of understanding where they can deal 
this". 
(UK tax manager, C10,2003). 
Likewise an IR Official expressed similar views. 
"I don't think that CTSA has been such a large cultural change in the 
corporate sector as it was on the income tax side because of the run in 
for CT pay-and-file, so in some ways it's not changed things that 
much" 
(IR Official, LBO1,2003). 
However one IR Official expressed the view that CTSA increased the take of 
the Exchequer. 
PT "With Corporate Tax Self Assessment, what do you think has been 
the impact of it? 
Ans "A lot more money gained". 
PT " Why was that? " 
Ans "I don't know. It's probably income tax self assessment, it's a 
very, very big effect. I don't know whether it's the public 
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thinking they are on to us, we had better pay what we actually 
owe, or partly the sentiment of better over-paying in case, and 
we'll get it back later. There is certainly quite a marked 
exchequer effect. Behaviourally, that's harder to say. It didn't 
seem to me personally to be a large change but certainly groups 
seemed to take it more seriously. There were certain areas that I 
know they reviewed carefully to make sure they were 
conforming with the law. I think for them it was more 
significant in the sense that they didn't feel able to take a flyer 
anymore. They take a view that they didn't in their heart of 
hearts really believe it. It certainly generated a lot of work for 
accountancy firms. Certainly better compliance gained in the 
sense of filing time. A lot of groups would just not file until it 
suited them. When I started out I think, it was literally several 
years they hadn't filed for. It was very difficult to encourage 
them to catch up when they get in that state but in practice they 
started filing currently whilst they still had a years grace ... yes I think. Certainly the major group I deal with it's clearly one of 
the objectives of the Tax Director to file and file correctly as 
well. So that's to the good, although we deal with quite sort of 
esoteric issues, the most important thing is to get people filed 
and paid. At least what they think they owe us" (IR official, 
LBO3,2003). 
However this quote shows that it is just not the increased amount of tax paid 
but CTSA is acting as a technology of government (see Miller and Rose, 1990) 
and its implementation is changing how the taxpayer is being governed in 
Foucault's terms (see Hobson, 2004) as discussed in Chapter 4. 
6.7 Divergent structure and processes and uncertainty 
Under the CTSA arrangements companies (on an individual basis) complete a 
prescribed format return which is known as a `Company Tax Return'90 and 
which details their taxable income and their own calculation of the tax due. 
This return has to be submitted within 12 months of the end of the accounting 
90 CT600,2002 Version 1 
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period, although the tax due is paid at an earlier date, either within the year of 
assessment or nine months after the year, depending on the size of the taxable 
profits of the group of which the company is a member. The return can be 
amended up to 12 months after the filing date by the taxpayer. The IR also has 
12 months from the filing date to give notice that they are intending to 
commence enquiries (COP 14,2003)91. This has introduced a period of 
uncertainty. Under the previous system, there was greater certainty as the IR 
had to immediately make a decision whether to ask questions or accept the 
computation. 
"You have to file the return and the Revenue no longer have to have a 
reason to open an enquiry They no longer have to express 
dissatisfaction; they can just open and they will open an enquiry every 
year on every computation that's material in the Group. You have to get 
back to the Revenue in a certain amount of time when they raise their 
enquiries. They can take 12 months to ask you a question or to write 
you the letter of 12 pages and then what they will say it has taken us 12 
months to write it, you can reply to us in 3 months. We have had 
discussions with them in the past where it has taken them say 3 months 
or 6 months to write the letter then they expect us to turn round a reply 
in the same time but they don't have any understanding of how 
complex it is to put together even one single item in the Profit and Loss 
account In the Profit and Loss account if you have one item of expense 
that can come from at least 15 different sources and how we get all that 
information back is very time consuming" (Tax director, C13,2003). 
This change in the control of the timing of responses suggests a shift in the 
balance of power between taxpayers and the IR. It is a source of frustration for 
"customers" and additionally displays a lack of appreciation by the IR. 
Another difficulty concerns the administrative aspects. CTSA doesn't deal with 
groups as a whole; it looks at the individual companies separately. For instance 
91 Available from httn: //-*v%vw. hmrc. ov. uk/pdfs/copI4. htm seen 2/8/06. 
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each company in a group will be sent a separate notice of intention to open an 
enquiry. Another example is where differences are covered by group relief92 
which does not involve any additional tax. 
"One example where groups get away with murder is in terms of if they 
make a mistake and it will be something that was wrong, where in a 
singleton company [I] would think about interest and penalties93 
because it is so badly wrong, in a group situation they [the taxpayer] 
will quite often avoid that because they have got availability of group 
relief, because you are looking specifically has this company created an 
offence or not yes it has created an offence. Has it made a tax 
difference, yes, but since I have started looking at it the have changed 
their group relief claim and they can do that legitimately 4" (IR Official, 
LBO2,2003). 
This is an example of where the structure and the processes are divergent. 
Groups are centralised in the LBO office structure as discussed in chapter 5 but 
the corporate compliance process of CTSA does not follow this centralization 
as each individual company is treated separately. For example a separate notice 
of intention to open an enquiry is sent to each company in the group95. 
6.8 Secondary practices 
Although the impact of CTSA has not been immediately evident, secondary 
practices as discussed in section 4.5, are operating at a level below the primary 
92 Whilst the tax liability is determined for each individual company, there is some limited 
recognition of groups via loss relief as previously mentioned. 
93 Interest and penalties are a function of the tax payable. If the tax liability is covered by group 
relief and reduced to zero there will be no interest and penalties. 
94The time limit for claiming group relief is the later of "two years from the end of the 
accounting period of the claimant company, and the date the relevant CT assessment of the 
claimant company becomes final and conclusive subject to an overall limit of six years from 
the end of the claimant company's accounting period ('the six year point')" 
(http: //www. hmrc. gov. uk/manuals/ctmanual/ctm97920. htm seen 7/11/06).. 
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practices introduced by CTSA. These secondary practices include a change in 
the type of questions asked by the IR. The effect of CTSA is that a more broad 
look is taken by the IR into the way information is captured by the accounting 
system of the corporates. Pre CTSA there was no assumption that the 
corporation tax return was correct. However under CTSA the assumption is 
that the figures in the return are correct unless proven otherwise as the onus is 
on the taxpayer to produce an accurate return.. 
"With CTSA you assume you are looking at the correct figures when 
you are looking at the accounts so the extension is to ask system 
questions about how did you get there. Some [taxpayers] might say it is 
an estimate of 20% or give details of how it is calculated accurately. 
Previously my approach was that my [IR Official] view was absolutely 
right and how did you [taxpayer] get to your view. Now it is rather why 
did you [taxpayer] take that view" (IR Official, LBO6,2003). 
This change in assumption has enabled audit techniques to develop. One of 
Mautz and Sharaf s (1961) postulates of auditing is that the data is verifiable. 
As a consequence, rather than the IR enquiring into the tax return on a 
substantive basis, enquiries can be directed at the taxpayers systems for 
identifying tax adjustable items such as the difference between capital 
expenditure and revenue items. 
Traditionally enquiries into the tax return have been commenced by written 
correspondence with recourse to meetings only if an impasse in the 
negotiations has occurred. A senior IR Official expressed the view (interview, 
IR3,2003) that it was a deliberate policy of CTSA that the enquiry regime 
would be less confrontational although it was not a direct intention to get closer 
95 httl2: /hvww. hmrc. Rov. uk/manuals/emmanual/em8110. htm seen 7/11/06. 
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to business. However during the Consultation process on the implementation of 
CTSA, regular meetings were held between the IR and corporates and their 
representative bodies which enabled the IR to get closer to business. The IR 
Official felt that this showed real success in shaping the system to Ministers' 
requirements and business and professional requirements. Thus the 
implementation of CTSA enabled the dialogue with business to develop and 
paved the way for the NCP, as described below, to be introduced. 
"I think CTSA has helped bring about the more informed practices that 
we've got because under the old system with, you know, submit a set of 
comps., ask some questions on it, then issue a formal notice saying that 
year was closed and settled, it was very regimented. Under CTSA the 
whole situation doesn't have the same kind of rigid feel about it and I 
think that's partly helped create the environment within which 
discussions like we have with our LBO case director and head [of tax] 
can take place" (UK tax Manager, CR14,2003). 
6.9 The Event of `Negotiations': Emergent Procedures 
HM Treasury and the IR issued a consultative document in July 2001 which 
announced that a review would be carried out to consider the extent and 
effectiveness of the Inland Revenue's links with business on administrative 
matters and policy issues (HM Treasury & IR, 2001: 7). The report on the 
outcome of the review, `Review of Links with Business' (IR, 2001), also 
known as the `Hartnett Report' after Dave Hartnett (Director General of the IR) 
who was responsible for producing the report, highlights that there has been 
improvement in the relationship between the LBO and large companies, but 
also acknowledged that there is scope for further improvement. The report 
contains 40 recommendations which seek to address these deficiencies, among 
which are new faster processes for the IR's enquiries. One such process is risk 
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assessment meetings set up between the company and the LBO, where 
company officials discuss the company's tax risks with the LBO and 
presentations are made by the company on the accounts (known as the "Fast 
Track" initiative). The report also recommends changes to communication 
processes between the LBO and large businesses and representative bodies. 
The LCF, as previously mentioned, was set up in order to establish `links' 
between the LBO and its customers and to provide a forum in which to debate 
current taxation and operational issues. In addition, the Corporate Tax 
Operational Consultative Committee was set up to liaise with representative 
bodies. There seems, however, to be mixed messages coming from the IR 
regarding the purpose of the review. The IR acknowledged that the review was 
a part of fostering the `enabling culture' 96- that is, encouraging voluntary 
compliance. However the IR 2002 Annual Report reinforces the regulating 
culture as the `enabling' message is not totally appropriate for large corporates. 
"This work, principally affecting customer relationships with larger 
companies, aims to bring business and the Revenue closer together and 
modernise the administration of the corporation tax system for big 
business. This will result in more efficient use of resources and improve the 
Revenue's ability to focus on areas where tax is at risk" (Cm 5706: 17). 
An action plan was drawn up out of the Review of Links with Business report 
to consider the 40 recommendations97. The report was held in some 
significance as certain of the recommendations were discussed in detail at a 
number of the LCF meetings. 
% http; //www. inlandrevenue. gov. uk/ctsa/sacc ct14 01_02. htm seen 19.03.2003. 
97 http: //www. inandrevenue. Rov. uk/pbr2001/revbusinesslinks. rdf seen 17/09/02. 
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There have been additionally individual meetings with the LBO and 
multinational companies to share the LBO's risk assessment with the taxpayer. 
The risk assessment sets out the areas or transactions which the IR perceive 
may be open to interpretation as to the correct tax treatment applicable or 
where tax planning techniques may have been utilised. The LBO has made its 
procedures for identifying areas of tax risk in tax returns more sophisticated in 
(LCF minutes 28 June 2000). recent years 98 
However the New Compliance Process ("NCP") pilot scheme, which consisted 
of 17 multinational groups encompassing a wide range of industries, 99 has 
formalised this emerging approach into `real time working'. It is also more of a 
joint working relationship. 
"The tax team [of the corporate group] and the case team [of the IR] 
start by discussing and clarifying their responsibilities and expectations, 
and by setting a timetable for key events10 ". 
The NCP pilot scheme was set up in response to recommendation 6 of the 
Review of Business Links report. This recommendation suggested a 
"structured approach" in which an operational working framework and 
timetable would be agreed between the case director and the large corporate. 
Working practices would include a presentation on the accounts by the 
corporate to the IR after the tax computations had been filed, the case director 
discussing the risk assessment with the corporate and subsequent enquiries 
98 This has been incorporated into a performance indicator. "% of our risk-based full enquires 
which result in the detection of non-compliance 76 (2001/02 target compared to 75.4 (2001/02 
result) (Cm 5706: 11). 
99 http: //www. inlandrevenue. izov. ukA]>o/minutes 201102. htm seen 22.03.2003. 
100 http: //www. inlandrevenue. gov. uk/lbo/minutes 201102. htm seen 22.03.2003. 
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would be based on the risks identified provided the company was `open with 
[the IR]' (IR, 2001: 20). The pilot scheme extended this approach. 
The pilot scheme consisted of 17 groups; 4 banks, 3 insurance companies, 4 
retail, 2 chemical and one each from the computer, consumables, financial and 
media sectors (LCF minutes 25 June 2002 and LBO interviews, 2003). The 
particular groups were chosen on the basis that their tax compliance was 
undertaken in-house by the group's tax team and the tax computations for the 
companies in the group were reasonably up to date. The groups were identified 
by the relevant case director as being, in their opinion suitable for the pilot 
study. The new process was developed further than envisaged by the Review of 
Business Links Report as detailed below. 
"Key elements of the new process [the LBO] were proposing were as 
follows. 
" For corporates who were willing to work openly and co-operatively, the 
LBO would, before returns were filed, agree a Compliance Plan for the 
year focusing on significant tax risks and, where possible, try to resolve 
issues; and, once returns are filed, it would check less and stick to the 
Compliance Plan. 
"A framework would be agreed between the corporate and its Case 
Director, to ensure mutual understanding of objectives, to clarify 
responsibilities and to set a timetable for the process. 
" The objective was to build more effective working relationships 
through openness and collaboration and a more efficient use of 
resources, giving earlier tax certainty and focussing early on important 
issues. 
" There would be a key responsibility on both parties to work openly and 
co-operatively; on the corporate partner to share knowledge of its 
business and of emerging tax risks; and on the LBO to work with the 
corporate partner to focus only on important issues and, where possible, 
to resolve issues before the return was filed" (LCF minutes 12 March 
2002). 
One case director gave the example of how the new way of working would 
materialise. In April 2004 the bank would give a presentation about the content 
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of the 31 December 2003 accounts and main issues affecting the group for that 
particular year. At the meeting where the presentation would be held, the group 
would hand out copies of the published accounts of the top 6 companies out of 
the 50 companies within the group. The presentation would cover the 
commercial background to the accounts, for example why turnover had 
increased and details of any group restructuring or unusual transactions. In the 
view of the particular case director, the presentation would cover the sorts of 
answers to questions which the Inspector might have when initially looking at 
the accounts and computations. In fact part of the presentation would involve 
the taxpayer anticipating the IR's questions. 
The NCP is considered by the IR as a structured way of dealing with groups. In 
some cases it is not a new type of relationship between the IR and the Group, 
but rather it is formalising previous informal practices. 
"It is encouraging us to do what we were doing before and particularly 
about open and honest relationships" (IR Official, IR4,2003). 
"Some groups do this [presentations] very roughly anyway. I always 
used to ask - one of the first questions I always used to ask in any 
meeting with a group was how are things going and what are the main 
issues for them. But you have got it much more formalised now and I 
think it makes them do it and it makes us do it as well and it keeps us to 
a better timetable... 
I think it means the Revenue are much more better focussed in their 
enquiries. As I say, I think I am lucky because all the cases I have 
inherited on it, they were being worked in that type of vein anyway and 
it is largely formalising what has been developed over recent years 
anyway" (IR Official, LBO2,2003). 
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The framework is formalised in writing in an agreement signed by both the IR 
and the group. This formalisation of practices has the advantage of making 
these secondary practices visible. By this visibility the participants in the NCP 
can be made accountable to the IR. The framework is disciplining the groups 
into conforming and making self regulated additional disclosures. This is 
supported by Foucault's writings as Preston (1989) quotes: 
"Foucault notes that the written document proved to be a major advance 
in the development of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1997a). Indeed the 
documentary apparatus becomes a critical component of the 
disciplinary technology as it "makes possible the measurement of 
overall phenomena, the description of groups, the characterization of 
collective facts" (Preston, 1989: 409). 
The pilot was evaluated and the responses were positive. 
"The benefits [were] 
" 93% of respondents thought that the process described in the 
framework document captured best practice. 
" 83% thought that they had previously been working in the way 
envisaged by the new process, but only to a limited extent. 
" There was agreement that the processes once bedded in would improve 
efficiency of tax administration in the range of 10 to 30%"(LCF 
minutes 20 Nov 2002). 
The questionnaire sent to evaluate the pilot scheme noted that "88% of groups 
and case teams responding thought that the new process had changed their 
working methods" (IR, 2000b). It would seem that the new practices had 
altered the relationship between the LBO and large corporates but only to a 
limited extent. The main benefit to the IR was that they gained knowledge 
about the group so that their risk assessment would be better informed. Also 
resources could be saved as time would not be spent on asking fruitless 
questions (LCF minutes 25 June 2002 and November 2003; IR, 2003). The 
benefits for the corporates from the IR perspective would be more `real time' 
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working, focused and targeted questions, greater tax certainty and better co- 
ordination of different Revenue departments through the `ringmastering' 
activities of the LBO (ibid. ). From a tax director perspective (who is 
participating in the NCP) the benefits are limited. 
"[There] must be some, earlier resolution of the issues ... but I haven't 
actually seen that yet. The sooner I can get things agreed the better, as 
far as I'm concerned, because I don't like having a lot of issues 
outstanding, because when we do the accounts at the end of the year, it 
becomes an issue with the auditors as to whether we should recognise a 
tax benefit or provide against and this sort of thing. So it's always 
better to have certainty sooner rather than later. And it also affects our 
cash flow, so it's very difficult for me when I'm feeding into the group 
finance director, the cash flows for next year, to know what the tax cash 
flows will be because I don't know where we are with seven or eight 
big issues that may or may not be resolved one way or t'other and if 
they are, they may or may not require cash in one or another month. 
It's difficult to know. So I would far rather get it resolved sooner rather 
than later" (UK tax director, C15,2003). 
The key benefit of NCP perceived by this tax director is to obtain greater 
certainty in ascertaining the amount of tax to be paid. Greater certainty can be 
achieved by tax queries and disputes being settled more quickly. 
6.10 Resistance 
Although as shown above the NCP scheme has been evaluated as a success 
there has been resistance to its implementation in a number of ways from both 
the groups and professional advisors such as tax partners of the Big four 
accountancy firms. 
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The NCP is a non statutory practice. Advisors expressed concern about 
discussing the tax treatment of transactions prior to filing and when the filing 
decision had not been determined. In addition US parent companies were not 
enthusiastic about the process as the practice is outside the legislation101. 
For some groups with a large number of companies it can be difficult to collect 
the information worldwide and it is difficult to expose all the issues and 
therefore the corporates may not be sure whether they had made full disclosure. 
This could have the impact of making them open to the charge of concealment 
by the IR as the NCP process relies on an open and trusting relationship. This 
may be an indication that the IR still does not truly understand the corporate 
environment. 
This open relationship also requires a certain level of disclosure of possible 
mass marketed schemes even though the groups might not wish to undertake 
them. Under the agreement between the group and the IR, the group is obliged 
to tell the Revenue about significant transactions as and when they happen102. 
The advantage to the IR is that they will know about that type of transaction far 
in advance of when they would have done so in the past. Therefore the scheme 
would have a shorter shelf life for other people who might wish to implement a 
similar tax scheme. Some groups felt that if they were associated with the 
NCP, promoters would be hesitant in approaching them and not offering them 
these mass marketed tax schemes. They felt they would lose a competitive 
advantage if they were not aware of what their competitors were doing even 
though they had no wish to pursue a tax aggressive position which involved 
101 US tax law is more prescriptive than UK tax legislation. 
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looking at opportunities and utilizing tax planning schemes to reduce their tax 
liability. One tax manager expressed the opinion that in order for NCP to be 
successful, as it was non statutory, it relied on the co-operation of the groups. 
In other words large corporates have power in negotiating the framework 
agreement of the NCP. 
"My main ground rule was that it had to be a level playing field. So 
they couldn't expect me to tell them about something real time that was 
open to a potential change in legislation unless they'd tell me real time 
when they were thinking about changing the legislation. So we agreed 
that in writing and I think a number of people have had problems with 
the fast track with inspectors saying, oh well you know it's breach of 
trust, you didn't tell us this, that and the other. Instead of being very 
open up front about the fact that you know clearly we're both coming at 
things from a different angle and therefore you know you've got to lay 
decent rules to start with. And on that basis we've had no problem with 
it. I mean we disclose everything either as it occurs or at the very latest 
obviously when we have to disclose anyway when we file the 
computation" (UK tax manager, C15,2003). 
Initially there were proposals to increase the NCP to 50% of LBO cases. It was 
felt by some IR officials that this may lead to a two tier scheme whereby those 
cases in the NCP would have preferential treatment to those cases outside the 
scheme. After the success of the pilot scheme 50 more cases were brought into 
the NCP in 2003. However in interviews IR Officials said it was becoming 
more difficult to sign up additional cases because groups who enjoyed 
currently an open and transparent relationship with the IR wondered what 
would be the advantages for them. 
"The difficulty now is ... signing up people 
for the new compliance 
process. Most of my groups turn round to me and say what's in it for 
102 Subsequent to the interviews being undertaken, legislation has been introduced whereby 
certain tax avoidance schemes have to be registered. 
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me. What's the difference, you are doing that already" (IR official, 
LBO2,2003). 
The proposal seems to be that the NCP will not be extended in its current form 
but there will be bespoke arrangements with individual groups to make use of 
the best practice from NCP (Senior IR Official, IR7,2004)103. The NCP is still 
in its infancy. As it is an open and honest relationship that the IR want to 
foster, it is based upon one of the key assumptions of self assessment in that the 
figures on the return are correct. 
"I think we're only now beginning to realise the implications of CTSA. 
As inspectors, I think for a while people went on very much as before. 
And the responsibility side of things, even though we've got the New 
Compliance Process, part of that is that we're not going to be asking 
questions about small things. CTSA expect them to get it right. I mean 
we're not saying, "we're not going to ask questions about, for example 
anything under a quarter of a million, say". We don't expect groups to 
then say, "oh well we can fiddle about with £249,000 and that'll be 
fine". You know the responsibility is still there. So I think it's an 
attitude from our point of view. What we, we expect that we should be 
thinking about they're trying to get it right. The companies should be 
trying to get it right as well. Now in the past their people have taken 
advantage of things. And say it could be this and you could have that 
technical interpretation of something or whatever. [It] might be large 
amounts of money involved. You say Just say that's wrong. Send it in. 
See if the inspector spots it or asks the question. And that's still going 
on to some extent with CTSA. The other side tend to still feel, 
particularly their sort of independent agents, still feel that they can do 
that legitimately. No, I think we've got, we've gradually got to move 
people to the, feel like they've got to try and get it right. And it's not 
legitimate to take a punt and hope for the best. And that's where the 
new compliance process I think should be helpful. Because it does put 
people under a sort of face to face, building a relationship if you like on 
trust. And people feeling that well, am I prepared to take the risk of 
undermining that trust by behaviour which I think you know I've done 
in the past" (IR official, LBO5,2003). 
103 The LBS Operating Model was introduced in April 2006, 
httn: //www. hmrc. gov. uk/lbo%operatiniz-model. htm seen 16/05/06. 
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The development of trust between the tax official and the corporate taxpayer 
enables an open relationship to develop which is the basis of the NCP process 
and the IR wishes to cultivate. Part of this trust, is being able to rely on the 
figures in the tax computation. In other words, the tax computation is an 
accurate representation of the truth as perceived by the large corporate. 
6.11 Chapter Summary 
This chapter and the previous chapter have explored the IR's, in particular the 
LBO's, structure, practices and processes of tax compliance. It has argued that 
the IR is now a different organisation from the bureaucratic one by virtue of its 
structure and also the marketing and strategic focus of the organisation. This is 
reflected in the practices of tax compliance: the use of the Australian Tax 
Compliance model and the introduction of NCP. However these changes of 
practices cannot be viewed in isolation and without acknowledgment of its 
history. The conflict between negotiations and a more formal rule base audit is 
described in the following quote. 
"I think what's happening with CTSA is that the Revenue can't really 
make its mind up whether it really prefers the old negotiating style, that 
anybody who's done tax over any length of time in the UK is wholly 
used to, or whether it wants to go fully to an audit style, as you have in 
the States, and I think its processes, and Fast Track [NCP] is one of 
them, its processes and its modus operandi are driving it inexorably 
towards an audit style where actually it doesn't want an audit style, it 
wants to retain the old way of getting round a table and negotiating. It 
doesn't want to go down this formal US approach" (ex IR official now 
tax advisor, A4,2003). 
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This quote illustrates the tensions in practice of the NPM approach as 
compared with the work of the tax official in examining the tax computations 
and agreeing the tax liability with the large corporate. 
The next two chapters examine the players in the corporate tax compliance 
game, the tax official and the taxpayer, and how the processes and practices 
introduced by the IR in response to NPM have changed their operating roles. 
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Chapter 7- The Knowledge Expert - the Tax Official 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have examined how, amongst other things, the 
impact of NPM's practices has refined the structure and processes and 
practices of corporate tax compliance for large groups. The corporate tax 
compliance process is always an interplay of experts. This chapter and the next 
chapter analyse the experts of the tax compliance process; the tax official and 
the tax director respectively. I first look at the tax official as an expert. In this 
chapter, I examine how the tax official as a subject is defined. This is a mixture 
of old and new specifications of the ideal `tax inspector'. It is this personal 
selection of certain aspects of the ideal that is really key in becoming a new 
knowledge expert subject through the interplay of objectivizations (part of 
which includes specification of the ideal) and subjectivization. As discussed in 
section 4.6, it is this constitution of the subject as "an object of knowledge" 
(Foucault/ Florence 1994: 315) that the knowledge expert emerges and informs 
"the truth" of the corporate tax compliance game. 
The question of truth is central to this thesis. As Foucault notes in The Care of 
the Self: 
"The task of testing oneself, examining oneself, monitoring oneself in a 
series of clearly defined exercises, makes the question of truth -the 
truth concerning what one is, what one does, and what one is capable of 
doing - central to the formation of the ethical subject" (1986: 68). 
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The apparent defining of the tax official impacts on the way the tax official 
engages in the tax compliance game. What practices are involved in the 
formation of this subject, in other words the `subjectivization'? What practices 
does the official engage in as an official? At another level what are the 
outcomes in terms of career development and progression, and rewards 
achieved by the successful tax official who engages with the game, in other 
words part of but not limited to the `objectivization'. This objectivization is not 
independent of or a consequence of subjectivization: one simultaneously 
influences and shapes the other and vice versa and from this `truth games arise' 
(Foucault/Florence, 1994: 315). Failure to acknowledge the changing game that 
has to be played results in the tax official receiving lower remuneration by way 
of a lack of bonuses, no involvement in interesting projects and being side 
lined. Therefore the tax official has to reconstitute himself or herself as a 
subject who accepts (or does not reject) the new forms of objectives. Just as 
Seneca, in ancient Rome, reflected in the evening on the day's activities in 
order not to confess his sins but to criticise and learn from his actions, the 
activity of the tax official has to be reflective to engage in the new game. 
Seneca does not punish himself but "rather he engages in a kind of 
administrative scrutiny which enables him to reactivate various rules and 
maxims in order to make them more vivid, permanent, and effective for future 
behaviour" (Foucault, 1983). However the tax official must do more than just 
reflect on his/ her actions, they must also engage with the evolving game by 
doing and being seen to be doing the right things in the right way and 
participating in the right networks. This objectivization of the subject, where 
the subject is examined as its own object, contributes to the new game. 
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This chapter also focuses on the remoulding of the tax inspector as a new 
knowledge expert. The objective is to examine the development of this 
remoulding by looking at practices and discourses which have shaped their 
identity as a tax official as a knowledge expert but also their identity as an 
Inspector of Taxes. Within the IR there is a certain status to being an Inspector 
of Taxes and certain jobs within the hierarchy of the IR are only open to those 
who are a fully qualified Inspector of Taxes. In addition my interest is in the 
practices and discourses which have remoulded this identity of the tax 
inspector from a bureaucratic inward facing technical civil servant to an 
outward facing new style tax official and how this has consequently impacted 
on the social and organisational aspects of the tax compliance process. I argue 
that the identity of a tax inspector has remained the same in some substantial 
respects, in contrast to some organisational literature on the identity of 
employees within the public sector such as consultants in hospitals (Doolin, 
2002). What is different is that this identity has been remoulded, not by 
forming a new identity or changing their identity into a different one, but by 
becoming a new representation, which is the outcome of the `remoulding'. 
These officials have to engage with tax knowledge still but must do so 
differently, in part through adopting a more strategic and managerial approach. 
How does the tax official engage in the tax compliance game? I first examine 
the role of the tax official as the IR's representative. This focus is important as 
1. it is a game of changing rules of enterpreneurial government, 
2. where the role of the expert is exposed, and 
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3. a mix of inquisition and parrhesia tactics are employed within the 
expert disciplinary frame. 
7.2 The IR's Representative 
A UK tax resident company or a foreign company doing business in the UK 
has to submit a corporation tax return to the relevant office of the Inland 
Revenue which deals with the tax affairs of the corporate. The relationship 
between the IR and the corporate taxpayer is conducted by representative 
officials of the IR and by tax directors on behalf of the corporates, for those 
companies that have an in-house tax department. In the UK, the tax official, 
who is an Inspector of Taxes, reviews the tax computations submitted by the 
company and conducts enquiries into the tax return on behalf of the IR. These 
officials also negotiate with the company officials any cash settlements which 
may arise in respect of disputed amounts. The issue of concern to this thesis is 
the practices that these representative officials engage in to interface and 
interact with each other. This important interaction is considered from the 
perspective of both how it has taken place in the past and now appears to be 
developing in new ways moving forward into the future. 
There has been limited academic work carried out in this area especially in the 
UK (Hasseldine et al. 2005). In the US, Pentland and Carlile (1996: 284) note 
when looking at the US tax administration by the IRS, that "[t]he interpretation 
and application of the tax code is highly contingent upon the character of the 
interaction between agent [tax official] and taxpayer". As noted in Chapter 3, 
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this is a significant insight. At the same time the approach adopted in this thesis 
can be distinguished from Pentland and Carlile's work in that I am not solely 
looking at the interaction of pairs of subjects occupying the opposed yet 
interdependent roles of tax official and the taxpayer. I am also looking at how 
this interaction is located within historically specific apparatuses (on either side 
of the interaction) and at the practices and discourses that arise from the 
location within these apparatuses of subjects. These subjects are experts in their 
respective fields and typically also skilled negotiators who are not unaware of 
the rules of the negotiation game and the motives and interests of the other 
party. I am therefore looking in a broader frame at the skills and understanding 
they bring to their interaction and how this constitutes two types of interfaces: 
1. the likely image as expert subjects on each side 
2. the relationship they have to their own entities; either the IR or their 
own companies. 
I therefore hope to reveal some significant ways in which the `tax negotiation 
game' has been played and is now being played in rather different ways, as the 
parameters within which the interactions are being played out are changing, not 
least because the IR is now requiring its tax officers to engage in systematically 
different practices and thereby to develop significantly different discursive 
tactics. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the approach I am adopting is a Foucauldian 
derived approach. In this approach, I am building on the concept of discursive 
practices as described by Foucault but in addition I am distinguishing these 
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discursive practices, and the discursive formation, from what has actually been 
done, the practices. In the context of my thesis the discursive formation under 
investigation is "tax" or rather the "correct amount of tax". 
This Chapter and Chapter 9 seek evidence of these transformations taking 
place from the perspective of the knowledge expert - the tax official. I use 
these three transformations to analyse the changing role of tax officials: 
shaping the tax official; immersion in IR discourse (this Chapter) and outward 
facing discourse with tax managers and tax professionals (Chapter 9) when 
looking at the event of tax compliance. 
7.3 The Tax Official - the Inspector of Taxes 
The tax official which is the subject of this research has both a general and a 
specific role. The tax officials interviewed are those senior Inspectors of Taxes 
who are at the top of the operational side of the IR. As a consequence they are 
instrumental in shaping tax policy and IR communications with taxpayers. 
They also have a specific role in that they are Inspectors of Taxes. The job of 
an Inspector of Taxes is to administer the collection of tax from taxpayers, 
whether individuals, partnerships or corporate entities. In the LBO, as 
elsewhere in the IR, they will be allocated a number of taxpayers depending on 
area of specialisation, the tax inspector's seniority and their technical skills. 
They are responsible for examining the tax affairs of these taxpayers to ensure 
that the taxpayers pay the `right' amount of tax. This may be a different 
amount from the correct amount of tax. As mentioned in Chapter 2, tax law 
does not cover every possibility and there may be grey areas in the legislation 
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or different views of interpretation of the legislation. For more complex cases 
this `right' amount may be ascertained by mutual agreement following a 
process of negotiation. 
In the pre-CTSA approach, the compliance process would commence with the 
receipt by the IR of tax computations and the financial statements from the 
taxpayer. The Inspector of Taxes would look at the computations to see if the 
calculation of tax liability would require further investigation. If he/ she 
decided this was the case they would ask a number of questions on the 
particular computation to ensure that the computation had been properly 
prepared in accordance with the relevant legislation (interviews A4, IR5, C9). 
Within the LBO the senior Inspectors of Taxes who deal with multinational 
companies and large corporates are Case Directors. These are very senior 
Revenue officials who are involved in a number of different aspects of tax 
work, including managing a team of subordinates to deal with the tax affairs of 
a number of large groups of companies and being involved in one off projects 
for the department as a whole. The following is extracted from the recruitment 
web site of the IR. 
"Continuing up the technical and compliance path you could eventually 
become one of the people leading a major part of our compliance 
activity. For example, a Case Director in Large Business Office, a 
Senior Civil Service post where you would be setting the strategic 
direction to the Revenue's approach to groups of companies and other 
major taxpayers. In this role you would lead the most demanding 
technical work, influence the development of tax policy and be 
involved in developing strategies on litigation'04". 
104 ht! p: //,. v%, vw. iniandrevenue. gov. uk/ioin-us/t-and-c-c-scs. htm seen 25/11/04 
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This description is a definition of the Case Director's job. It is also 
demonstrating the attractiveness of this job to potential recruits. However what 
is interesting from the empirical evidence collected is the reflections by the 
Case Directors not just on how they see their formal job description but also on 
how they identify with their role as it is now and how it has changed. These 
Case Directors have a major influence on how the IR services are delivered to 
the large corporates. They are informants to the process. Consequently how 
they see their changing role has an impact on the corporate tax compliance 
process. However before this is unpacked I will describe how the expert 
knowledge of the tax official is shaped. 
7.4 Shaping the knowledge expert 
This section considers the explicit formal training that the tax officials 
undertake. It looks at both the tax technical knowledge; the sufficiency of 
which is judged by examinations, and work based training. 
A key aspect of tax specialists in the UK, whether they are employed by the 
IR, tax professional practice or companies, is that they usually do not study 
taxation specifically at undergraduate level at University. If they do study tax it 
will be at most a two- term course within either an Accounting or Law 
department (Tiley, 2006; Miller, 2002). 
Tax officials are civil servants employed by the IR. These tax officials are a 
discrete proportion of the population of individuals who deal with tax. The 
205 
population includes, amongst others, lawyers, accountants and Chartered Tax 
Advisors and they come from a range of diverse academic disciplines (Start', 
2006). Unlike some countries, such as Australia, a tax advisor does not have to 
be registered with the tax authority to file tax returns on behalf of a client. 
For a tax official it is most likely the IR is their first employer after leaving full 
time education. It is common for tax inspectors to have worked solely for the 
IR since they left University. Entrants into the IR frequently join straight from 
University 105 after studying a variety of subjects at Undergraduate level. These 
subjects would not be tax specific and might not be as relevant as a Law, 
Accounting or even a business related degree. 
There are two streams of entrants to the IR; the `Talent Recruitment 
Programme' ("TRP") and the `Fast Stream'. The difference between these two 
streams is that the TRP recruits directly into the IR whereas the `Fast Stream' 
is run by the Cabinet Office to recruit graduates with the capacity to reach the 
Senior Civil Servicelob. The IR is one of a number of Central Government 
departments included in the `Fast Stream'. 
"It was always a feature [of the senior Civil Service] that you recruited 
people from diverse backgrounds, or Oxbridge backgrounds so the 
folk law would have it in the senior Civil Service it was very much like 
that but generally speaking .. but in the Revenue, you didn't recruit lawyers or accountants, people from all sorts of backgrounds; marine 
biologists, all sorts of people to do tax and somehow they managed to 
105 There are two types of inspectors: approximately 90% of them are NFT (not fully trained) 
and the remainder FT (fully trained). NFT inspectors deal with smaller cases. The FT 
Inspectors are those which have completed the Inspector training course and deal with the 
larger taxpayers. FT inspectors are in the majority direct graduate entry although a few will 
have progressed through the `ranks'. 
106 http: //-, v,. vw. inlandrevenue. gov. uk/talent/offer-fast-stream. htm seen 29/11/04 
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learn their craft and become successful, both in the Revenue as 
.. working in a technical 
field and in the general Civil Service as 
administrators. People running the health service for example, other 
than the doctors, probably had no qualifications in health care at all" 
(ex IR official, Al, 2002). 
How do this group of diverse individuals `learn their craft and become 
successful'? What practices and discourses are utilised to become a tax 
inspector and what is meant by being `successful'? How do these individuals 
learn to talk like a tax official and see things like a tax official? 
The next section explores the formation of the tax inspectors as knowledge 
experts from the perspective of formal training, the role of technical knowledge 
and the practices of enquiry. What is the "taken for granted knowledge" - the 
implicit knowledge? Part of being an expert is not only knowing the implicit 
rules of the specialised knowledge but also being able to read the signals within 
that knowledge. This expert knowledge is emphasised by the IR. From the 
recruitment web site of the IR -a Case manager in the LBO's "role requires 
strong detection, investigation and technical skills'07" 
7.5 Formal training 
Tax officials have to undergo formal training and pass exams to become an 
Inspector of Taxes108. Prior to September 2003, the training programme 
consisted of a six- year examinable course. Since this date the programme has 
been condensed to four years. It combines both formal learning and practical 
107 h=: //www. intandrevenue. og v. uk/ioin-us/post-trp. htm seen 15/11/04. 
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casework; `on the job' training. Participants attend a training centre for one day 
a week. The practical casework training is undertaken in their respective 
offices where a portfolio of work carried out is completed. In the fourth year 
specialist training in one of four particular compliance areas is undertaken. The 
four areas are as follows: 
" Personal Returns Compliance Offices which deal with the tax affairs of 
individuals. 
" Special Compliance Office which deals with taxpayers who are 
suspected of serious tax fraud. 
" Network Offices which deal with the tax affairs of companies not 
within the LBO. 
" Large Business Office 
At the successful conclusion of the training programme the title of Inspector of 
Taxes is obtained. There are two aspects to formal training; firstly technical 
knowledge and secondly investigative approach. 
7.6 Technical Knowledge 
This part of the training course concentrates on tax knowledge (known as `Core 
Professional Training') although in the first year aspects of bookkeeping, 
incomplete records and business economics are covered. A Trainee Inspector 
Programme was introduced in 2004 for non- graduates to train as an Inspector 
108 Examinations were introduced for an early form of tax officials; surveyors in the late 1870s 
(Sabine, 1966: 73,122-123 and Lamb, 2001: 290). 
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of Taxes specifically in the LBO in a two year period. The training was split 
into four modules: 
"Module 1 
This module explores what a company is and its rights and obligations. 
You will also study basic bookkeeping and how business transactions 
are recorded by companies. You will be introduced to Accounting 
Standards and their importance to your work. You will find out what to 
do if the records kept by a business are inadequate for the purposes of 
arriving at the business profits and how the profits of companies are 
computed for taxation purposes. 
Module 2 
This module covers how cases are selected for enquiry and the law in 
relation to making enquiries. It also covers how to examine a 
company's business records, interviewing skills and how cases are 
brought to a conclusion. 
Module 3 
Here you will learn about certain allowances available to businesses, 
how company profits are assessed to tax and some aspects arising when 
companies form a group. 
Module 4 
To complete your learning you will cover how employment income is 
taxed and what national insurance contributions are. You will consider 
how the capital gains tax legislation applies to companies and take an 
overview of some areas specific to the work of LBO"109. 
From the above it can be see that the training is focused mainly on technical 
tax knowledge and in addition investigative skills are covered. The following 
quote emphasises the tax focus of the technical training. 
"I mean it isn't a formal qualification but I think in a professional 
world, having done what was then called a full training as Inspector of 
Taxes training, I think that's recognised because it's not just tax that 
you're doing. A 180 odd tax cases that you have to sort of virtually 
remember and be able to quote "(UK tax partner ex IR, A3,2002). 
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This focus on tax technical knowledge constitutes the tax inspector as an expert 
`subject'. However although the training is very tax focused as the above 
extracts illustrate, the IR and those who have undergone the training are keen 
to point out that the training is not just limited to tax cases. As the interviewee 
goes on to say. 
"... But you also have to do book keeping, accounting and you have to 
prepare a set of accounts from incomplete records. So we have to know 
what T accounts are. So there is, you know there is an understanding of 
how to read accounts as an inspector"(UK tax partner ex IR, A3,2002). 
This training contributes to the precise calculation of the tax assessable. 
"The LBO is an organisation of skilled knowledgeable people who are 
interested in getting the right answer whatever the right answer is. It is 
an intellectual exercise" (IR official, IR7,2003). 
This technical focus is an indication of the nature of the truth game. It is an 
intellectual exercise where more validity is accorded to truth being defined as 
correctness even though there is no simple right calculation of the answer to 
the question of what should be the amount of tax payable by a large group. 
The focus on truth as correctness may also be in part a reflection of the 
bureaucratic nature of the IR organisation. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Hall 
(1963: 33) identifies six dimensions of bureaucracy in organisations, one of 
which is "promotion and selection for employment based upon technical 
competence". In an old style bureaucratic organisation, career advancement 
was enhanced by having superior technical knowledge, such as knowing the 
'o9http: //www. inlandrevenue. ov. uk/join-us/inspector/business. htm seen 
25/01/04 
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tax cases in detail, arriving at the correct tax treatment irrespective of the 
length of time taken to achieve the result. Inspectors are sometimes more 
concerned with the detail of the `correct answer' rather than finalising the year 
of accounts under review. 
"They seem to be less pragmatic so they're -I don't think they're 
driven by, well by getting the assessments finalised. I think they're 
more driven by, well the law says this and I interpret it this way and 
therefore I'm going to pursue this argument forever and a day rather 
than say, well actually if I give a little bit it doesn't make a huge 
amount of difference to the end result. I think they're far more, but 
they're less pragmatic and so they, they're not as bothered about getting 
the tax computations that year signed off' (UK tax manager, C 14, 
2003). 
In addition superior technical competence could be measured by examining the 
number of technical arguments won and settlements reached such that the 
`correct truth' can be measured. For the old style knowledge expert success in 
doing their job would have been demonstrated by achieving a number of tax 
adjustments, in other words correcting the tax computations for tax technical 
errors. For the new style knowledge expert, it is still necessary but no longer 
sufficient as I discuss further in Chapter 9. 
One consequence of this focus on taxation solely is that it gives tax a greater 
prominence than otherwise may be the case. 
"that's the other thing that's been no more noticeable since I left the 
Revenue is that the Revenue when I was there, perhaps it was just me 
but, tended to think that the World began and ended with taxation and 
that's all anyone in business ever focussed about, but to a large extent 
that isn't true. The whole commercial world goes on and often tax is 
just an afterthought. " (ex IR UK co manager, C9,2003). 
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A tax official may view every transaction outside the normal course of business 
to be tax motivated. The Review of Business Links report notes that large 
corporates want the IR to appreciate that not every business decision is driven 
by tax (IR, 2001: 4). This can impact on the relationship that the tax official 
has with his case as he may view the taxpayer with suspicion and ask more 
detailed questions than may be strictly appropriate as he imagines that every 
transaction has been undertaken for non bona fide commercial reasons. So the 
`truth game' becomes an unstable game. The training has wider aspects of a 
more practical nature such as how to examine computations for miss-statement. 
7.7 Investigative approach 
The training also covers how to investigate and interview taxpayers. A tax 
inspector has to look for omissions in the tax computation such as income 
under declared or transactions not disclosed fully or where the information is 
presented in a more tax favourable light than may otherwise be the case. The 
traditional approach was that the Inspector of taxes would make enquiries into 
the tax computations. These enquiries would be in writing often taking the 
form of a large number of questions. 
"You didn't know a great deal about it but what you needed to do was 
to try and think about it in the broad terms and ask hopefully intelligent 
questions about what was going on that was sort of relevant to the 
taxpayer and you sort of moved between being sceptical and being 
cynical depending on the topic and response you were getting. It was 
really like an investigation you didn't actually take anything at face 
value and you developed a way of asking questions etc and probing the 
answers that you were given. .. For a long while continued to deal with 
what was seen as general technical enquiries rather sort of technical 
questions refer to tax cases things like this generally do the job they 
were recruited to do" (Ex IR Tax partner, Al, 2002). 
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This type of questioning disguised the lack of information about the taxpayer 
that the Inspector had. They were able to obtain limited information from the 
financial statements and from the computation and from other sources such as 
press articles. From the questioning the Inspector would seek to satisfy himself 
that the computations were correct; meaning that the computations were a 
"true" reflection of the tax affairs of the taxpayer. An additional benefit would 
be that, as a result of these questions, an omission or error would be 
highlighted and this would result in additional tax becoming payable, known as 
"adjustments". Although not expressed explicitly, this allowed a measure of 
how good the Inspector was perceived to be at his job (interview C9). One of 
the strengths of this approach is that the activities of the officials are 
controllable. Everyone is doing a similar thing and it is documented in a 
written form. As the correspondence was conducted by letter only, all 
interactions were documented. This can be compared with meeting notes 
whereby the minutes of a meeting will only record the significant matters and 
not all interactions such as asides. Another aspect of control is that the 
inspectors' effectiveness could be managed as their performance could be 
made visible and measurable. The Tax Inspectors were being made into 
calculable selves in that their performance was being judged. Miller and 
O'Leary also make this point - the "life of the person comes to be viewed in 
relation to standards and norms of behaviour" (Miller and O'Leary, 1987: 262). 
"It was never overtly declared that you would ask, you know, all these 
questions, but certainly from the law of averages the more questions 
you asked the more likely you were to get a result out of it and 
certainly, despite what the Revenue say, you were target orientated and 
there were lists or rewards for reaching certain targets [re additional tax 
liable], not financial rewards particularly, but actually, yes, latterly 
financial rewards because your pay depended on it, or increments 
213 
depended on it. Certainly promotion prospects depended on it" (Ex IR 
official, Al, 2002). 
"That's right. The Civil service is a classical pyramid and your 
promotion prospects depended upon annual reporting and your reports 
would be "has achieved his target", "has not achieved his target", "has 
exceeded his target" and depending on which box you fell into certainly 
your promotion prospects would be dented or enhanced. So, yes, there 
was definitely some incentive to get adjustments. That is the backdrop 
as far as the Revenue is concerned. There was never this, as I say, this 
"you will ask all these questions", but it certainly ... the mindset of the 
people who were asking the questions was such that they knew that was 
the way to get success, or thought that was the way to get success. " (ex 
IR official UK company tax manager, C9,2003). 
This method is a simple hierarchical surveillance of tax officials as proposed 
by Foucault in his book `Discipline and Punish' (1977a). However this 
approach can be criticised for its simplicity. The tax compliance game is 
between two parties; the tax official and the taxpayer. A weakness of this 
approach is that it views the taxpayer in a certain light. 
This approach was referred to as the scatter gun approach by tax professionals 
outside the IR. The particular questions were not focused, in the opinion of tax 
professionals outside the IR, and they often demonstrated evidence of a lack of 
understanding by the Inspector of the business environment of the corporate. 
"Well from, from what I could see that the [LBO tax district] inspectors 
were more the inspectors I dealt with in the early nineties and other 
people had described to me in the eighties, who were far more, always 
wanting more information, always writing very long letters, really 
delving into the detail. Not looking for the big issues, so a lot of people 
described it as the scatter gun approach. They just asked questions 
about everything and hopefully they'll hit upon the one thing that's 
going to give them some revenue. " (UK company tax manager, C14, 
2003) 
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A consequence of this number of questions was that it took a large amount of 
the company's management time to answer these questions and obtain the 
required information. A further difficulty would be that the questions could 
relate to a previous year and a substantial amount of time could have passed 
since the transactions had taken place. In the meantime employees may have 
moved to other jobs or the records may be difficult to locate or to obtain in the 
required form. The use of the term `scattergun', as well as being a shorthand 
description of what took place, also informs us about the parties to the 
relationship's understanding of the dynamics of the relationship. The tax 
inspector is invisible to the taxpayer and the taxpayer is almost invisible to the 
tax inspector. For the new style of game to be effective the tax inspector and 
the taxpayer must be visible to each other. 
The NCP, with its focus on meetings, is an attempt to make the tax inspector 
and taxpayer mutually visible. However this new type of game requires a 
different sort of disclosure what I have described above as a form of parrhesia 
both by the taxpayer and by the tax official. 
7.8 Immersion in the IR discourse - implicit training 
As well as formal technical training in investigations work, experience gained 
elsewhere influences the style of questioning by Inspectors, not just those 
Inspectors who had the particular experience but also other Inspectors who 
implicitly acquired the informal knowledge through discourse. 
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"In the 90s I think that what has almost happened is that more of the 
culture of investigations in the traditional technical areas has occurred. 
Partly I think it is as those people who started their careers doing 
investigations will have moved into what was Enquiry branch, Special 
Compliance Office, Special Office and more of them are now out 
running districts and more of them have gone to the LBOs and they use 
the techniques that they learned before and so are not afraid to sort of 
say you don't expect me to believe that do you? Even if you are 
dealing with somebody trying to argue that x% of this number 
represents a valid expenditure rather than somebody saying well yes I 
did win that £25,000 on the dogs at Walthamstow. Because I only ever 
win you know. Those techniques are coming through into the 
traditional technical areas and I don't think it's a problem as long as it's 
done in a way in which you recognise that the taxpayer who is not 
understating profits is not essentially a crook and they are probably not 
lying to you whereas the ones I am saying probably is they probably 
are not lying to you but they may not be telling you everything and they 
will always be putting a gloss upon it and you start to recognise that 
there is a difference in the type of individual you are dealing with. " (ex 
IR official UK tax partner, Al, 2002). 
This example of `implicit' training is built around the old style version of the 
`truth game' and the old identity of the tax inspector. However this implicitly 
gained knowledge is not transferred when there is a change of Tax Inspector 
dealing with a particular taxpayer. There are frequent changes in jobs for Tax 
Inspectors. They will deal with the same cases for a maximum period of 5 
years although in practice it is often much shorter. The average period is 
approximately 2.5 years (interview LBO official, LBO4,2003). The reason 
given for the movement of staff within the LBO and from and to the `Network' 
(other IR operational offices outside the LBO) is that Inspectors should not get 
too comfortable with their cases. As Savage (1998: 69) writes when discussing 
Weber's argument, "the modern bureaucracy depends upon distinguishing 
individual members of staff from their specific jobs so that they do not use 
such jobs as devices for self- promotion". There is a common currency that any 
Case Director within the LBO has a broad but deep knowledge, and a 
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complexity of understanding of the key technical aspects. This knowledge 
enables them to deal with large retail companies one day and shipping 
companies another notwithstanding that the two industries are very different. It 
is also a reflection on the development of the identity of the Tax Inspector, as 
previously discussed, that Tax Inspectors `learn their craft' on the job having 
come from a multitude of academic disciplines. However this movement of 
staff has an impact on the tax compliance process in that the delay in agreeing 
the tax figures for a particular year is even more extended. 
"My experience last year [was] where we'd been arguing about 
something I mean literally for years, since the mid nineties this 
argument had been going on. And it had gone through several different 
inspectors. And of course every time you get a new inspector you're 
always starting again to pick up the file and, oh well, what does this 
mean? And they pick up something, someone else hadn't picked up. 
So you go round and round and round and round in circles, and at the 
end - it was getting to the point that we really needed to settle this 
somehow or other. " (UK tax advisor, A3,2002) 
This approach to implicit training is built around the old style of game and old 
style of identity and notion of the tax inspector as subject. 
7.9 Immersion in the IR discourse - organisational structure 
As well as the implicit knowledge acquired, another factor which shapes the 
subject, the Tax Inspector, is the organisational structure of the LBO. There are 
two aspects to be considered. Firstly the administrative structure of the offices, 
including the personnel involved, and how they are managed, including the 
"in" and "out" nature of their typical experience. Secondly the functional 
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structure of the organisation; by this I refer to the degree of specialisation and 
sectorisation of taxpayers amongst the various offices. 
As I mentioned in section 5.9 each LBO office has a slightly different structure 
and is fairly autonomous. There is no one person in charge of the particular 
office. Below the senior inspectors in a hierarchical structure are other 
inspectors of more junior grades (B 1 and B2). A typical LBO office had 5 case 
directors, 9 Inspectors of B1 grade who in limited circumstances would be case 
directors on smaller cases in their own right, 20 inspectors of B2 grade and in 
addition a number of administrative staff including an office manager, most 
likely at B1 level. This small size of unit enables the office to operate in an 
autonomous way. However the offices are bonded together by the inspectors 
having a shared history of training. It was interesting to note that each of the 
six offices that I visited had a different organisational structure and layout, only 
one of which was an open planned office layout. Each of the offices seemed 
separate within the organisation. An interesting comment was that the tax 
officials explained at five of the offices that they were one of the few offices 
not to be open planned! This is also evidence of the localised nature of the 
structure. Their knowledge of the other offices in the LBO was limited, 
showing that limited mobility within the LBO takes place. 
The remuneration structure is different depending on the seniority of the Tax 
Inspector. At grades B1 and below their pay is determined internally by the IR. 
This is not true of the remuneration of case directors, who are in the main 
Principal Inspectors (SCS). For these individuals there is not a separate pay 
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scale and system for the IR. These senior employees are compared with those 
of the same grade across the Civil Service, in other central government 
departments such as Agriculture, Work and Pensions etc. In addition they are 
ranked against one another by the deputy directors of the LBO who are at the 
same grade as them. A significant factor in determining their remuneration is 
their relative position compared with their peers and this relative position could 
well change each year. It is possible for an employee's particular ranking to go 
down even though their performance has stayed the same or improved if some 
of the other employees have had a particularly successful year. The ranking has 
a significant impact on pay and the bonus received. 
7.10 Business Sectorisation 
The second aspect of organisational structure is by business sectorisation. The 
localised nature of operations is also evident with this sectorisation. The 
professional firms have industry specialists such as, but not limited to, banking, 
insurance, telecommunications and property companies. The LBO has matched 
this industry specialisation with sectorisation where a particular LBO office has 
a focus on a sector group, such as pharmaceutical companies at the Manchester 
LBO and major utilities at the West Midlands LBO office. The location of the 
particular sector specialist LBO initially was due to historical reasons; for 
example, shipping groups are based in Liverpool LBO. The West Midlands 
LBO was an exception in that it was set up with the intention to have the major 
utilities, which were previously privatised companies, all together in the 
particular LBO. 
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".. utilities was a very interesting example, the utilities sector is 
nationalised industries mainly, there was no-one interested, and then 
you have these cash cows created with basically local monopolies and 
an interest created, potentially paying tax for the first time, interested in 
creating a low tax environment for themselves and acting in a fairly 
unified way. ...... I gather we negotiated a 
lot of cross industry 
agreements with them on a particular, like how soon as we have dealt 
with that pipeline, transmission system.. across the board so they are all 
operating on a level playing field. So you see a sudden change, 
necessitating a consistent approach from us and having benefits for both 
sides" (LBO official, LBO 1,2003). 
In London where the Financial Services companies are concentrated, there are 
specialist offices for banking and insurance groups. The tax officials have to 
become sector specialists as well. Whilst this may previously have been the 
situation in the banking and insurance industries due to specific legislation 
applying solely to those sectors, this is a new development in other sectors, 
albeit the development of these different sectors has been rather on an ad hoc 
basis (interview, LBOI, 2003). Each sector has a lead contact and a second 
contact. The objective from the IR's perspective is to have an exchange of best 
practice and to ensure consistency in approach. (Interview LBO6,2003). 
However not all sectors are as homogeneous as, for instance, the Financial 
Sector industries which have representative bodies such as the British Banking 
Association or the Association of British Insurers. 
A difficulty for the Case Directors is where there is not an established sector. 
Consequently they have to develop new expertise in these different types of 
businesses and to understand the commercial aspects. This requires a new and 
different type of knowledge from tax technical knowledge. 
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".. Well, [among the advantages, ) consistency is a big one, commercial 
knowledge. If I were in a provincial LBO, I would have to deal with, 
probably three or four different sectors. This issue is actually becoming 
commercially astute in relation to each of those sectors, sort of 
understanding the major drivers and the developments, where it is 
going, where the sector is going as well as the sensitivities. That's the 
more difficult one, getting to grips with that, getting the knowledge 
formalised, making connections with the right people, the 
representative bodies. I mean certainly they will have to handle the, the 
sector committee will have to handle the representative bodies, there is 
no way that Head Office would handle that when it's our own 
speciality. I think as well, it's not as clear what the role of sector 
committees would be or sector leader or whatever, in the sense that it is 
possible to do too much, too little" (LBO official, LBO6,2003). 
There are acknowledged difficulties of sectorisation in that one size doesn't fit 
all as illustrated by the following quote. 
"The problem I suppose about sectorisation is that most groups of any 
size unless they are very specialist, are involved in more in one sector. 
And once you start categorising things as being in a sector you're, you 
know you're losing quite a bit. And you might miss out a lot of things 
just by persuading yourself that this is the one the group is in" (LBO 
official , LBO5,2003). 
The advantage from the IR viewpoint is that sectorisation "gives a much more 
consistent approach to all cases and we're able to give certainty much sooner" 
(Cm 6050). This is an acknowledgement of the changed outward facing respect 
for the taxpayer's concern for certainty. 
7.11 Specialist Knowledge 
Another aspect of new knowledge is specialist knowledge which is functional 
knowledge but not sector specific. The type of technical knowledge cannot 
remain the same. Tax legislation has become more complex as a result of both 
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anti avoidance legislation and adapting existing legislation to new business 
types and transactions, including different types of financial instruments. It is 
no longer sufficient to be just a corporate tax specialist. The professional firms 
have functional specialists such as transfer pricing specialists. The IR have had 
technical experts in the Technical Department who would be specialists in 
transfer pricing, thin capitalisation or international experts. These specialists 
are outside the main operational departments such as the LBO. Specific 
transactions and situations would be referred to them by tax inspectors and then 
the specialist would conduct enquiries with the taxpayer directly (interview, 
LBO official, LBO2,2003). However what is new is the intention to recruit 
functional specialists to advise on commercial aspects of transactions therefore 
not tax specific. The intention is to recruit sector experts who understand the 
business on short term contracts or `call off' ontracts so the expertise is 
readily available. This is to counteract one of the criticisms of the LBO by 
corporate taxpayers which is the lack of commercial awareness (IR, 2001). The 
main impact of this use of functional specialists is where there are a number of 
questions being asked by the tax inspectors with little or no tax effect. One of 
the interviewees referred to a leasing expert being recruited who has made a 
major contribution in that he has directed people away from enquiries which 
were going nowhere (senior official, IR2,2003). In addition the IR has 
recruited a Banking specialist to give advice on the banking industry as well as 
professionally qualified accountants - `compliance accountants'. These 
qualified accountants, with significant professional experience gained outside 
the IR, assist the compliance teams with technical accountancy input. This 
input may include challenging either the accounting policies selected by a 
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company in preparing their financial statements, or the methods used to apply 
the chosen accounting policies in practice (interview, LBO official, LBOI, 
2003). Within the LBO, these accountants represent the LBO at meetings with 
representatives of the corporate taxpayers and their advisors. It is common for 
these representatives of the corporate taxpayers to be either qualified 
accountants or ex IR officials, although they are predominately qualified 
accountants. 
The advantage for the IR of this bought-in expertise is that the IR can ask more 
focused questions and use their time more efficiently as demonstrated by the 
following quote. 
"I think it should do and if you are doing a capital allowances claim on 
a new building, trying to distinguish plant and the structure for 
example, apart from the industry that has grown up outside to do that, 
the inspector your average inspector, my gifted amateur, really 
wouldn't know a great deal about competent surveying or the way in 
which the building is constructed. Whereas if you put a surveyor in, 
the surveyor would at least speak the same language, would know to 
what extent you were pushing one area too far one way or other. They 
know broadly what the average percentages are in a typical building 
between the mechanicals and civils and this sort of thing. Therefore 
they are likely to be more effective in dealing with the accountant [tax 
professional/ tax advisor]: ' (Ex IR official UK tax partner, Al, 2002). 
As a result tax officials are having to become not only sector specialists but are 
also having to understand how to make use of non tax function experts. They 
have always utilised the technical policy and international departments of the 
IR but this is a new kind of expertise. It is the understanding of how to 
integrate with experts who have not had the benefit of the IR training and 
discourse. They each have a different professional background and the way 
223 
they deal with these different types of expert knowledge is different. For 
example at the senior levels of the tax profession both lawyers and accountants 
advise on tax planning opportunities but the way they approach the problem 
and possible solutions will be different. Basically a lawyer will focus on what 
the legislation says and judicial interpretations of tax cases whereas an 
accountant, whilst having in mind the tax law, will also be aware of the impact 
of the tax planning transactions on the accounts of the company and relevant 
disclosures. Although the solutions may well be the same how they approach 
the outcome may well be different. 
"we've had some enquiries from the LBO accountant. I've found, I 
think we found that quite difficult because he wasn't a member and he 
isn't a member of the key, of the core team. So he's a specialist they 
call in for a particular area and we found that he didn't understand our 
business and because he had no relationship with us, we - you know he 
asked questions that maybe we thought were unnecessary" (Tax 
manager, C14,2003). 
Miller and Rose (1990: 2) argue that the powers of expertise have become a 
significant aspect of government. These additional centres of expertise are 
translating into forms of managerial governance as the LBO attempts to mirror 
the specialisms of their corporate cases as well as the specialisms of the 
professional advisory firms. 
7.14 Discussion 
There is recognition within the literature that Civil Servants need to change to 
become a new style official. "[T]he civil service needs a new kind of 
specialized generalist, trained and experienced in managing" (Foster, 2001: 
224 
744). Foster argues that as the political environment has changed and Ministers 
are not involved in drafting legislation, Civil Servants need new skills. 
This emergence of a new style tax official as knowledge expert is part of the 
way the IR is reinventing itself in its dealing with taxpayers. It is reinventing 
government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). This phenomena is what du Gay 
refers to as `entrepreneurial government' (2003: 670). 
However with any change programme there will be resistance to change both 
from the individual tax officials and from the organisation itself. One 
interviewee reflected on the lack of ambition he saw in the Inspector with 
whom he dealt and interpreted it as a resistance to change: 
"I don't know if the inspectors are being measured on how they adopt 
some of the stuff that is being wheeled out. I imagine some of it is quite 
hard to measure. I imagine some inspectors don't particularly care, I 
imagine some inspectors are not quite so ambitious, they're quite happy 
to sit there and do what they've always done as long as they don't lose 
their job. It's going to be very hard to get people like that to change. I 
know our tax inspector not this one or the previous one, but the one 
before him it was the time that his case director had got another job he 
was moving on and I said to him over the phone "Are you interested, 
are you going to apply for it? " and he said " No, I'm quite happy doing 
what I'm doing", which I found kind of strange I thought even if you 
didn't have a lot of ambition, you might at least have a little bit, you 
might at least try it, but he was quite happy just to sit there. If he's like 
that there could be other people in the Revenue like that. So if there's 
no way of motivating people to adopt some of the changes and they're 
not measured on it, why are people going to change? "(UK company tax 
manager, CIO, 2003). 
The interviewee linked it with the question of measurement, suggesting that if 
it were possible to measure responsiveness to change, it may be possible to 
motivate people to embrace change: 
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"[T]he impression I have of the Revenue is that it's a very large 
organisation, a bit of a dinosaur, and if you want to change things it's 
going to take forever because change is something that's resisted in the 
organisation. People get stuck in their ways and will pay lip service to 
new ideas perhaps, but in terms of the way they actually approach their 
work on a day-to-day basis, nothing really changes. Or they think that 
they're changing to what's required, but in reality they're not they're 
only changing a little bit and what's required is a lot more"(UK 
company tax manager, CIO, 2003). 
However with the increased strategic and managerial focus of the IR this form 
of disciplinary knowledge no longer suffices. With the development of new 
style working practices that modern multinational entities discover themselves 
having to engage in, such as a move away from one-way authoritarian 
interactions `directed' by the LBO towards more apparently open two-way and 
informal negotiating processes, the inspector has to become a new type of tax 
official. They need to have both the `old' technical knowledge and also a new 
broader knowledge of `soft skills' such as non confrontational meeting skills, 
customer service skills, and treating taxpayers as customers, in addition to 
greater specialist knowledge as multinational corporates and tax legislation 
becomes increasingly complex. The Inspectors have to become a three 
dimensional transdisciplinary T shaped tax inspector. Transdisciplinary in the 
sense of "grafting other business disciplines and skills onto a [tax] base" 
(Hoskin and Anderson-Gough, 2004). It is the technical knowledge used in a 
different way. The knowledge itself doesn't change but the way it is used 
changes. This new knowledge contributes to the tax official doing his job in 
new ways as Deetz (1992) writes 
"Disciplinary power resides in every perception, every 
judgement, every act.... It is not just the rule and routine which 
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becomes internalised, but a complex set of practices which 
provide common sense- self evident experience and personal 
identity" (Deetz, 1992: 37 in McKinlay and Starkey, 1998a: 4). 
In the next chapter I examine how the corporate taxpayer is being transformed 
through discursive practices into a customer. It will be seen that from the large 
corporates' perspective the tax compliance game is changing as a consequence 
of the IR engaging in a different way with them. 
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Chapter 8- The corporate taxpayer reconceptualised as a 
Customer 
8.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter it was noted that the corporate tax compliance process is 
always an interplay of two knowledge experts: the tax official and the taxpayer. 
It is worth recalling why this focus is important as 
1. it is a game of changing rules of enterpreneurial government, 
2. where the role of the expert is exposed, and 
3. a mix of inquisition and parrhesia-based tactics are employed within the 
expert disciplinary frame. 
How does the other party involved, the taxpayer, play this new game as a 
knowledge expert subject? I argue that the taxpayer has to play a role which 
has to incorporate the construct of the "customer". 
The customer relationship building trend is visible across the public sector and 
is a key feature of NPM in practice (Needham, 2006; Brunsson & Sahlin- 
Andersson, 2000). In this chapter the corporate taxpayer's reconceptualisation 
as a Customer subject is developed in more detail. The taxpayer's role in the 
process of tax compliance cannot be looked at in isolation. The corporate 
taxpayer does not submit tax returns without an understanding or a perceived 
understanding of how the IR operates and the practices of individual tax 
officials. In addition corporate taxpayers are influenced by both the discourses 
and practices arising from the IR. However this is not a one way process. These 
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IR discourses and practices, which are employed by tax officials, are 
themselves influenced by the taxpayer's activities. Thus the focus of this 
chapter is on how the IR is engaging differently with the large corporate 
taxpayer and, as a consequence of the IR doing different things, how the nature 
of the tax compliance game is changing from the large corporates' viewpoint. 
As with the tax official, this important interaction is considered from the 
perspective of both how it has taken place in the past and also how it now 
appears to be developing in new ways. As discussed in Chapter 2 the corporate 
taxpayers' representatives are either tax directors and tax managers for those 
corporate taxpayers that have an in-house tax department, or tax professionals 
who act for corporate taxpayers who subcontract their tax compliance work to 
a professional firm of accountants. In my professional experience, both these 
groups (tax directors/ managers and professional advisors) have well developed 
negotiation skills, equal to, if not exceeding, those of IR officials, and are 
aware of some of the rules and dynamics of the negotiation game and the 
interests of the other parties. They are also becoming aware of how these rules 
of the tax negotiation game have changed and how to take advantage of these 
new parameters of the game. 
As argued in Chapter 1, the large corporate has always been in a position of 
power when dealing with the IR. They have a range of practices available to 
them, a `whole series of specific governmental apparatuses' with which to 
exert power in the relationship. They are able to negotiate tax settlements and 
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they are significant contributors to UK p1c110 not just by the payment of taxes 
but also by providing employment in the UK which contributes to the Gross 
Domestic Product and provides a larger pool of taxpaying individuals. In 
particular this chapter looks at the ways in which the large corporate's 
relationship with the IR is being altered strategically and the need for the IR to 
engage differently with the large taxpayer by doing different things. Part of 
engaging differently is the reconceptualisation of the corporate taxpayer as a 
customer. 
In this chapter, I first look at the subjectivisation of the taxpayer as a customer 
of the IR. It is worth recalling Foucault's words (writing as Maurice Florence) 
here: 
"The question is one of determining what the subject must be, what 
condition is imposed on it, what status it is to have, and what position it 
is to occupy in reality or in the imaginary, in order to become the 
legitimate subject of one type of knowledge or another" (Foucault / 
Florence, 1994: 314). 
In this section I look at the choice of customer discourse for the corporate 
taxpayer and how this customer discourse has shaped the customer subject. 
Secondly I look how the IR is determining the taxpayer as a customer subject. 
By this I mean what practices have been put into place, such as customer 
service targets, which have contributed to the objectivisation of the customer 
subject. Thirdly I look at how the corporate taxpayer operates as a customer 
subject. Through this analysis I want to argue that the customer concept has 
become a technology of government. 
110 UK plc refers to the "corporation of the United Kingdom" in other words the country as a 
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8.2 Who is the corporate taxpayer? 
Chapter 2 explained who the corporate taxpayer was. The discussion there 
focussed on the in-house tax manager who, as was mentioned, is usually a 
professionally qualified accountant with a number of years of post qualification 
experience. 
Tax managers do not tend to stay long with the same group as there is little or 
no career progression within an in-house tax department, except in a very large 
tax department (interview, 2003, A4). The tax manager's experience is limited 
to the activities of the group and after a period of two years or so, the rate of 
increase in this experience plateaus unless the group is engaged in acquisitions 
and disposals of major subsidiaries or special financing structures. This is 
different from professional accounting firm practice where there is scope to 
work on a variety of clients and transactions of increasing size and complexity, 
and to gain promotion within the firm's taxation practice. In-house tax 
departments frequently are referred to as `lean and mean' by tax professionals 
and tax managers in that they do not have excess staff (interviews A5, C14, 
2003). This may be due to the view that they are regarded as primarily a cost 
centre by the company's management and therefore as a department for which 
costs are to be minimised. 
Historically the role of tax managers encompassed submitting tax returns and 
implementing tax efficient structures after the commercial decisions had been 
taken. However this role is changing. Tax managers are much more heavily 
wealth operation. 
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involved in business strategy, actively promote the work of their department to 
the Board of Directors (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000b) and identify and 
manage tax risks that the company faces (Ernst & Young, 2004). They also 
have a direct responsibility for ensuring that the Group's business units are able 
to operate tax efficiently. They need to promote the tax function by internal 
communication in order to market themselves to the other business units 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000b, 2002). Tax functions are seen more as acting 
as a service provider to other parts of the group (Porter, 1999b). They have 
internal clients, customers, to which they provide tax services. 
8.3 The choice of customer discourse 
It is necessary to distinguish two ways in which the construct of the `customer' 
can be deployed discursively. One is in the context of classic external market 
relations, where there is a classic supplier / buyer relationships 
t 1. But 
increasingly a second way has emerged, in internal market situations, where 
organisations wish to redefine the intra organisational and inter departmental 
and divisional relations even though these relationships may not be a classic 
supplier/ buyer arrangement. In this context there may be a link, ultimately, to 
external customer relations, but the customer discourse has a principally 
internal focus, to remake the whole way employees both perceive and enact 
their own work and its interrelations with others in the organisation. If we 
might describe the classic external market relationship as involving the `visible 
customer', the latter may be described as one with the `invisible customer' - 
1" In the Marketing literature a distinction is made between the customer and the consumer. A 
wholesale business sells to a retailer, its customer. The consumer is the retailer's customer. 
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both in the sense that the term is being used metaphorically, by extension, not 
for `real customer' relations, and because this practice may remain totally 
invisible to such real customers, except insofar as it changes (and possibly 
improves) the quality of their interrelations with the organization and its 
employees. The invisible customer is thus visible only to those within the 
organisation. 
It appears, reviewing the history of the construct within the IR, that the IR 
introduced the customer concept internally, i. e. in the invisible customer mode, 
to refer to taxpayers in the early 1990s (interview, IR4,2003). This was 
developed into a customer service approach. Following the White Paper 
`Competing for quality' (Cm 1730) and policies introduced by the Citizens 
Charter 112 (Cm 1599), and Next Steps, the Board of the IR decided that 
significant change to the structure and processes of the IR was needed (NAO, 
1996). This resulted in a ten year change programme starting in 1992. The 
change programme focused on four important areas known as the "Four Cs" 
which emphasised `Customer service', `Compliance', `Cost efficiency' and 
`Caring for staff `(NAO, 1996: 1). These "Four Cs", as they began to be 
known, were translated into a programme which reorganised the office 
structure; simplified and streamlined processes; improved the use of IT and 
changed the culture of the Department (NAO, 1996: 1)113. 
"Z Government Departments and Next Steps agencies which introduced the Citizens Charter 
showed significant improvements such as the Passport Agency. However the introduction was 
not without criticism among which was the feeling that the performance targets introduced 
might have been set too low (Butcher, 1997). 
1" See Lamb, Tuck and Hoskin (2003a, 2003b, 2003c). 
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Management change programmes were introduced, such as Total Quality 
Management models, in particular the European Foundation for Quality 
Management "Excellence Model" (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000) which 
focuses on customer service. The customer service and enabling concepts were 
further emphasised with the issue of the `Modernising Government' White 
Paper in March 1999 (Cm 4310). Marketing techniques were utilized when 
Income Tax Self Assessment was introduced (Farron et al, 1999) and a 
marketing director of the IR was appointed in November 2000 (Cm 5118: 1). 
Applying this distinction to the IR, I would suggest that there was a first phase 
in which changes were made in this `invisible customer' sense, focussed 
inwardly and with little external visibility. More recently the discourse of the 
customer has been extended to the visible customer as well, and in the process 
has arguably become far more visible or insistent internally as well. 
The work I did as a research fellow on the CRAKA project examined the role 
of the Customer discourse more generally within the IR. In our paper 
"Emergence of the Customer Concept in Inland Revenue Discourse and 
Practice" (Lamb, Tuck and Hoskin, 2003c) we discussed some dilemmas and 
ambiguities associated with this reconceptualisation in a regulating department. 
We argued that "far from being just a reclassification of the taxpayer as 
customer, the emerging discourse and the associated embedded practices of the 
IR were in part being embedded in organisational change and the merger with 
1-IM Customs and Excise" (ibid: abstract). The topic of concern of this chapter 
which extends this work is the impact of customer discourse for large 
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corporates and I will argue how the large corporates are being remade into a 
visible customer. 
The emergence of a customer discourse may still seem strange in the IR 
context, since taxpayers are subjects of the state rather than customers. 
However, it is already apparent, in many private sector contexts, that the use of 
customer discourse in relation to `invisible customers' does not require that the 
buyer has a choice as to from whom they can purchase services or goods, 
insofar as there is a corporate requirement that these have to be acquired intra 
group. But here the point is that those who may otherwise be seen purely as 
`calculable selves' in their interactions become calculable but also calculating 
selves, and in that respect are empowered in their interactions. As du Gay and 
Salaman (1992) put it: 
"While this process of relabelling may appear as a totalitarian attack on 
diversity and difference it is never conceived of or represented as such. 
Rather, the enterprising customer is imagined as an empowered human 
being - the moral centre of the enterprising universe. Within the 
discourse of enterprise customers / consumers are constituted as 
autonomous, self-regulating and self-actualising individual actors, 
seeking to maximise the worth of their existence to themselves through 
personalized acts of choice in a world of goods and services" (Du Gay 
and Salaman, 1992: 622/3). 
This draws on the ideas developed in Foucault's last work on the Care of the 
Self, where particular networks of `practices' were identified as the means for 
exercising self-care in different ways in different eras, e. g. via regimens of 
physical and spiritual exercise, with `examination' of one's acts being a 
particular technique referred to in the Roman era (Foucault, 1986). The new 
network of self regulating but invisible customers operates via these practices 
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and in the process constitutes a newly invigorated internal market for goods 
and services within an organisation. 
Through adopting this kind of discourse and practice the public sector has 
embraced those ideas from the private sector which Ogden (1997) refers to as 
being part of the "enterprise culture". 
"The need to meet the "demands of customers" has been invoked by 
Governments in its attempts to pressure public sector organisations into 
performing as though they were commercial enterprises subject to the 
economic and efficiency imperatives of the competitive market, with 
the result that public sector professionals are now expected "to exercise 
initiative; compete for "consumers"; cost their activities and think of 
themselves as "producers" if they are to prosper, let alone retain their 
jobs (Ogden, 1997: 536). 
Ogden (1997) draws on Miller and Rose's (1990) conceptual framework when 
considering the introduction of the customer service concept within the newly 
privatised water industry even though the water companies were in a monopoly 
position. He interviewed Ofwat personnel and managers from five of the ten 
water companies and found that the measurement of customer service, even 
though there was no possibility of customer choice, enabled companies and 
analysts to compare the efficiency and effectiveness of the operations. Viavio 
(1999) examined the "quantified customer" within a UK manufacturing 
company making cleaning products. 
"This space [calculable customer] reshaped traditional segmentations of 
responsibility. It made visible new dimensions of performance. And it 
restructured the patterns of dependency and power between 
organizational agents. (Viavio, 1999: 709). 
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This research differs from the preceding research in that the three parties to the 
tax compliance process have been interviewed; the tax official, the tax manager 
and the tax professional, whereas Ogden and Viavio have looked at the 
relationship from a single viewpoint. 
8.4 Duty of care from service provider 
There is arguably a complexity in the duties and responsibilities of the IR that 
itself pushes the IR towards this stage in a more explicit but also awkward or 
uncomfortable way, since it has a dual role towards taxpayers. As Montagu, the 
then Chairman of the IR stated in 2001. 
"Put simply, our strategy is to be, and to be seen as, an enabling as well 
as a regulating Department" (Cm 5118: 1). 
The IR has a duty to regulate taxpayers to ensure the tax legislation is applied 
correctly and they pay the correct amount of tax. At first sight this dual aspect 
of conflicting roles seems problematical. How can it be possible for a 
regulating department to have a customer friendly perspective? However IR 
Officials do not see this conflict as it is acknowledged that the term "customer" 
has organisational and structural effects within the IR. 
"IR's staff have now accepted the term customer but accountants 
complain about the term. Customer is a useful phase; it encourages a 
state of mind in IR staff; `We [IR] rely on customers. We cannot do 
anything we like"' (IR official, IR3,2003). 
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There is an appreciation in the IR that the roles of regulating and enabling are 
not conflicting but interconnected and necessary for the administration of tax 
collection. 
"Outside the LBO environment the majority of our people spend most 
of their time helping people. If you are on Pay As You Earn sections 
largely you are helping people who write in saying "Can I claim for 
this? " and "Here's my information", and most of the contact you have 
there is actually the enjoyable part of the job. So a lot of our people 
have always been doing customer service. It was just getting the 
wording right for those who were more on the enabling side, on the 
regulating side, those who were investigating accounts. There is always 
a tension there because effectively you are saying, again on non LBO 
cases, "I don't believe your accounts". You don't actually say that but 
you say I have got concerns. However you write it up that's how the 
customer would see it. But you have still got a duty to handle them 
right and to handle them as you would like to be dealt with. I have 
never actually had that much of a problem with it. People worry about 
using the word customer when they used to say taxpayer but it's not 
really an issue" (IR official, LBO2,2003). 
Ayers and Braithwaite (1992) support this view. They argue that more effective 
regulation can be achieved when regulators are `benign big guns'. The greater 
degree of compliance is achieved when the enforcement procedures are kept in 
the background and regulation can be conducted in a non-adversarial way. This 
is also reflected in the ATO Compliance Model which was discussed in Section 
3.3.2. 
There is some resistance to the term `customer' by the large corporate 
taxpayer. However the interdependency of the dual roles is accepted by tax 
managers as the following quote illustrates. 
"I told [a previous director of LBO] quite vociferously we aren't 
customers. In my view the customer of the Inland Revenue is the 
Treasury and we are not customers we are taxpayers. But I think what 
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they are trying to say is, "Yes, you are taxpayers, but in terms of the 
service we provide you, we are acting not just as regulators but also as 
facilitators, so to that extent you are customers". Clearly to the extent 
they are regulators we are tax payers then we have to pay up and face 
the consequences, but I think, to be fair to them, they are trying hard in 
some areas to improve the service they provide to taxpayers and make it 
easier for taxpayers to comply with their legal obligations. " (UK Tax 
Director of FTSE 100 company, C13,2003) 
This dual conflict becomes less of an issue for the IR as a whole as the IR has 
expanded its activities and now the IR is not just a tax collection agency, where 
money is being collected from taxpayers, including companies and citizens, it 
is also a benefits agency where money is being paid out to citizens. The focus 
on the customer and these additional activities have made the IR become more 
outwardly focused. It has moved away from an internal facing bureaucracy 
where, in the words of one IR official, taxpayers were regarded as a nuisance if 
they telephoned as this hindered the IR with getting on with the `real' work, to 
an organisation which has a strategic plan and a marketing strategy. The 
following section describes the accountability practices, which have been 
introduced by the IR to change the relationships between the IR and large 
corporates. 
8.5 The objectivization of the customer (Stage One): challenging providers 
to act `as if' they had customers (the invisible customer phase) 
Having seen the objectivization of the corporate taxpayer at a general level in 
the previous two chapters, in this section we see specifically that the corporate 
taxpayer as a subject has become `an object of knowledge' through being 
constituted as a customer. This signal of change in tax determination approach 
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is in line with a `customer' focus. Some IR officials have already been 
pursuing this approach but two documents which mark this change are firstly 
the July 2001 Consultative Document and secondly the `Review of Links with 
Business' report (2001). The consultative document was issued by HM 
Treasury and the IR in July 2001. It announced a review would be carried out 
that would consider the extent and effectiveness of the Inland Revenue's links 
with business on administrative matters and policy issues (HM Treasury & IR, 
2001: 7). The report on the outcome of the review, `Review of Links with 
Business' (2001), highlights that there has been improvement in the 
relationship between the LBO and large companies, but also acknowledged 
that there is scope for further improvement. The report contained 
recommendations which sought to address deficiencies, among which were 
new faster processes for IR's enquiries, including meetings set up between the 
company and the LBO, where company officials discuss the company's tax 
risks with the LBO and presentations are made by the company on the 
accounts; and the introduction of the `New Compliance Process' ('NCP'). The 
report also recommended changes to communication processes between the 
LBO and large businesses and representative bodies: the Large Corporate 
Forum, which was set up in order to establish `links' between the LBO and its 
customers and to provide a forum in which to debate current taxation and 
operational issues; and the Corporate Tax Operational Consultative Committee 
set up with representative bodies. There seemed to be mixed messages coming 
from the IR regarding the purpose of the review. The IR acknowledged that the 
review was a part of the `enabling culture' 114. However the IR 2002 Annual 
114 httpV/www. inlandrcvenue-gov. uk/ctsa/sacc_ctl4_01_02. htm seen 19.03.2003. 
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Report reinforces the regulating culture but with `customer discourse' now 
centrally embedded. 
"This work, principally affecting customer relationships with larger 
companies, aims to bring business and the Revenue closer together and 
modernise the administration of the corporation tax system for big 
business. This will result in more efficient use of resources and improve the 
Revenue's ability to focus on areas where tax is at risk" (Cm 5706: 17). 
These changing practices have been evidenced by certain multinational 
companies making presentations to the IR on aspects of their business. There 
have been meetings between the LBO and multinational companies to share the 
LBO's risk assessment with the taxpayer. The LBO seems to have made its 
procedures for identifying areas of tax risk in tax returns more sophisticated in 
recent years. "5 The NCP pilot scheme, which consisted of 17 multinational 
groups encompassing a wide range of industries, 116 formalised this emerging 
approach to `real time working'. It is also more of a joint working relationship. 
"The tax team [of the group] and the case team [of the IR] start by 
discussing and clarifying their responsibilities and expectations, and by 
setting a timetable for key events1 '" 
This is an indication of the IR building relationships with taxpayers/ customers. 
8.6 Customer relationship building 
Part of the development of the customer relationship has been progressed 
through the use of targets. Public sector agreements with measurable targets 
"s This has been incorporated into a performance indicator. "% of our risk-based full enquires 
which result in the detection of non-compliance 76 (2001/02 target compared to 75.4 (2001/02 
result) (Cm 5706: 11). 
116 http: //www. inlandrevenue. gov. uk/lbo/minutes 201102. htm seen 22.03.2003. 
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were introduced within the IR following on from the 1998 White Paper, 
`Public Services for the Future: Modernisation Reform Accountability' (Cm 
4181) and its 1999 supplement (Cm 4315). The public sector target concerned 
with customer service is as follows: - 
"PSA target 5 
Achieve a 2.5 point improvement in customer service by 2004, as 
measured by an annual customer service index" (Cm 5706: 14). 
This quantifiable measure has introduced a new visibility to customer service. 
This point is supported by Miller. 
"as a process of attributing financial values and rationales to a wide 
range of social practices, thereby according them a specific visibility, 
calculability and operational utility" "does not reproduce the visible but 
renders visible" (Miller 1990: 316/317). 
Also the inclusion of the PSA customer service target has focused the IR to 
measure "customer service". However customer service is not a fixed concept 
and there is no precise definition of what is meant by this term. It is interpreted 
by different organisations and different individuals in different ways 
(Needham, 2006). There is clearly confusion over what is meant by `customer 
service' amongst large corporates themselves. It can be interpreted as the IR 
being facilitators to help the corporates to pay the correct amount of tax: 
"There were no customers when I was in the Revenue. They were 
taxpayers. I have to say, I don't think the idea that we are customers sits 
comfortably with my idea of corporates or with inspectors. 
"Customers" suggests a level of voluntary participation, doesn't it? 
There's no voluntary participation with paying tax, so to call us 
customers is a little bit tongue in cheek. To be fair, though, that doesn't 
mean the Revenue are not being sensitive. I think more so than when I 
117 http: //w%vw. iniandrevenue. 2ov. uk/lbo/minutes 201102. htm seen 22.03.2003. 
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was there they are giving care to us as a customer, if that's the way it 
would be perceived, in terms of being considerate about our year-end 
pressures and other pressures. Group plc are going through a big 
disposal process at the moment and the Revenue are mindful of this and 
will lay off us for a little while in terms of enquiries and I don't really 
recall that happening when I was in the Revenue. Then the Revenue 
moved relentlessly on and asked enquiries and if you were busy, well 
you just had to deal with it as well as whatever else you had to deal 
with. The Revenue now are saying "We understand that your year-end 
approaches and we won't bother you from the middle of July to the end 
of August and we'll ask any enquiries [on the previous year's return] in 
September, " (UK Company Tax manager, C9,2003). 
However customer service can also be understood to have a deeper 
significance than the previous quote. It can be interpreted as being a major part 
of the process of tax collecting; asking focused questions and concluding 
promptly the tax treatment of outstanding enquiries and issues: 
"For me [customer] service would be asking sensible questions at an 
appropriate time and resolving them in a timely manner and I think it's 
the resolution that gets difficult because it gets bogged down" (UK Tax 
Director of multinational company, C8,2003). 
Likewise within the LBO there is not one consistent view of what constitutes 
customer service and views on what is meant by customer service differ 
between the IR and large corporates. 
"Primarily they know who the case team are, they will know them as 
individuals and they can pick up a phone and talk to us. Whereas in the 
network [outside the LBO] it is much more likely they will get changes, 
different people being with the case from one year to the next" (IR 
LBO Official, LBO5,2003). 
"In some groups the tax function is quite marginal to the main business. 
They can be difficult to deal with, not so much because they're into 
aggressive tax planning, or whatever, it's just that they can never get 
the relevant information, and so they can be hard groups to deal with 
and so we try to give them as much support as possible to break down 
the culture in their organisation" (IR LBO Official, LBO2,2003). 
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"They'll quite often say we'd like to give you this information, but we 
can't get it out of XYZ. So quite often it helps if you say "Okay, well 
lets go and visit these premises, lets meet the financial controller of this 
factory or this set-up, this establishment". So that's one way" (IR LBO 
official, LBO2,2003). 
The different interpretations of what is meant by "customer service" obviously 
has significance to the measurement of customer service such as when the 
monitoring of the PSA target is undertaken and this focus on measurement of 
customer service has continued to gain greater importance. However perhaps 
more significantly, the "customer service" term gets more deeply entrenched 
within the IR discourse, in part because of the quantified measurement, 
objectivization of the customer. The practice of measuring customer service 
has the effect that customer service takes on a more prominent role in the 
activities of the IR. This is evidenced by one of the recommendations, Is 
included in the Review of Links with Business report: that regular independent 
customer satisfaction surveys should be carried out "to monitor progress in this 
area" (IR, 2001: 9). The first customer survey was a quantitative survey, the 
objectives of which were to ascertain whether "the LBO was providing a 
satisfactory service, acting in a professional manner and identifying risks 
effectively" (LBO Forum minutes, 20 Nov 2002119). The LBO acknowledged 
that the survey was `useful' and would continue to survey in 2003 from a 
qualitative perspective. The proposed survey would concentrate on five areas 
"Understanding the business, Contact with the LBO throughout the year; 
General weaknesses in commercial understanding, "Ringmastering12099 and 
118 Recommendation 4 (IR 2001) 
11' http: //www. inlandrevenue. gov. uk/Ibo/minutes 201102. htm seen 27/02/04 
120 "Ringmastering" is the term which is used to describe the co-ordination role of the LBO 
Case Directors. It is envisaged that this role will co-ordinate the IR's enquiries across the range 
of tax areas such as employee taxes and Stamp Duty (IR, 2001: 8). 
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Sectorisation" (LBO Forum minutes 22 July 2003121). The scope of the 
definition of customer service has been enlarged to encompass more of the 
LBO's work. This has given customer service a greater visibility by the 
introduction of measurable outputs. 
8.7 The objectivization of the customer (Stage Two): the institutional 
emergence of the visible customer 
In this section I look at how the corporate taxpayer operates as a customer 
subject. It is worth again referring to the Maurice Florence article here. 
Foucault writes that he studies 
"the constitution of the subject as its own object: the formation of the 
procedures by which the subject is led to observe itself, to analyze 
itself, to decipher itself, to recognise itself as a domain of possible 
knowledge" (Foucault/ Florence, 1994: 316). 
I am interested in how the subjectivisation and objectivisation of the customer 
subject by the IR impacts on the corporate taxpayer. In other words, how does 
the large corporate taxpayer respond to the IR? We have seen there was 
resistance to calling large corporate taxpayers "customers" but accepting that 
large corporate taxpayers are reconceptualised as customers by the IR, how 
does the corporate taxpayer reflect this conceptualisation? 
One aspect is that the greater visibility of customer service has increased 
expectations from the IR perspective. One of the primary activities of the IR is 
a duty to collect tax in acc6rdance with legislation (regulating). Customer 
121 httn: //Nv`vw. inlandrevenue. gov. uk/lbo/minutes 220703 htm seen 27/02/04 
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service is part of the enabling message. This increased focus on customer 
service is not without difficulties as there may be a limit to the `enabling and 
regulating' message. The customer discourse may have been introduced to 
effect a cosmetic change in the approach of dealing with taxpayers on a 
superficial level, however the customer discourse approach has become 
embedded in the IR organisation (Lamb, Tuck and Hoskin, 2003b, 2003c). Its 
wider use and employment by the IR has come to encompass not just a 
different way of looking at taxpayers but it as also become a key part of 
managing and controlling IR organisational practices, such as being part of the 
performance appraisal mechanism of IR officials. 
"We have a new director who raised the question with us a few weeks 
ago about whether our appraisals ought to have an element for customer 
appraisal and in principle I don't see anything objectionable about it. I 
don't really suppose we would get objective professional reaction. For 
example one colleague has a serious difficulty with a major customer. 
The customer has been a major defaulter and my colleague is looking to 
impose a penalty which the customer doesn't like. We are talking about 
millions of pounds. It's become very personal so I wouldn't want his 
appraisal depending upon the customer being able to take it up" (IR 
official, LBO3,2003). 
This development gives the large corporate taxpayer added power in their 
relationship with the IR although they may not be aware of it. Parrhesia is two 
sided game. One possibility is that these large multinationals have a new 
opportunity, within the new-style `event' of the annual tax liability review, to 
manufacture consent through a tactically adept deployment of its newly 
engineered `expertise advantage' as the taxing body has taken a decision to 
become more strategy and marketing focussed, reconstructing the taxpayer as 
`customer' as well as `subject' in the process. One impact of these new style 
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relations within the IR is the creation of customer service managers to reinforce 
the discourse of "customer service". The consequential outside impact is that 
the customer is more visible, providing the taxpayer gets beyond the 
bewilderment of just being renamed a customer. The end result is that both 
parties "act as if' the taxpayer is a customer and as shown by the following 
quote the taxpayer becomes more customer like. 
"I think that the thing that influences the Revenue behaviour more and 
more is the management focus on the customer. At the regional office 
level there are people who are customer service managers. Now if you 
know that and if you know there is more likelihood of your work being 
reviewed if there is a complaint then it is more likely that you will 
behave in a way that doesn't cause your work to be reviewed. There is 
nothing worse than a complaint because you have to do a lot of work to 
prepare a report on a complaint and then you don't know what's going 
to happen. We go back to the way the Civil Service works again, I 
think: `If you can avoid something happening, you will... (Ex IR 
official, Al, 2002). 
Another impact of these new style relations is a more effective deployment of 
"power" by the IR. Whereas as a bureaucracy it `played its cards close to its 
chest', in undertaking negotiations it now requires or invites the `customer' 
into a different and apparently more open kind of dialogue. This is indicated by 
the way in which taxpayers, including corporate entities, are required to make 
more voluntary disclosure. The customer discourse is becoming a technology 
of government. The onus of decision is thereby shifted towards the taxpayer, 
and accountability becomes more open-ended. It is a more informed game from 
both the IR and the large corporates' perspectives. However at the date of the 
interviews, it may well be that large corporates did not realise the importance 
of being visible and being seen to be visible. The joint working approach of the 
New Compliance Process means that the power relations are being played out 
247 
in different ways. The traditional view of governmentality being a top down 
approach is evolving into a new two-way approach. The remaking of the large 
corporate taxpayer as a visible customer creates power in a different way for 
the corporate. Notwithstanding large corporates already had power but these 
relations are being re-engineered as a result of the change in IR practices and 
discourse. 
8.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has examined the development of the corporate taxpayer to 
become a customer subject. The IR is engaging with the customer subject 
differently through the use of performance targets, and the NCP. I have argued 
that the customer discourse has become a technology of government and the 
corporate taxpayer is being made into the visible customer. 
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Chapter 9- The Event of Compliance 
9.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have considered the knowledge expert; the IR 
official and the corporate taxpayer/ the customer, each from a separate 
perspective. These two kinds of expert subject meet at an event concerned with 
eliciting the truth but where each side has a different version or level of the 
truth to make visible. Truth constitution proceeds outside the event as well as 
during the event. Tax rules and returns procedures have yielded certain things 
as agreed, others for debate; specifically the quantum of the numbers or an 
interpretation of the law or the facts. In the event we have a mix of inquisition 
and parrhesia and each side comes to speak the truth as experts. And this is 
against a background of not just the tax authority / subject (in the terms of 
citizen) relation but in the new relationship of service professional / customer. 
The old relationship reflects the old style inquisitional approach; the new style 
approach is based on earlier disclosure, with a significant role still for old-style 
inquisition but employing oral as well as written forms of examination, thus 
constructing a space for a more intensive and two-way play of parrhesia. 
Therefore the issue of concern of this chapter is the way in which the corporate 
taxpayer interfaces and interacts with the IR against a background of an IR 
which is changing at both structural and procedural levels. This event is 
significant in itself in that it takes place between new kinds of expert subjects - 
the tax official, now re-moulded as T shaped, and the corporate taxpayer 
(including sometimes the professional advisor). The corporate taxpayer is now 
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not merely a taxpayer but it has been constructed as a visible customer. These 
changes to both these subjects are not limited to the subjects themselves but the 
changes also effect and influence the `other' subjects as interlocutors in the 
new truth game. The interface of the event takes place on a number of levels 
and in different media; from the formal submission of the tax computations by 
letter and prescribed form as detailed in Chapter 6 to an inclusive dialogue and 
discourse at meetings. The far end of the spectrum of the latter is the new 
compliance process where the IR would like to see the relationship develop 
into a partnership style of working. 
It is worth recapping here the traditional approach to corporate tax compliance. 
A group of companies would send the financial statements and the tax 
computations of all group members based thereon to the Inspector. Until the 
introduction of Pay and File there was no time limit by which this information 
had to be received by the IR. The IR would assess the profits to tax and it was 
up to the taxpayer to prove otherwise with their tax computations. There was 
no set format for these computations; some companies would produce a tax 
computation for a major company on one side of a sheet of paper. Tax 
computations prepared by one of the large accounting firms would go into 
several pages containing analyses of various information in the accounts such 
as a detailed Profit and Loss Account. Even with the advent of Pay and File 
under which tax computations had to be submitted within 12 months after the 
end of the accounting period, the amount of information submitted to the IR 
was of a limited nature. Discussion on the computations would take the form of 
formal written correspondence between the Inspector and the taxpayer whereby 
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the inspector would investigate the accounts to find out what was going on, as 
an Inspector shows in the following quote. 
"my mentality was all about investigating at the top level ... and by investigating I don't necessarily mean confrontational investigating, I 
mean being determined to find out the facts before I let anybody know 
my view of the law. Now that may sound strange but 95% of tax 
debate certainly used to take .... you know if you come up through the 1980s 1990s used to take place against a background where the only 
view the Revenue had of the facts was what was in a set of accounts, 
which tells you very little indeed, and what an accountant might have 
said to them if they'd asked a question or so. But neither of those gets 
the Revenue very far in understanding what the real facts are .. " (IR 
official, LBO3,2003). 
The Inspector would obtain the information he thought necessary by writing to 
the taxpayer and asking for detailed analyses such as a breakdown of legal and 
consultancy fees, and repairs and maintenance expenditure. In other words the 
requests for information related to those areas in which potentially tax could be 
at risk as a result of specific tax legislation. This exchange of correspondence 
could have been undertaken over a number of years. Obviously this was 
especially difficult for companies as the particular records would probably 
have been archived and the employees who dealt with the particular 
information may either have left the company's employment or forgotten the 
detail due to the passage of time. 
The purpose of the questioning was to establish the `truth' of the computations. 
However this truth game was framed by the relevant knowledge as disclosed in 
the documents. Although the questioning and answering renders the truth 
visible, this truth is framed in the old style bureaucratic practices. At this stage 
in the thesis it is interesting to recall the practices of a questioning approach by 
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reference to the Inquisition. In Chapter 4, I drew upon the practices of the 
Inquisition in the Middle Ages in France whereby the inquisitors would 
question the accused to find out the truth. In any inquisition question and 
answer environment truth games are played. How and how much information 
is disclosed (see McBarnet, 1991) influences the outcome of the game. Within 
the `old style' practices of inquisition, the questioner has a degree of control of 
the investigation. The friar or the priest put the question and the accused had to 
answer. There was an acceptance of the questions in the form in which they 
were put (see Le Roy Ladurie, 1978). The authority is held by the inquisitor: 
the accused, i. e. the interviewee (the subject) need only to respond and in this 
sense is powerless to raise issues that the interviewee may wish to be covered. 
However compare this practice with present day practices. There is an outward 
facing discourse between the inquisitor and the interviewee. Both these parties 
have a duty and/or an opportunity to initiate truth statements. The accused can 
volunteer information which the inquisitor is able to follow up to find the truth. 
The interviewee is empowered within the parameters of the new game. He is 
able to answer the questions with an overflow of information both verbal and 
written (see McBarnet, 1991). This contributes to a change in dynamics of the 
game in which the principles of parrhesia are embedded. From the advisor's 
perspective, the information provided to the IR must be managed and 
controlled. Part of this is not giving more information to the IR than what is 
required in terms of the legislation, to prevent other lines of enquiry being 
opened. This means that the event of compliance for both parties becomes 
more significant as they both have to take an active role in the truth game and 
cannot remain as a mere respondent. 
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9.2 New Style Compliance Practices 
As discussed in Chapter 6, with the introduction of CTSA there was more onus 
on the part of the taxpayer to disclose all relevant facts as it is up to the 
taxpayer to submit a correct return and indeed they sign the return to this 
effect122. This has an effect of changing the approach of the Inspector to 
determining the `truth' of the computations. The assumption is that the 
information contained in the computations is correct or is true. The truth that 
the Inspector is seeking is different. The Inspector no longer has to find out the 
facts so extensively or missing information in the return and can use his 
investigative approach to find out different missing information using his wider 
perspective such as obtaining an understanding of the sector/ business in which 
the taxpayer is operating. The practice of obtaining this information is 
different. More discussion about the information takes place face to face rather 
than being purely documenting the information at a distance by written 
correspondence. Meetings are held between the IR and the representatives of 
the corporate taxpayer prior to the commencement of written correspondence. 
It is also undertaken at a different time; earlier in the corporate compliance 
process. 
"... getting into and involved with a new group is an interesting 
process. Primarily you try and start with personal contact, meeting all 
of the tax departments and I rarely deal with accountants the advisors 
directly, usually the tax departments so my largest customer at the 
moment we started by having a meeting followed by a lunch at which 
there were 14 on both sides starting to get to know each other. That's 
one side of the process. The other is that you start with the files and 
read them through from the beginning on all the issues that have yet to 
122 Obviously if the taxpayer wishes to do so they can still choose not to disclose or 
misrepresent but this approach is closer to evasion. 
253 
be resolved, as well as a lot of background. We have an immense 
volume of material, fortunately most of it on computer, but it really is a 
matter of getting stuck into the group and try to understand its business, 
its drivers, what its plans are, whether it's going to survive. I have seen 
a lot of groups that have been taken over and perished over the years. 
One of the games you can play is try and learn by understanding 
whether they have actually got a viable business or not. Or are they 
minnows that are going to be swallowed" (IR Official, LBO3,2003). 
In addition to the different method of obtaining the information, the traditional 
distant way of corresponding with the IR by letter has been replaced by a more 
inclusive relationship where both parties know each other by face and first 
name. In addition to those corporate taxpayers within the NCP, corporate 
taxpayers and case directors for the large corporates meet at regular intervals. 
Often this will be a presentation of the accounts for a particular accounting 
period to explain the commercial aspects of the group; transactions which have 
occurred in the year and the group structure. It is of advantage to both the 
taxpayer and the Inspector. 
"already we are showing the benefits of that in that we are able to 
agree things up front. We discuss things with them to the extent or to 
improve their understanding of our commercial issues, improve their 
understanding of our group structure so that when they see numerous 
companies incorporated abroad they don't suddenly think they are all 
for tax purposes because we are a highly regulated industry and we 
have to set up lots of companies in different jurisdictions where we are 
carrying on business" (Head of Tax, C13,2003). 
This more open dialogue is not just limited to sharing information on the 
group. Although the corporate tax compliance process is governed by rules, 
laws and cases it is also very dependent upon which tax inspector the taxpayer 
is dealing with, and the particular tax inspector's competency. This may be 
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thought of as a new type of inquisition practice where the seeking for the truth 
is in the face to face oral dialogue between the inquisitor, the tax inspector and 
the taxpayer - the customer, similar to the seeking for the truth in Ion, the 
Greek play as mentioned above in section 4.8. The dialogue also reflects the 
personal relationship between the parties. 
The personalised nature of the relationship is illustrated in the following quote: 
"I think it really does depend on personalities on both sides. And then 
if we had an inspector who viewed industry as all being on a scam 
and trying to avoid tax left, right and centre and you know smelling a 
rat under every boulder then we would probably be in a very, very 
different position to where we are today. No matter how hard we try to 
get a relationship going. And equally there are probably some very you 
know decent, pragmatic case directors out there who hit a similar stone 
wall on the other side. So - and I think the suspicion is equally based. 
Which I just find quite bizarre because I've been on this victim support 
group which I mean the name tells you everything you need to know 
about it doesn't it, where I just couldn't understand why people thought 
they were victims. Because the whole point was that it was supposed 
to be improving the relationship. But they think it's some sort of 
scammy way of the government trying to find things out earlier than 
they would otherwise do (Tax director, C15,2003). 
However the understanding of the personalised relationship may not be the 
same by both parties. The whole issue of agendas underneath the surface, such 
as a distrust of taxpayers or the imposition of targets in the IR as a whole, may 
be reflected in the truth game so that the truth game cannot be looked at out of 
its context. As mentioned in the Methods section in Chapter 4, the interviews 
have to be taken in context as the interviewees might be reflecting their own 
personal agendas behind their comments in the interviews. 
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"[Corporate taxpayer]'s very happy with tax inspectors, he's just got 
some absolutely amazing deals on some really big issues. Why is he 
happy? Because his tax inspector ... his tax inspector hasn't realised 
what good deals are being offered, or if he has realised, is happy to let it 
go. So, he's probably getting away with more than the taxpayer who's 
being dealt with by a more aggressive Principal Inspector of Taxes, 
who may have done a few types of arrangements or whose systems may 
not be perfect, or whatever, but is being far more heavily targeted and is 
coming under far more resource pressure and so on, because he happens 
to be up against a more, with a little "a", aggressive style of tax 
inspector. The problem with these sorts of approaches is that it depends 
entirely on who you're dealing with" (Ex IR official, A4,2003). 
The desire to get to know the other side to a negotiation process is a key 
element for any successful negotiation outcome (Wall, 1985). The importance 
of knowing the other expert is acknowledged by professional advisors and the 
IR. 
"You have to know who you're dealing with and therefore you have to 
know the type of person you're dealing with and you have to work out 
how to make that relationship work and that's important for clients if 
they happen to be dealing with somebody who is going to be more 
intrusive into their computations because they can find themselves at 
much greater risk than the clients who have got a tax inspector who 
thinks he's got a good relationship with them when actually he doesn't 
realise the reason he thinks he's got a good relationship with them is 
that .... he's not appreciating what's going on, 
he's not good enough to 
appreciate what's going on. The problem with tax is all the time it 
comes down to personalities and managing the personalities and 
managing the personalities in a professional way and I don't think it 
actually matters what surrounds all that" (Professional advisor, A4, 
2003). 
Thus knowing the other expert is part of the truth game: how the truth is 
disclosed is part of this knowing. 
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9.3 Managing the process of meeting the Customer 
For a tax official, meeting the customer is one way of obtaining the truth. 
However the truth is not obtained in one meeting. The truth game is played in a 
number of rounds. The whole truth is produced through truth being ascertained, 
refined, ascertained and refined again in an iterative process. This process is 
dependent on both oral and written aspects. The written documents are part of 
the oral examination. Referring to the NCP, one IR Official said, 
"We will have followed it up after the initial meeting, we will have 
indicated the areas we want to be interested in, I mean, usually tax 
planning issues, quite sizeable ones. After the meeting we would have 
written out saying OK we are interested in that, send us in the 
documents you have got prepared, the bible. They always have a bible, 
and that comes in, we then ask supplementary questions for 
information. And at that point we then start forming a view on how 
acceptable we find what they have done, or question it, challenge it, 
whatever, but with a view to resolving it, ideally by the time they file, 
but in practice the issues are too big to resolve but we made substantial 
progress. So when they file, in principle they may change their minds, 
(laughter) they won't, but the deal is that when they file there are no 
surprises, you know everything that they know we will be interested in 
they will already have told us about" (IR official, LBO3,2003). 
Another way tax officials use to ascertain the truth is engaging with other 
knowledge experts. One IR official described the position of utilising other 
experts as follows. 
"I was going in advance of them putting in the returns, going to see a 
firm where they had some doubts about whether what they called their 
production technology group qualified for a research and development 
allowance or not. They had given us information before hand but, in a 
lot of these cases, what appeared in writing, you may think oh I'm not 
so sure about that but usually when you actually go to see the people 
and talk to people at the sharp end, we are talking actual scientists 
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there, you usually get a fairly good idea whether it does or not within 
minutes of talking to them"(IR official, LBO", 2003). 
Truth is not produced in isolation but by correspondence with other 
knowledges. 
9.4 Managing the process of meeting the IR Official 
How do tax managers manage their relationships with IR officials? There are a 
number of possible things that each of these parties can do. One way is to be 
proactive and attempt to get the IR officials to ask the appropriate questions so 
eliciting the information and obtaining some certainty over the tax position the 
company is taking. 
"The major tax issue for us on the corporation tax side, is obviously 
capital allowances123 when one is spending around £x million a day and 
so the classification of assets what constitutes capital expenditure is 
fundamental to the tax which we ultimately pay.. and we do not get 
questioned on this so I have had to now rather change my approach to 
them because they are not coming forward with the questions that 
would then enable us to .. define our approach and put the questions to 
them so I'm sending them now for instance a very detailed explanation 
of what we regard as or constitutes the cost of an asset and so the 
treatment of costs and internal utilisations and so on So I send them a 
twenty page document and I say what do you think because and I have 
to do that because I have £x spend" [and need to have certainty of 
treatment] (UK tax manager, C11,2003). 
Another way is to build a relationship with IR Officials by educating them 
which may include a factory site visit. 
123 Capital allowances are allowable tax deductions (tax depreciation) against profit before 
taxation. They are available on certain plant, equipment and motor vehicles at prescribed rates. 
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"each time a new one[tax inspector] appears they have to sit through an 
hour from me about the way our [business] work and where we get our 
income from and the fact that we are regulated and so on and they get 
taken round a [site visit] ... Oh yes they love it yes that's in a way that 
the huge pleasure of this job because there cannot be an asset business 
that is a better business to show people round, indeed people love going 
behind the scenes which take them into the underworld of [particular 
business]" (UK tax manager, C 11,2003). 
The tax manager is using the particular attributes of the company to establish 
rapport with the tax inspector to establish a trusting relationship. One 
consequence of this approach is that the personal barrier between the tax 
official and taxpayer is being lowered as well which permits a more open 
relationship which is favourable to new style practices such as NCP. 
9.5 Outward facing discourse with tax managers and tax professionals 
The negotiation game of the tax compliance process involves the tax official as 
a distinctive' subject defined by his identity, albeit a remoulded identity. Just as 
important is the perception of the changing 'tax official' by tax managers and 
tax professionals with whom he is dealing. Evidence of this understanding and 
knowing the expert subject is achieved through the comments made by tax 
managers and tax advisors about their inspectors. Part of this is an appreciation 
of whether the tax official does his job differently and how differently the tax 
official approaches his changing job. 
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"But so far as we are concerned we see the same outward, if I can use 
their phase, customer facing organisation because at the end of the day 
we don't deal with the Inland Revenue like our customers don't deal 
with [Group plc] they deal with their distribution centre and we deal 
with our inspector and so to that extent, as far as we can see, there is no 
change it's still the two inspectors" (Tax manager, C8,2003). 
This quote can be considered at different levels. It could be considered from 
the perspective there has been no change in the remoulding of the tax inspector. 
However it could also be considered that although the tax official has changed, 
the tax manager is not recognising those changes or alternatively organisational 
change has not filtered down to individual interactions. 
Tax managers also recognise the expert knowledge of the tax official. This 
expert knowledge is restricted to detailed technical aspects reflected in the 
nature of the inspector's enquiries and the wish of the tax officials to obtain the 
`correct answer' (i. e. the truth) whatever that answer may be. 
"there was an awful lot of stuff about them wanting to make sure that 
there was some sort of tax symmetry between investors in different 
countries outside the UK and the Bank as the payer of all this interest. 
Quite why they were so interested in acting as tax policemen for the 
rest of Europe, I don't know" (UK tax Manager, C6,2003). 
There is criticism of the boundaries of `legitimate' in examination and truth 
extraction in this quote. In addition there is implied criticism of the tax 
inspector. The interviewee is expressing frustration at the inability of the tax 
inspector to do his job as the interviewee thinks it should be carried out both on 
the basis of not focusing on the job the tax manager thinks it should be carried 
out and getting involved in activities which are outside his remit as a UK tax 
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official. This criticism of the individual styles of different tax inspectors is also 
illustrated in the following quote. This also emphasises the preconceived view 
that tax managers have of a tax official's duties. The interviewee understands 
that the tax official's role is not to concentrate on the precise calculation of the 
tax but to have in mind the overall objective to collect tax and focus on 
possible tax planning structures put in place where there would be scope for 
variations in tax treatment. 
"Well, the guy we've got at the moment and the guy before him were 
quite detailed not the previous guy but the guy before him, they go into 
a lot of detail. For example, you'd have lots of questions about 
provisions or various add-backs or making sure there were symmetrical 
interest deductions and income between UK companies and that kind of 
thing, The guy we had in between was more of a broad brush guy. He 
was prepared to let the little things just look after themselves because 
they weren't going to be great big revenue raisers even if there were 
adjustments at the end of the day. He used to focus much more on the 
bigger picture you know, if there were structures we'd put in place that 
kind of thing. "(UK company manager, C10,2003). 
The new approach to the truth game could be regarded as more threatening by 
the customer but more effective by the tax official. The fragmented 
organisational structure of the IR and in particular the LBO, as described in 
chapter 5, impacts on the consistency in approach of the tax inspector: 
"we've experienced a very high turnover of inspector and case 
directors. We've had within the past, I guess, 3 years 3 different 
inspectors and 3 different case directors. It's [LBO Office]. Part of it is 
people moving on. Actually I tell a lie we've had 4 case directors, not 3. 
One guy we never even got to meet he was on our case so briefly. So 
one of the things we notice is that there's a lot of instability and 
inconsistency in the approach that we have because all these individuals 
have different ways of working, particularly at the inspector level. They 
have very different approaches in the way they handle enquiries" (UK 
company manager, C 10,2003). 
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Although the frequent changes in Inspector, is not new, it has always been a 
problem, it is more of an issue now with the NCP and new style operating 
practices as there is more "knowing" of the Inspector. 
Although the LBO tax officials regard themselves as specialists or sector 
specialists, their lack of specific non-tax specialist knowledge is recognised by 
tax managers and tax professionals. 
"I think one of the real issues that faces the Revenue is that they are 
expected to know about the tax legislation, we're not. We just go 
straight to our advisors and that's how it is. They are the Revenue, of 
course you know about it. So we did a sale and lease-back and there 
were tax benefits, but it was UK to UK, so there was no actual revenue 
loss. It was just that we managed to gain advantage and someone else it 
was the use of their tax losses. 
So it was a £50 million sale and leaseback. The inspector said I know 
nothing about sales and leasebacks can you tell me about it, please. 
Yes, I can. So the issue is that, in terms of education, you sometimes 
have to educate them about the tax as well, because they're at a 
disadvantage because they have to deal with the generality of taxpayers 
and they can't be expected to understand all this and sometimes they 
don't go to international division, or specialist division, technical 
division, because they're overwhelmed as well and so sometimes they 
come to the taxpayer to ask for the analysis" (UK company tax director, 
C8,2003). 
To respond to this, the IR have to raise their expertise game so that tax 
inspectors can raise their expertise as well. 
In addition it is acknowledged that there are different pressures for tax officials 
compared with those in the private sector. 
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"One was that in the Revenue you could say, "I don't like it, it doesn't 
work and that's my view about it, go away". In the profession you 
can't say that, you can say well it might not work, certainly if you did it 
this way it won't work but if you did this you got somewhere. So there 
is always, "it's not no, it's no but here is another way of doing it". You 
have always got to find another way of doing it as best you can. That 
was one particular change that I was conscious of' (Ex IR Tax partner, 
Al, 2002). 
However there is a limit to the degree of expertise a tax official has to acquire. 
His sanction is to challenge the customer to justify the course of action. 
9.6 The Truth Game and the Customer 
The changed character of the Corporate Tax Compliance game, is at the heart 
of negotiation in the calculation of taxation and this could have implications for 
the tax yield from MNCs. As discussed in Chapter 8, the taxpayer has been 
made into a visible customer. The IR wants to enable taxpayers, as customers, 
to get their tax right the first time but does this new visibility of the corporate 
taxpayer reduce the benefit of surprise and information advantage that the IR as 
a regulator previously had? Has the truth game been altered as a result of the 
customer focus? It has been altered to the extent that there is more recognition 
of the other person and the part which they play in the truth game. 
"I think first of all you want to be concentrating on things of 
importance that are just not an aggravation. So you understand that the 
other person's got a job to do that involves them doing other things, 
other than answering your questions. So that sort of awareness. I don't 
think the customer minds - the customer would expect you to be quite 
delving you know, in your questioning. You're not going to have much 
confidence if you're not asking decent questions to any other, anybody 
else. So I mean there's part of the customer service thing has to be to 
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make them happy that the tax system itself is operating effectively"(IR 
official, LBO5,2003). 
So the practices of questioning are modified to take into account the customer 
perspective and not just for the specific customer but in general across the 
department. A modified truth game is put into play by these new practices. 
The truth game is also affected by increased disclosure through CTSA. The IR 
Official no longer has to ask so many detailed questions questioning the 
validity of the information as it is the responsibility of the taxpayer to submit 
an accurate return. 
Another influence on the truth game is the introduction of new ways of 
working such as NCP. Not only explicit practices are introduced by these 
initiatives but the pressure on the IR Officials to ensure that these initiatives are 
successful changes the negotiation practices and consequently the truth game. 
"Some saw tremendous benefits in using it [NCP] as a lever to get the 
Revenue to agree all sorts of things that were open, because this is a 
pilot and a pilot the Revenue wants to succeed, so let's use the 
opportunity. One of those at least I know also said "And I will not tell 
you about tax avoidance" and as far as I'm aware the Revenue signed 
up to that. I'm aware of another very large organisation where the 
Revenue got very annoyed that that organisation .... where the Revenue 
pretty much knew that that organisation had been involved in 
something it wanted to know about and that organisation said "No, 
we're not going to tell you" and the Revenue was so desperate for that 
organisation to be seen as part of the pilot they left it as part of the pilot 
and said " OK, you don't have to answer that avoidance question, " (IR 
Official, LBO3,2003). 
This is also acknowledged from the taxpayer perspective in terms of the rules 
for choosing or agreeing to take part change the relationship. It is also an 
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example where customer discourse as a technology of government is being 
applied to both the regulator and the regulated. 
"Well my main ground rule was that it had to be a level playing field. 
So they couldn't expect me to tell them about something real time that 
was open to a potential change in legislation. Unless they'd tell me real 
time when they were thinking about changing the legislation. So we 
agreed that in writing and I think a number of people have had 
problems with the fast track with inspectors saying, oh well you know 
it's breach of trust, you didn't tell us this, that and the other. Instead of 
being very open up front about the fact that you know clearly we're 
both coming at things from a different angle and therefore you know 
you've got to lay decent rules to start with. And on that basis we've 
had no problem with it" (Tax Manager, C 15,2003). 
The taxpayer has been made more powerful in that as a customer he/she can set 
some of the rules for the truth game with the IR. Governmentality is now a 
different two way process not predicated on a principle of repressive and 
closed-ended rule (e. g. Neu, 2000; Bush and Maltby, 2004). 
9.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has considered the changing event of negotiations between the IR 
Official as an expert subject and the corporate taxpayer as a customer. Once a 
taxpayer is constructed as a customer, the objective measures of customer 
service influence the regulation of the customer. It cannot be assumed that 
administrative performance is linked to customer satisfaction (Kelly, 2005). 
The corporate tax compliance game is played in new ways. 
By examining the new style truth practices of the IR Officials and the remaking 
of the corporate taxpayer as a visible customer this chapter has explored and 
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extended the notion of how governmentality should be understood, which is 
now not purely about ruler/ subject relations but it is implicated in aspects of 
service provider/ customer relations as well. 
266 
Chapter 10 - Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the key findings and themes addressing the questions 
as posed in Chapter 1 which were: 
1. How is the process of corporate tax compliance changing for large 
groups of companies? 
2. How is this process being managed by the Inland Revenue? 
I first address each of the questions in turn and I then explain the limitations of 
this study and possibilities for future work. 
10.2 The Changing Process 
This thesis has examined the tax compliance environment for large corporates. 
This environment cannot be looked at as an isolated ring fenced research site. 
Modern Nation States are increasingly concerned to maximise the collection of 
tax revenues and to prevent tax leakage from the system in order to pay for 
public goods and satisfy citizens' demands for improved service from 
hospitals, schools and other public services. The combination of attracting 
foreign investment with a low corporate tax rate and the need to improve 
taxpayers' compliance with the law is fraught with difficulty. This has resulted 
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in the introduction in the UK of legislation124 which requires pre-disclosure of 
certain tax avoidance schemes in advance of the tax return being filed. This is 
in addition to the increase in so called "stealth taxes" e. g. "Total Tax 
Contribution" (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005a). 
Against this backdrop, the impact of the phenomena of NPM on tax 
administrations can be seen. Tax Administrations have incorporated new style 
working practices, frequently using practices first developed in the private 
sector (TQM, key performance indicators etc. ) which have changed both the 
organisational structure and the processes and practices of tax administration. 
This has included the setting up of specialist units to deal with the tax affairs of 
large corporates as mentioned in Chapter 2. In Chapter 6, I explored further the 
structure of the IR. Given the role that the IR plays in the Government of the 
state and in enabling the financing of the state, the structure and processes of 
the IR are instruments of government. The IR operations have developed from 
a localised nature with individual authority, in that the focus was on the site of 
the taxpayer's business or residence not on the taxpayer itself, to one where IR 
operations focussed on the large corporate taxpayer as a stratified taxpayer. 
This can be considered the first steps of defining the large corporate taxpayer 
as a subject. However the past cannot be ignored as there are still localised 
origins in this style of operations within the LBO, such as the regional offices 
dealing with banks and insurance groups of companies in London and 
Edinburgh. Within these structures, bureaucratic practices have been 
supplemented by entrepreneurial governance where outcomes are more 
124 Finance Act 2004 Part 7. 
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important than inputs (Osbourne & Gaebler, 1992). This involves the 
reclassification of taxpayers as customers and the introduction and further 
refinement of performance targets. The practices of corporate tax compliance 
have changed as well, from a focus on activity being carried out by the IR, to 
one where the IR operates in a surveillance and disciplinary role. Taxpayers 
self assess their tax liabilities under CTSA and the IR audit those returns. There 
has been a shifting of accountability from the IR to the taxpayer. In addition, 
where the process was previously a long (in terms of time scale), formal and 
distant relationship with the IR carried out principally in writing, it has, while 
retaining aspects of this past, shifted towards being a mixture of the written and 
the oral, generating a more inclusive dialogue with the taxpayer, frequently in 
the form of meetings based on targeted yet potentially open-ended questioning. 
The NCP is part of this development. 
10.3 The Managed Process 
At one level, even given this background of a bureaucratic entity now having a 
marketing and strategic focus with greater specialisation and sectorisation, the 
nature of the event does not change; the basic nature of tax compliance still 
exists. However the corporate tax compliance game is being played by experts 
with different and changing expertise and under what I have conceptualised as 
new rules of engagement, which entail more oral interchange deploying more 
open-ended questions entailing a different kind of immediate if still 
information-based truth-telling. The representatives of the IR, the tax 
inspectors - knowledge expert subjects are being made into `3D T shaped' 
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officials. The conceptualisation of the customer is making the taxpayer more 
visible. This allows new ways of investigation to develop from an `inquisitio' 
approach to a practice of more examination and disclosure. The truth is being 
disclosed in new ways. As the corporate taxpayer becomes the visible 
customer, the amount of power in the relationship is increased. Both parties to 
the compliance process "act as if' the taxpayer is a customer in a regulatory 
environment and consequently the customer becomes more customer-like. 
This is a new application of the Foucauldian approach which opens up the 
"black box" of what goes on in the event of tax compliance. It has focused on 
the two knowledge expert "subjects" in the process. The subjects cannot be 
looked at in isolation because their subjectivization and objectivization are at 
the same time both separate and connected in that the IR Official and the 
corporate taxpayer, each operating in different separate organisations, are 
connected by the event of compliance. It has also made use of Foucault's 
writings on the effect of the `truth game' within this subjectivization and 
objectivization in this research site. The saying of (true) things beyond what is 
usually said, or parrhesia, thus develops into a two sided game where the 
questioned have a space for generating parrhesia from the inspectors as well as 
vice versa. 
10.4 Limitations of the Study 
A key limitation of this study is the methods adopted to obtain the empirical 
data. My thesis looks at the practices and discourse of the large corporate tax 
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compliance process. The data was obtained from semi structured interviews 
where the parties concerned talked about the practices that they engaged in to 
secure compliance. Observations of the practices taking place, such as 
attendance at taxpayers meetings with the IR, or attendance at internal IR 
meetings, would have enabled me to observe at first hand the practices being 
undertaken. In addition the study is restricted to the UK only and other 
countries are not addressed. As the study took place prior to the formation of 
HMRC the work of HM Customs & Excise such as Value Added Tax, duties 
are not covered. 
Another limitation of this study is that the research has been at the same time 
interdisciplinary, complex, and wide-ranging theoretically informed empirical 
work. As such this research has not covered all the complexities in the 
relationship between the IR and large corporates. However I hope as a 
consequence of this research that I have signified new developments and thus 
opened opportunities for further work. 
10.5 Contribution 
In addition to discussing the changed process and the managed process in 
Sections 10.2 and 10.3 above, this section details the contribution of this 
research. In Chapter 1,1 set out my empirical and theoretical contributions and 
so in this section I elaborate the detail of the contributions and set out the 
significant findings arising from this research. 
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The empirical contribution is significant in that the research site is novel. Few 
researchers have examined the practices of UK tax administration, in particular 
the IR. The level of access I gained was unique. I interviewed key senior 
informants at the IR, large corporates and tax partners from a Big 4 
accountancy firm in the same series of interviews. This enabled me to develop 
a new significant theoretically informed analysis of the empirical data. 
Drawing on the later work of Foucault, I was able to exploit this level of access 
to investigate these high level knowledge experts constituted as subjects and 
how these subjects interact in high stake complex negotiations. This is a 
pioneering methodology linking governmentality, expert knowledge subjects 
and subjectivization and objectivization. What makes this research unparalleled 
is that although it is carried out in a regulatory environment similar to prisons 
and mental hospitals 125, large corporates, in particular FTSE 100 companies, 
have a choice as to where there are regulated. They have the ability to move 
parts of their operations (such as head office and administrative functions, 
manufacturing operations and research and development) to other countries, 
within reason, who may offer favourable conditions such as business 
environment, tax concessions, availability of specialised labour etc. Therefore 
they effectively can choose at least partially whether to be regulated by the UK 
tax authorities or some other jurisdiction. At the same time the IR has 
reconceptualised these powerful large corporates as customers. 
125 Typical Foucauldian examples as used for example in Discipline and Punish (1977). 
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This thesis makes a major theoretical contribution as the Foucauldian 
theoretical framework is being applied to both the regulators and the 
regulatees, and so does not look purely at those who are `disciplined' as the 
objects of the exercise of knowledge-based power, but also looks at those who 
exercise power as the disciplinary experts who have the relevant knowledge to 
occupy such positions. Arguably as well this is a truth game where such roles 
are not easily assigned, since the objects of the exercise are senior employees 
in the large corporates (and arguably those large corporates themselves). 
Additionally these regulatees (i. e. the corporates) are empowered within the 
playing out of the truth game through their rights to "customer choice" and 
operational discretion over which state will constitute their tax jurisdiction. 
In addition the interviews were carried out when the IR was undergoing a 
period of change. This research therefore contributes theoretically to an 
understanding of how change and NPM practices play out in a large established 
bureaucracy. This research links governmentality to the whole of the NPM 
theme. Due to the seniority of the IR employees interviewed, this allowed me 
to develop insights into how high level officials cope and find opportunities in 
the new organisational reality. I was able, as well, to see how high level tax 
experts engage with the IR, cope with the changing environment and find 
opportunities to exploit their relationship with the IR. This in essence is the 
new kind of truth game and it is essential for the players to understand this 
game to enable them to operate successfully in a globalised corporate tax and 
tax jurisdiction world. 
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Thus this thesis has made a significant theoretical contribution in that this 
research tracks a new kind of interaction of the interplay between 
subjectivization and objectivization which seems to have become established 
and develops a theoretically informed way of looking at emergent 
governmental and more wide ranging forms of application. 
Additionally, my research can inform and contribute to current policy 
development. The recently published 2006 Review of Links with Business 
Report known as the "Varney Report" has further highlighted the importance 
of HMRC relationships with large corporates. This report proposes a 
framework for HMRC to include advance rulings procedures, disclosure of risk 
assessment process and a greater awareness of business's viewpoint126. This 
shows that there is increasing attention to and understanding of large 
corporates by HMRC. Likewise large corporates have to respond and act and 
become visible customers. 
10.6 Future Research 
Both the research site, the administration of taxation, and the methodological 
approach offer rich opportunities for future research. The interviews conducted 
as part of this research were carried out before the merger of the two tax 
administrations in the UK - Inland Revenue (direct taxes) and HM Customs 
and Excise (indirect taxes) which resulted in HM Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC). For large corporates this has involved the setting up of a specialist 
126 http: //www. hmrc. gov. uk/large-business/review-outcomes. htm seen 18/12/06. 
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unit - the Large Business Service (LBS) to deal with all the tax affairs of large 
corporates. This has also involved structural change within the organisation 
with the appointment of a Client Relationship Manager to be responsible for 
the total tax service from HMRC, who could either have a direct tax or indirect 
background. In addition a New Operating Model `Working with Large 
Business' 127 for the LBS was introduced in April 2006. This new structure is 
focused on 17 sectors, each with a sector leader. A future area of research 
would be to examine the impact of the merger on the corporate tax compliance 
process. 
This research has highlighted the importance of expert subjects to the 
compliance process. I have obtained, together with Dr Lynne Oats, research 
funding from the Centre for Business Performance of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales to examine the role of qualified accountants 
employed by HMRC in the corporate tax compliance process of large 
corporates. 
The methodological contribution also opens up possibilities for future research. 
One possibility is a research project examining how the `truth game' is 
applicable to auditors' enquiries by addressing how an auditor goes about 
seeking the truth when auditing a set of financial statements. 
127 http: //www. hmrc. gov. uk/lbo/0pgratiniz-model. ndf seen 6 June 2006. 
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Appendix 1- List of Interviews carried out 
Number Code Position Organisation Date Length 
I C1 Financial Director Large private 
group 
18 February 
2001 
_ 60 mins 
2 C2 Financial 
Controller 
FTSE 100 group 5 March 
2001 
60 mins 
3 C3 Tax Manager FTSE 100 group June 2001 60 minn 
4 C4 Tax Manager Large private 
telecom ou 
June 2001 45 mins 
5 C5 Tax Manager Overseas group 13 June 2001 50 mins 
6 Al Tax Partner Big 4 
accountancy firm 
9 September 
2002 
80 mins 
7 A2 Tax Partner Big 4 
accountancy firm 
September 
2002 
60 mins 
8 C6 Tax Manager FTSE 100 group September 
2002 
60 mins 
9 A3 Tax Partner Big 4 
accountancy firm 
24 September 
2002 
60 mins 
10 A4 Tax Partner Big 4 
accountancy firm 
24 February 
2003 
90 mins 
11 C7 Financial Director Large corporate 4 March 
2003 
15 mins 
12 IR1 IR official Inland Revenue 27 Feb 2003 20 mins 
13 A5 Tax Partner Big 4 
accountancy firm 
17 March 
2003 
60 mins 
14 C8 Tax Manager FTSE 100 group 26 June 2003 60 mins 
15 C9 Tax Manager FTSE 100 group 26 June 2003 60 mins 
16 IR2 Senior official Inland Revenue 27 June 2003 60 mins 
17 C10 Tax Manager FTSE 100 group 30 June 2003 60 mins 
18 C11 Tax Manager FTSE 100 group 21 July 2003 60 mins 
19 C12 Tax Manager FTSE 100 group 22 June 2003 45 mins 
20 C13 Tax Manager FTSE 100 group 22 June 2003 60 mins 
21 C14 Tax Manager FTSE 100 group 25 June 2003 60 mins 
22 IR3 Senior official Inland Revenue 9 September 
2003 
95 mins 
23 IR4 Senior official Inland Revenue 16 September 
2003 
105 
mins 
24 IR5 IR official Inland Revenue 1 October 
2003 
60 mins 
25 LBO 
1 
LBO official Inland Revenue 10 October 
2003 
60 mins 
26 LBO 
2 
LBO official Inland Revenue 31 October 
2003 
120 
mins 
27 LBO 
3 
LBO official Inland Revenue 25 November 
2003 
120 
mins 
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28 LBO LBO official Inland Revenue 1 December 210 
4 2003 mins 
29 LBO LBO official Inland Revenue 2 December 80 mins 
5 2003 
30 LBO LBO official Inland Revenue 8 December 105 
6 2003 mins 
31 C15 Tax Manager FTSE 100 group 8 December 60 mins 
2003 
32 IR6 Senior official Inland Revenue 9 March 45 mins 
2004 
33 IR7 Senior official Inland Revenue 20 May 2004 70 rains 
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Appendix 2 Interview questionnaire with Case Directors 
Introduction: Brief reminder/explanation of the purpose of the research 
and researcher's identity. Explanation of the nature of the 
confidentiality/anonymity agreement plus request to tape record. 
General 
" Outline of my research. Discuss the research - obtain his help in forming 
the project. 
" Could you tell me a little about your background: (possible supplement. 
How you ended up here) 
" How long have you worked here, and what has your role been (i. e. get his 
view of his trajectory to where he is now)? 
" What formal qualifications do you have and where did you get them? (work 
based training? ) 
" What is the nature of your job here? 
" How is it different from the other case controllers in this office? 
History of the LBO 
" How developed? 
" How is the work in the office managed? 
" Specialisation? 
" Use of resources - timesheets. How is the actual time compared with the 
budgeted figure? What is the impact if you go overbudget? Is the finite 
time allocation evident to the tax director/ tax manager? 
Operational Practices 
From what I gather, the IR has been required to change some of the 
nature of its activities and as part of these wider changes, they have 
changed, and are in a process of changing, their approach to fulfilling 
their activities. 
What would you say were the reasons at the time for making these 
changes? 
How do you think they have worked out in practice? (i. e. `before' vs `after' 
perspective) 
" More specifically, has the change in approach of the IR affected 
specific working practices? 
" In what ways (if at all) has the documentation required by (or sent to) 
the iR changed? 
" Do you have to different things with/ for customers? (focussing on time 
allocation between different roles, with customers, vis-ä-vis IR, or in- 
office or support activities, might be helpful. ) 
What do you think the IR's objectives are in developing their new 
approach? 
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9 How far do you think that the IR is achieving its objectives? 
Fast Track 
" When did fast track get replaced by the `new compliance process'? 
" How were the companies chosen? (outsources compliance - different 
types of customer) 
" What have been the advantages to the companies? What have been the 
disadvantages? In your view/ in the companies' view? 
" What has been the impact of the Hartnett report? 
Inspector Expertise 
" What kind of expertise have you had to develop? [Might be technical or 
more general business/ communication skills. ] 
" What kinds of expertise does the job demand now? 
" Would you say you are having to become a different tax inspector? 
" If yes, what's different? 
" If no, do you think you may have to down the line, with the changes 
underway? 
" What different procedures do you have to (or, if the pervious answer was 
`no', envisage having to) carry out? 
" What additional time do these new procedures take up? 
" What do you feel about the changes underway (maybe get him to specify 
these if it's unclear)? 
" Are you comfortable with it/ them? 
Relationship with Companies 
" How do you feel your relationship with corporates has changed over the 
last 5 years? 
" Is it for the better? 
" If so, why do you think it is better? What is it in your day-to-day work 
that makes you feel it is better? 
" If not, why not? 
" How do you assess whether it is an improved or deteriorated 
relationship? What are the characteristics of it? 
" Are most relationships between customers and the LBO similar, or do they 
vary a lot? What about outsourcing compliance? 
" What has been the biggest effect, in your experience, in determining the 
relationship between a customer and the LBO? [The particular group of 
companies, the IR Case Director, the tax advisor team? ] 
" How do the relationships differ? 
" What makes one company easier/ better to deal with than another? 
" How far, in general, do you think that you understand their business? Any 
particularly good examples? 
" How far do companies differ in the approach they want to adopt to IR 
enquiries? 
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" Is there any current topic/ focus that runs across IR enquiries? 
" What is the impact of accountants being part of the LBO/ I note that the IR 
is currently recruiting more accountants. What do you think will be the 
impact of this? 
CTSA 
" Impact 
" Audit approach 
" Risk assessment 
0 Disclosure 
Risk Assessment 
" How significant is risk assessment in terms of discussions/ negotiations 
with companies? 
" Have you been involved in a meeting with a corporate whereby the IR's 
risk assessment is shared with the group? 
" What were the objectives of the meeting? 
" What did the company feel were the objectives of the meeting? 
" What were the good/ bad things about the meeting? 
" Did the relationship with the company improve as a result of the meeting? 
" What has been the impact of the risk based approach enquiries generated by 
you on your customers? 
" Have any of your clients taken part in pre-enquiry discussions with the IR 
aimed at identifying significant risk areas? 
" If so, how did you prepare for the meeting? 
" How did the meeting go? 
" Were you satisfied with the outcome? 
" How has the approach to tax return enquiries changed? 
" Have any of your customers been able to enter into a dialogue with the 
Case Director at the LBO before filing their return? 
" Was it beneficial? 
" Did it achieve its objectives? 
Other 
" How are case directors judged? [Targets % of full enquiries which result in 
the detection of non-compliance, customer service targets? ] 
" What do you feel is the success to date of the IR attempt to develop a more 
(supposedly) customer- focussed approach with large corporates? 
" "Spend to Save" initiative 
" Enabling/ regulating message 
Close 
Are there any questions I haven't asked you that you think I should have 
asked you? 
(Are there any other people you think I should I be talking to here that I 
haven't seen, or haven't arranged to see)? 
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Do you have any questions for me? 
Thank you.... 
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Appendix 3 
Interview questionnaire with tax advisors 
Introduction: Brief reminder/explanation of the purpose of the research 
and researcher's identity. Explanation of the nature of the 
confidentiality/anonymity agreement plus request to tape record. 
General 
" Could you tell me a little about your background: (possible supplement. 
How you ended up here) 
" How long have you worked here, in this post? 
" What formal qualifications do you have and where did you get them? (work 
based training? ) 
" Have you ever worked for the IR? 
" What is the nature of your job here - is it similar to colleagues here in this 
office, elsewhere in the firm, what are the main differences? 
Operational Practices 
From what I gather, the IR has been required to change some of the 
nature of its activities and as part of these wider changes, they have 
changed, and are in a process of changing, their approach to fulfilling 
their activities. 
" What would you say are, or have been, the main changes, with regard to the 
IR and the way it works? 
" How has this impacted on your clients, and you/this firm? 
" More specifically, has the change in approach of the IR affected 
specific working practices (e. g. re strategy, risk assessment, return 
etc... ) - here, your clients, the IR? 
" How have you adapted to these changes? 
" In what ways has the documentation sent to the IR changed? 
" Do you think that the/any proposed changes will affect your organisation 
(further) 
" If yes, details? 
" If no, why not? 
" Do you think that the IR is achieving its objectives? (What do you think 
those objectives are? If not answered above) 
Advisor Expertise 
" In what ways are the IR's changes impacting on your job specifically (if 
not answered above? 
" Have you had to acquire additional expertise? 
" Are you a different tax advisor? 
" If yes, what's different? 
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" If no, do you think you should be? 
" What different procedures do you have to carry out? 
" What degree do these new procedures dominate your work? 
" What do you feel about the change? 
" Are you comfortable with it? 
" How did you/have you been preparing for the change? 
Relationship with IR 
" How do you feel your relationship with the IR has changed over the last 5 
years? 
" Is it for the better? 
" If so, Why do you think it is better? What is it in your day-to-day work 
that makes you feel it is better? 
" If not, why not? 
" How do you assess whether it is an improved or deteriorated 
relationship? What are the characteristics of it? 
" What determines the relationship with the LBO? The particular group of 
companies, the IR Case Director or both? 
" How do the relationships differ? 
" What makes one case director (Inspector) easier/ better to deal with than 
another? 
" Is the relationship dependent on an individual or a LBO office? 
" Do you think that the case director understands your client's business? 
" Have you had to educate the Case Director? How? 
" Have they, case directors, shared information with you (i. e. have they had 
to `educate' the advisor? ) 
" Have you found there is a common approach to IR enquires across your 
clients/ 
" Is there a current topic/ focus of IR enquiries? 
" How have you had to handle disputes or disagreements? What is your 
strategy for doing this? 
Risk Assessment 
" Have you been involved in a meeting with the IR whereby the IR's risk 
assessment is shared with the group? 
" What were the objectives of the meeting? 
" What did your client feel were the objectives of the meeting? 
" What do you think were the IR's objectives of the meeting? 
" Did the meeting meet the objectives? 
" What were the good things about the meeting? 
" What were the bad things? 
" Did the relationship with the IR improve as a result of the meeting? 
" What has been the impact of the risk based approach enquiries generated by 
the IR on your client? 
" Have any of your clients taken part in pre-enquiry discussions with the IR 
aimed at identifying significant risk areas? 
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" If so, how did you prepare for the meeting? 
" How did the meeting go? 
" Were you satisfied with the outcome? 
" How has the approach to tax return enquiries changed? 
" Have any of your clients been able to enter into a dialogue with the Case 
Director at the LBO before filing their return? 
" Was it beneficial? 
" Did it achieve its objectives? 
Other 
" In discussions with the IR how much time is being spent on discussing the 
commercial aspects of the business and accounting for the transactions 
rather than looking at the tax implications? 
" Have you evidence of the use of accountants by the IR? If so in what way? 
" Are any of your clients part of the LBO pilot of the new faster approach to 
enquiries for 2002/03? 
" What do you feel are the consequences of the IR implementing / delivering 
a customer service approach? 
" Are you using the Internet Corporation Tax Services for agents to view 
your clients' companies' payments and liabilities on-line? (Is it helpful? Is 
it showing you the information you require? ) 
" Evidence of IR's targets? 
" What makes a good relationship with the IR? 
Close 
Are there any questions I haven't asked you that you think I should have 
asked you? 
(Are there any other people you think I should I be talking to here that I 
haven't seen, or haven't arranged to see)? 
Do you have any questions for me? 
Thank you.... 
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Appendix 4 
Interview questionnaire with tax managers/ tax directors 
Introduction: Brief reminder/explanation of the purpose of the research 
and researcher's identity. Explanation of the nature of the 
confidentiality/anonymity agreement plus request to tape record. 
General 
" Could you tell me a little about your background: (possible supplementary 
how you ended up here) 
" How long have you worked here, in this post? 
" What formal qualifications do you have and where did you get them? (work 
based training as part of that? ) 
" Have you ever worked for the IR? 
" What is the nature of your job here - is it similar to colleagues here in this 
office, elsewhere in the company, what are the main differences? 
Operational Practices 
From what I gather, the IR has been required to change some of the 
nature of its activities and as part of these wider changes, they have 
changed, and are in a process of changing, their approach to fulfilling 
their activities. 
" What would you say are, or have been, the main changes, with regard to the 
IR and the way it works? 
" How has this impacted on your company, and you? 
" More specifically, has the change in approach of the IR affected 
specific working practices (e. g. re strategy, risk assessment, return 
etc... ) - here, your company, the IR? 
" How have you adapted to these changes? 
" In what ways has the documentation sent to the IR changed? 
" Do you think that the/any proposed changes will affect your company 
(further) 
" If yes, details? 
" If no, why not? 
" Do you think that the IR is achieving its objectives? (What do you think 
those objectives are? If not answered above) 
Tag manager's Expertise 
" In what ways are the IR's changes impacting on your job specifically (if 
not answered above? 
" Have you had to acquire additional expertise? 
" Are you a different tax manager? 
" If yes, what's different? 
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" If no, do you think you should be? 
" What different procedures do you have to carry out? 
" What degree do these new procedures dominate your work? 
" What do you feel about the change? 
" Are you comfortable with it? 
" How did you/have you been preparing for the change? 
Relationship with IR 
" How do you feel your company's relationship with the IR has changed over 
the last 5 years? 
" Is it for the better? 
" If so, Why do you think it is better? What is it in your day-to-day work 
that makes you feel it is better? 
" If not, why not? 
" How do you assess whether it is an improved or deteriorated 
relationship? What are the characteristics of it? 
" What determines the relationship with the LBO? Your company, the IR 
Case Director or both? 
" How do the relationships differ? 
" What makes one case director (Inspector) easier/ better to deal with than 
another? 
" Is the relationship dependent on an individual or a LBO office? 
" Do you think that the case director understands your company's business? 
" Have you had to educate the Case Director? How? 
" Have they, case directors, shared information with you (i. e. have they had 
to `educate' you? ) 
" Is there a current topic/ focus of IR enquiries? 
" How have you had to handle disputes or disagreements? What is your 
strategy for doing this? 
Risk Assessment 
" Have you been involved in a meeting with the IR whereby the IR's risk 
assessment is shared with the group? 
" What were the objectives of the meeting? 
" What do you think were the IR's objectives of the meeting? 
" Did the meeting meet the objectives? 
" What were the good things about the meeting? 
" What were the bad things? 
" Did the relationship with the IR improve as a result of the meeting? 
" What has been the impact of the risk based approach enquiries generated by 
the IR on your company? 
" Has your company taken part in pre-enquiry discussions with the IR aimed 
at identifying significant risk areas? 
" If so, how did you prepare for the meeting? 
" How did the meeting go? 
" Were you satisfied with the outcome? 
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" How has the approach to tax return enquiries changed? 
" Have you been able to enter into a dialogue with the Case Director at the 
LBO before filing the return? 
" Was it beneficial? 
" Did it achieve its objectives? 
Other 
" Is your company part of the LBO pilot of the new faster approach to 
enquiries for 2002/03? 
" What do you feel are the consequences of the IR implementing / delivering 
a customer service approach? 
Close 
Are there any questions I haven't asked you that you think I should have 
asked you? 
(Are there any other people you think I should I be talking to here that I 
haven't seen, or haven't arranged to see)? 
Do you have any questions for me? 
Thank you.... 
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